Page 2 of 2 SPEAKING
FREELY 'Action for action' on defusing N
Korea's nukes By Kim Myong Chol
should be discussion on how to define the
targets of the second phase, the obligations for
each party, and also the sequence of the
actions.''
On arriving in the Chinese
capital, he proceeded directly to the US Embassy
to meet with his American counterpart Christopher
Hill in a renewed bid to remind the Americans in
advance of the reciprocal actions they were
obliged to adopt to correspond to
those North Korea takes to
declare all of its nuclear programs and disable
all of its nuclear facilities within the shortest
possible period.
The following day, the
chief North Korean nuclear negotiator was quoted
by The Financial Times as stating at the first-day
gathering of chief nuclear negotiators: "We are
ready to declare all our nuclear programs and
disable the existing nuclear facilities at a
proper time. But for us to do so, other countries
should fulfill their obligations."
The
same day, the New York Times quoted South Korean
nuclear envoy Chun Yon-wu as saying, "It is not a
matter of whether this is technologically possible
... but a matter of how serious other nations are
in taking corresponding measures."
Alan
Romberg, senior associate and director of the East
Asia Program at the Henry L Stimson Center, is
among the very few American experts who took
notice of the obligations for the US to fulfill in
the second stage of the February agreement. In an
interview with the Council on Foreign Relations on
July 18, he observed with respect to North Korea's
offer to declare all of its nuclear programs and
disable its nuclear facilities:
In the February agreement, the
United States pledged to begin to take steps to
remove North Korea from the list of
state-sponsored terrorism. The United States
said it would advance the process of removing
the restrictions on North Korea under the [World
War I-era] Trading with the Enemy Act. My guess
is that in return for permanent disablement of
nuclear materials and weapons, the North
[Koreans] will want North Korea removed from the
terrorism list, [and] they will want the Trading
with the Enemy Act restrictions taken away. They
may well want something more forthcoming than
they've gotten so far on a future light-water
reactor, and they may want to get something on
future access by North Korea to the
international financial system.
However, the Americans failed to
appreciate the obvious North Korean commitment to
the principle of "action for action" and insisted
on Pyongyang completing Phase 2 preferably by the
end of the year in exchange for further oil. As
the US negotiator gave an account of North Korea's
position to the July 20 Washington Post, "the
North Koreans insisted on tighter coordination for
what they would get in return for such steps,
including 950,000 tonnes more fuel oil and
progress toward better diplomatic relations".
This set the stage for North Korea's flat
refusal to move beyond the closure of the nuclear
facilities. As the Russian news service Interfax
reported last Friday, a positive aspect about the
July 18-20 gathering of chief nuclear negotiators
is reaffirmation of the principle of "action for
action" and the inauguration of working committees
of specialists such as those discussing a peace
regime in Korea and normalized relations with
Pyongyang. The chief US negotiator is left looking
foolish, with his credibility lost again, as
illustrated by his awkward handling of the BDA
saga.
Before leaving Beijing last Saturday
for Pyongyang, chief North Korean negotiator Kim
Kye-gwan warmed up his country's demand for a
light-water reactor if it is to dismantle its
existing nuclear facilities.
"It is
obvious what we're supposed to do. But the other
nations seem to be not so well prepared. What is
basically important in the solution of the nuclear
issue is not whether we will receive the supply of
heavy fuel oil, but whether the US will change its
policy," he said. "We're not a parasite living on
heavy oil. What is basically important in the
solution of the nuclear issue is not whether we
will receive the supply of heavy fuel oil, but
whether the US will change its policy.
The
dean of Georgetown University's Walsh School of
Foreign Service, Robert Gallucci, a former US
negotiator who struck up the 1994 Geneva Agreed
Framework, offered a piece of advice: "In dealing
with the North Koreans, we must study well in
advance, otherwise we will end up playing into
their hands."
Kim Myong Chol is
author of a number of books and papers in Korean,
Japanese and English on North Korea. He is
executive director of the Center for
Korean-American Peace. He has a PhD from the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Academy of
Social Sciences and is often called an
"unofficial" spokesman of Kim Jong-il and North
Korea.
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