WASHINGTON - The language of the US National Security Council's top expert on
Asia was convoluted but pointed. "The key question about the inter-Korean
summit," said Dennis Wilder, the NSC's senior director for Asian affairs, "is
how it can be used to advance the denuclearization process in North Korea."
With those carefully chosen words, Wilder left no doubt of US concerns about
what North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and South
Korean President Roh Moo-hyun are likely to discuss - and how their
get-together in Pyongyang is going to advance US aims.
"It's going to be very important," Wilder reminded journalists as President
George W Bush was about to take off for next week's gathering in Sydney of
leaders of the Pacific Rim powers at APEC, the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation grouping, "to hear from President Roh exactly what he hopes to
accomplish in that summit, and how it will advance the six-party process".
Bush expects to get an earful when he and Roh meet "on the sidelines" on
Friday, the last day of the APEC gathering. If Bush does not read Roh the riot
act on what he thinks of a North-South Korean summit, he will at least let him
know he does not want it to devolve into a lovefest that undermines the
six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear-weapons program.
Already, Wilder noted, "We have a lot of moving pieces on North Korea, we have
a lot of working groups operating." He didn't quite say so, but the message was
clear. One thing the US does not need at this stage is another "working group"
- that is, a group of two, Kim and Roh, working above and beyond the dealings
of the diplomats at the six-nation talks on North Korea's nuclear-weapons
program.
The bottom line: the United States is anxious to know - preferably well in
advance - what South Korea is willing to give or expects to get in return.
Somehow Wilder sounded very much like a super-salesman - or maybe a corporate
executive defending his corner of the market - as he talked of "a lot of
attempts to incentivize the North Koreans to move forward". His remarks, at the
end of a lengthy briefing on Bush's whole APEC adventure, got tougher as he
built on the theme.
"We have a plan that calls for performance, and a performances-based approach
to providing North Korea with aid," said Wilder, alluding to the huge windfall
that will come North Korea's way if only Kim Jong-il finally gives up his
nukes.
"What we want to ensure," he went on, "is that whatever is decided at the
inter-Korean summit is part of that mosaic, builds on what has been done, and
provides positive incentives to the North Koreans to continue down the road
that all people in East Asia want them to continue on, and that is the
denuclearization of the [Korean] Peninsula."
Whether Bush can convince Roh of the need to tailor of the inter-Korean summit
to US aims for the six-party talks, however, is extremely problematical.
South Korea is working up a long list of "incentives" of its own - an
outpouring of aid to overcome the devastation of recent floods, vast new
investment in economic and tourism programs, deals on aid and trade, increased
inter-Korean family visits and cultural exchanges beyond those initiated when
Roh's predecessor, Kim Dae-jung, flew to Pyongyang in June 2000 for the only
previous North-South summit.
All the hoopla over the summit arouses fears - differing, to be sure - in both
Washington and Seoul.
The fear in Washington is that Roh will give away so much that Kim will see no
need to begin to live up to promises in the six-nation nuclear agreement of
February to reveal details on his nuclear program, much less junk it entirely
as promised. The fear in Seoul is that Roh will come back to Seoul with nothing
much in return beyond generalities.
Pessimists firmly predict no agreement on returning more than 400 South Koreans
held in the North, including fishermen and Korean War prisoners, no deal for
regular family visits beyond the brief, highly publicized encounters set up
after the June 2000 summit, no understanding on pulling back forces from the
line between the two Koreas - and certainly no firm commitment on a deadline
for doing away with all those nukes.
For Roh, in the view of South Korean conservatives, the dividend will be a
spectacular burst of publicity needed to ensure the victory in December's
presidential election of a successor dedicated to perpetuating his policies.
Lee Myung-bak, the candidate of the conservative Grand National Party, way
ahead in the polls, is calling for "give and take" in all dealings with North
Korea - something that many people in the South feel has been missing in the
process.
Roh and his allies and advisers, of course, see the summit - quite aside from
its positive impact on whomever they get to run against Lee - as another
dramatic move to open up the North, pursue a wide range of contacts, and
finally bring about lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. On the way, they
believe, the North will grant some concessions that Kim Jong-il would not
consider if they were presented as sine qua non points in negotiations.
In fact, they say, in that case there would be no North-South talks at all.
Such opposing views put the US in a tenuous position. The State Department,
eager to get along with whoever's in charge in South Korea, has applauded the
summit. Only on background - or in adroitly staged briefings - do officials
betray Washington's fear that the summit will detract from six-party talks.
The US, however, is playing some cards that will certainly influence whatever
Bush tells Roh - and, as with Roh's summit with Kim Jong-il, also go well
beyond the scope of the six-party talks.
The chief US negotiator, Christopher Hill, is engaged in what are called
"working-level" talks in Geneva this weekend with North Koreans, including
presumably his counterpart, Kim Kye-gwan, whom he has come to know well.
He's putting on the table some topics that would have been absolutely beyond
the realm of discussion by the US just a year ago. Among the bait he's holding
out are diplomatic relations between Pyongyang and Washington, negotiations for
a "peace treaty" in place of the armistice that ended the Korean War and
removal of North Korea from the State Department's list of "terrorist" nations.
These lures, though, come with complications and reservations. For one thing,
Hill says the US must first get Japan on board before North Korea loses its
long standing as a "terrorist" state.
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, having taken over the government on a
rightist wave of indignation over the abduction of Japanese citizens from Japan
to North Korea a number of years ago, may be extremely reluctant to assent.
Then again, however, Japan too has agreed to separate talks with North Korea
next month - surely a sign of a thaw if not a serious shift in the rhetoric.
Hill also has said, in a mood of optimism that's hard to accept, that he's
hoping for another full-fledged round of six-party talks next month - before
the North-South summit - at which North Korea not only reveals all the details
of its nuclear program but agrees to finish the ordeal of doing away with the
whole thing by the end of the year.
Hill's "working-level" talking in Geneva should set the stage for the Bush-Roh
meeting. For that matter, Bush will also meet on the APEC sidelines with
Chinese President Hu Jintao as well as Abe. By the time they're all finished
talking, the Roh-Kim summit may seem anticlimactic as, to judge by Wilder's
remarks, the US sincerely hopes.
Journalist Donald Kirk has been covering Korea - and the confrontation of
forces in Northeast Asia - for more than 30 years.
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