Koreas summit leaves
unanswered questions By
Jing-dong Yuan
MONTEREY, California - The
summit of the two Koreas held on October 2-4, only
the second of its kind in more than 50 years since
the 1953 Korean War ceasefire, took another small
- albeit important-step in the long and at times
unpredictable road toward peninsular peace and
reconciliation.
South Korean President Roh
Moo-hyun came to the summit with low expectations
and went away with a lot of symbolism and a
high
price tag.
Kim Jong-il, the hermit leader
of the North, has given no commitment that he will
return the visit to the South, a promise he gave
Roh's predecessor, Kim Dae-jung, but never
fulfilled. With a little more than two months left
on the job, Roh was content with the lift he got
from the visit.
The joint agreement signed
at the end of Roh's visit declared that "the South
and the North have agreed not to antagonize each
other, to reduce military tension and to resolve
disputes through dialogue and negotiation."
The conciliatory tone is commendable but
one is reminded of similar documents issued by the
two sides in the past, including the 1991
North-South Joint Agreement on Reconciliation,
Nonaggression, and Cooperation and Exchange, the
1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula, and the 2000 North-South
Joint Declaration, only to be left unimplemented,
not to mention violated, as the case of North
Korea's nuclear weapons program clearly shows.
The economic aspect of the summit is the
most noticeable - and expensive: Seoul is to
provide economic aid that runs into the billions.
The packages will include development assistance
and funding of major projects, with no strings
attached. It was wise for Roh not to be tempted to
link economic aid to political issues such as
human rights and the South Korean abductee issue,
among others.
The two sides also agreed to
have frequent meetings between "their highest
authorities", enhance military confidence
building, and facilitate reconciliation by
expanding "reunion of separated family members and
their relatives".
But it is far less
understandable that the summit made passing
reference to the nuclear issue, without an
explicit linkage between the South's largesse and
the North's commitment to progress on
de-nuclearization. This is all the more puzzling
as the Six-Party Talks in Beijing was inking a
joint statement exactly to that effect. What may
be troubling for those who have never been
enthusiastic about the multilateral process and
are always suspicious of Pyongyang's real
intentions is that Seoul's handout could undermine
the very structure of phased shutdown and
dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapon
making facilities.
A somewhat puzzling
reference in the joint declaration calls for
having the "leaders of the three to four parties
directly concerned" negotiate an end to the
current armistice regime and build a permanent
peace regime on the peninsula. What is not clear
is who will be present at the negotiation table.
If it is three, who will be excluded?
This
raises the question of what impact a separate
peace between the North and South will have on
China's role in peninsular affairs. Would
reconciliation and peace reduce that role? Would
US influence increase as a result?
The
implications for China as it continues to perform
a delicate and at times difficult balancing act
must be seen in the broader contexts of Beijing's
multiple interests and policy objectives: a
de-nuclearized Korean Peninsula, in particular in
that it averts a possible nuclear domino effect in
Northeast Asia; stable China-North Korea
relations, not from an ideological perspective but
more from that of securing a strategic buffer; the
growing ties between Beijing and Seoul and China's
views of the longer term prospects of a unified
Korea and the consequences for China's security;
and the complexity of Sino-US relations with both
regional and global implications.
Since
the establishment of diplomatic relations between
Beijing and Seoul in 1992, China has adopted and
maintained a balanced two-Korea policy under the
new political and security environment. While
rhetorical support of eventual peninsular
unification remains the official policy, Beijing
nevertheless regards the current division as a
preferable and realistic situation. For China,
hasty unification can only be achieved with the
sudden (and engineered) collapse of the Kim
Jong-il regime, which would be highly
destabilizing and have uncertain consequences,
especially regarding the future of the US-South
Korea alliance.
This balanced "two-Korea"
policy allows Beijing to strengthen ties with
Seoul in all aspects of the bilateral relationship
but continue to maintain a stable relationship
with the North. China's own admission of its
limited ability in mediating between the two
Koreas and influencing developments on the
peninsula notwithstanding, it nevertheless has
responded to requests from both sides as long as
Chinese interventions are conducive to and do not
undermine peninsular peace and stability.
China's "two country-Korea" policy is
sustainable as long as the North is not pushed
toward further isolation and paranoia.
Beijing hence encourages both inter-Korean
rapprochement and Pyongyang's efforts to break its
self-imposed seclusion to win international
sympathy, economic assistance and understanding.
China hailed the historical North-South
Summit of July 2000, considering it a significant
step toward peninsular stability and inter-Korea
reconciliation. Chinese analysts attributed the
historical summit to President Kim Dae-jung's
unswerving pursuit of the "Sunshine Policy" that
reduced hostility and tension.
Finally,
maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula
serves China's fundamental security interests.
This has several elements. First, however
abhorrent it may consider the Kim Jong-il regime,
Beijing never loses sight of the bigger, strategic
picture: it is critical that North Korea as a
viable state, a buffer, be sustained. A North
Korea that either implodes or embroils itself in a
military confrontation with the US would seriously
threaten Chinese interests and should be avoided.
China therefore would not support, and
would even oppose if need be, any measures that
threaten the very survival of North Korea. In this
regard, greater economic interactions between the
North and the South are compatible with Beijing's
peninsular interests.
Taken in this
context, the North-South summit in no way
undermines China's fundamental interests. Beijing
will watch the developments carefully and
unequivocally let it be known that it remains a
key player in regional peace and stability. In
that sense, China's role in achieving permanent
peace on the peninsula can only grow as its power
and confidence expand.
Dr Jing-dong
Yuan is Director of East Asia Nonproliferation
Program at the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, and an Associate
Professor of International Policy Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies.)
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