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2 'Taliban' want a say in Korean
talks By Michael J Green
There is much speculation about what
President Roh Moo-hyun will do when he meets North
Korean leader Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang August
28-30. The opposition Grand National Party (GNP)
worries that Roh will pledge billions of dollars
in aid to secure a dramatic visit by Kim to South
Korea's Cheju Island on the eve of the South
Korean presidential election.
The South
Korean minister of unification has said that
North-South economic cooperation will be on the
agenda, but no
promises have been made
comparable to the shameless $450 million bribe
that former president Kim Dae-jung arranged to
secure his June, 2000, summit with Kim Jong-il.
The US government, which was notified but not
consulted about the summit, has expressed its
expectation that the meeting in Pyongyang will
advance the denuclearization goals of the
six-party talks.
With preparations for the
summit shrouded in secrecy and managed by South
Korea's intelligence chief, few officials in Seoul
or Washington had an opportunity to plan for
outcomes. Now that the trip is public, different
groups will jostle for position to determine what
is given and what is received. Depending on who
wins - and on Roh's attitude - it is possible to
construct three scenarios for the summit. One is
good. One is bad. And one is ugly.
The
good The good scenario will depend on the
national-security experts in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Trade and the South's National
Security Council keeping Roh focused on the
national interest and not just the polls. It will
also require Roh to think about his place in
history over the course of decades and not just
over the next six months.
In the recent
past I have heard Roh dismiss rumors about a
North-South summit and declare his lack of
enthusiasm for a trip north, stressing that
denuclearization must proceed and noting that Kim
Jong-il had pledged to first make a trip south to
reciprocate the June, 2000, summit in Pyongyang.
Granted, these statements were made to
high-ranking US officials, but Roh seemed to lack
the dangerous messianic desperation about
North-South relations that characterized Kim's
attitude before June 2000.
Assuming that
Roh and his team stay strategic, a good scenario
is possible. Roh would travel to Pyongyang on
August 28 with a clear message for Kim: further
expansion of North-South economic cooperation in
stages is possible, but only if Kim pledges to
complete phase two of the February 13 six-party
agreement by the end of the year.
This is
what the US and South delegations tried to achieve
in the last round of the six-party talks. It would
mean disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facility
to the satisfaction of the International Atomic
Energy Agency and the other five parties and a
credible declaration by Pyongyang of its existing
inventory of nuclear, weapons, components and
facilities.
In the good scenario, Roh
would seek Kim's support for working on the peace
mechanism contained in the February 13 agreement,
but would recommend restarting the confidence
building measures contained in the unimplemented
North-South Basic Agreement of 1992 as a first
step toward a North-South peace treaty.
He
would also tell Kim that progress on human rights
is important, and seek ways for an early
accounting of the hundreds of abducted South
Korean citizens missing in the North, in addition
to urging Kim to make progress with Japan on its
missing abductees. Roh could note the aspirations
of all Korean people for reconciliation and
reunification, but he would avoid any euphoria or
celebration. Most important, he would tell the
South Korean people honestly whether Kim Jong-il
agreed to his proposals for concrete steps to
improve North-South relations.
In the good
scenario, Roh might advance the cause of
denuclearization, human rights and real
reconciliation and he certainly would do no harm
if he failed.
The bad The bad
scenario will happen if the summit is driven by
domestic political considerations over national
security. The politicos around Roh realize that a
celebration of North-South reconciliation in
Pyongyang will polarize the South Korean public.
However, since Roh currently has only about 20%
support in most polls and polarization of South
Korean society would rally 50% to his side,
politicos may calculate that those would be good
numbers going into the December election. A
celebration in Pyongyang would also overshadow the
GNP's August 18 presidential primary and keep the
conservative candidate off message in his or her
first week.
A symbolic summit would not
require any actual breakthroughs, since the left
will look at the whole event as a glass half full
even if it is empty. Roh has already won points
with optimists by convincing Pyongyang to refer to
him in official North broadcasts as the "President
of the ROK [Republic of Korea]".
He can
score more points in Pyongyang by convincing Kim
Jong-il to publicly confirm what Kim Dae-jung was
only able to report unilaterally after his 2000
visit: that the North is ready to proceed with the
three-stage confederation process. Since Pyongyang
can continue what it is doing anyway, the price
would only be ideological.
Roh might also
declare with Kim that the Korean War is officially
"over", which would be hugely symbolic, but have
no legal bearing until the armistice is replaced
with a formal mechanism to maintain the peace. To
ameliorate the center and the other parties in the
six-party talks, Roh could point to statements he
extracts
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