Page 3 of
3 Working through Korean unification
blues By Andrei Lankov
North Koreans, further increasing
their alienation and disappointment.
Under
protection of the confederation regime, a land
property system could be redesigned, or rather
created from scratch. The recognition of the 1946
land reform and its results is a necessary first
step. To placate former owners, some partial
compensation might be paid, even though the
present author is not certain whether
grandchildren of former landlords, usually rich and
successful men and women, are
really in dire need of such compensation.
As the next step, the cooperative property
should be distributed among its members,
preferably among the people who are really present
in their villages (perhaps, a free rent system
might be the first step). At any rate, by the end
of the confederation period, land and real estate
in North Korean should be safely privatized, with
North Korean residents (and, perhaps, recent
defectors) being major or even sole participants
in this process.
One of the more
controversial parts of the package might be a
general amnesty for all crimes committed under the
Kim family regime. This is especially necessary
because the fear of persecution seems to be one of
the reasons which keeps the North Korean elite,
including its lower ranks, united around the
inefficient and brutal regime. They believe that
collapse of the Kims' rule will mean not only the
bend of their privileges (which actually are quite
small - only a handful of top officials enjoy a
really opulent lifestyle in North Korea), but they
are more afraid of judicial persecution and even
mob violence.
It is not incidental that
North Korean officials and guides in Pyongyang ask
one foreign visitor after another about the fate
of former East German bureaucrats. Indeed, despite
considerable liberalization in recent years, the
regime remains exceptionally brutal, and its
officials have no illusions about this.
Unfortunately, this fear of persecution has kept
the murderous regime going for the past decade or
so and led to many more deaths.
One might
argue that such unconditional amnesties to all
Koreans is probably "unethical". Perhaps, but
let's face it: the sheer scale of the crimes
committed makes any serious and fair investigation
impossible. About half million people have been in
prison during those decades, and many more exiled,
and nobody will be capable of investigating all
these cases carefully and impartially. A great
number of people have been directly or indirectly
involved with the human-rights abuses, and again,
it is impossible to investigate a few hundred
thousand former officials who by the nature of
their job might have been responsible for some
criminal actions. Hence, only partial, selective
symbolical (and therefore largely politically
motivated) justice can be served at best.
A general amnesty would solve two
problems: first, it will make former North Korean
bureaucrats less willing to resist changes;
second, it would diminish the scale of intrigue
and manipulations, since people would not be
fighting to avoid the fate of arbitrarily chosen
scapegoats. It should become part of the law, and
to be taken seriously the amnesty should be made
as straightforward and unequivocal as possible.
Of course, amnesty does not mean complete
forgiveness. There might be restrictions for
former party and secret police officials to occupy
certain positions in a post-Kim Korea (a policy
pioneered by Eastern Europe). It might be a good
idea to create non-judiciary commissions to
investigate former abuses, like it was done in
post-apartheid South Africa. This commission might
lead to truly awful discoveries, but the promise
of amnesty should be kept even if it will become
clear that North Korean prison camps were not much
different from Adolf Hitler's Auschwitz or Pol
Pot's Tuol Sleng in Cambodia.
The
confederation treaty also should include some
legal measures which will make certain that North
Koreans will not remain the source of "cheap
labor", to be used (and abused) by South Korean
businesses.
For example, the military of
the two Koreas should be integrated first, and
there should be large quotas reserved for former
North Korean servicemen in the united army.
Politically, the North Korean military might
become a hotspot of social discontent: the 1.2
million-strong North Korean armed forces probably
lack the skills necessary for modern warfare, but
this force consists of professionals who have not
known anything except the barracks life and
intense nationalist indoctrination. If former
military officers are given commissions in the
post-unification forces, their skills and zeal
will find a good and useful outlet. Otherwise, the
very same people are likely to join the ranks of
organized crime.
It is also important to
provide large admission quotas for North Korean
youngsters at major South Korean universities.
Korean society is both hierarchical and
meritocratic, and being a graduate of a major
Seoul school is a necessary condition of entry for
nearly all important jobs. It is not incidental
that the entire life of a middle-class South
Korean family is often designed to facilitate exam
preparations for the children.
Unfortunately, for decades to come even
the most gifted North Koreans will be unable to
compete on equal terms with much better prepared
South Korean students, and this means that they
can realistically hope to get only to lower-level
universities, usually in the North. Both actual
and perceived quality of education in those
schools will remain relatively low for decades,
and this will ensure that North Koreans, even with
"new" college-level education, will be permanently
relegated to subaltern positions. Hence,
affirmative actions are necessary, even if such
measures are certain to provoke an hysterical
outcry from Seoul and Busan parents.
The
confederation regime will help to solve another
important problem - that of the North Korean
middle class. As East Europe demonstrated, a
majority of active supporters of democracy and
reform has come from local-educated urban groups,
a close analogue of the Western "middle class".
The same is likely to happen in Korea.
However, the same people will become very
vulnerable after unification. Who will hire an
engineer who has not seen a computer? What can be
taught by a social science teacher who spent his
or her college years memorizing Kim Il-sung's
genealogical tree and the "Dear Leader's" asinine
pronouncement on everything, from rice planting to
nuclear physics? Who will visit a former North
Korean doctor whose medicine is essentially on the
1950s level?
During the confederation
regime, special efforts could be made to
re-educate those people, at least partially,
preparing them for a new environment while still
allowing them to continue their professional work
in the North. Most of them will be unable to
adjust, unfortunately, but at least the 10 or 15
years leniency will give a chance to the lucky and
determined few, and will also provide others with
time to find other ways to make a living.
The confederation model does have serious
shortcomings. For example, there are good reasons
to believe that the new North Korean political
elite will consist largely of Kim-era officials
(or their children) who will retain their old
habits, including that of corruption and
inefficiency. A Northern democratic government
would be prone to populist decisions, based on
pressure from below, and North Koreans are likely
to have particularly naive views on how their
society and economy can and should operate, so
some mistakes introduced via popular vote might
become ruinous and costly.
But no ideal
solution is possible. One should not harbor too
many illusions. The recovery of North Korea will
be prolonged and painful. Even if unification
happens tomorrow, the difference between the two
Koreas will remain palpable until 2050, if not
longer. Tensions, misunderstanding and even
outright hostility between northerners and
southerners are bound to continue for a long time.
There are no easy and simple solutions.
But the current state of affairs cannot continue
indefinitely, and it is time to think how
unavoidable problems can be mollified. The current
policy of Seoul administrations merely helps to
postpone the problems created by Korea's division,
and the disastrous choices made by the North half
of the country. But sooner or later, Korea and the
entire world will have to face these problems -
and solve them.
Dr Andrei Lankov
is an associate professor in Kookmin University,
Seoul, and adjunct research fellow at the Research
School of Pacifica and Asian Studies, Australian
National University. He graduated from Leningrad
State University with a PhD in Far Eastern history
and China, with emphasis on Korea. He has
published books and articles on Korea and North
Asia.
(Copyright 2007 Asia Times
Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us
about sales, syndication and republishing.)
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
