Lee begins his North Korean
gambit By Leonid Petrov
Just days after his inauguration as the
president of the Republic of Korea, Lee Myung-bak
faces an important decision. The so-called
"pragmatic" approach to North Korea, which was
formulated and promulgated during his election
campaign, is now going to be implemented.
Even before Lee moved into the
presidential Blue House in Seoul, many people
associated his ascendance to power with the
potential deterioration of inter-Korean relations.
If not a complete freeze, a serious cooling may be
awaiting the fragile North-South Korean
cooperation. Some political groups found his
conservative stance and rhetoric disturbing, while
others welcomed the fresh approach.
The
war of words on what policy toward North Korea is
most
effective has been going on between
the two camps: the supporters of unconditional
engagement and the pragmatic conservatives. It is
likely that debate will continue because a
solution for the issues regarding the North is
still nowhere in sight. Lee Myung-bak's
criticism of the Sunshine policy of his
predecessors is concentrated on the "unilateral
appeasement" which the two previous governments
allegedly pursued in their relations with
Pyongyang. Initiated by Kim Dae-jung in 1998 and
continued by Roh Mu-hyun until last month, this
policy has been based on the principle of almost
unlimited help to North Korea. Also dubbed an "ATM
policy" (where the North would turn to the South
only when it needed some cash) it cost a fortune
to South Korean taxpayers and attracted a negative
attitude from the Seoul's' strategic partners,
chiefly the United States and Japan.
Paradoxically, even North Korea was suspicious of
this policy and repeatedly denounced it as a
subversive trick aimed at implanting capitalism
and destroying socialism in the North.
One
can endlessly list the shortcomings of the
Sunshine policy, but compared with its extreme
alternatives - open confrontation and war - it
seemed to be working and even achieved plausible
results. When it was first formulated 10 years
ago, hardly anybody expected that North Korea
would survive this long. Nor did many people
expect that the zones of inter-Korean cooperation
would start clustering along the Demilitarized
Zone (DMZ) with passenger cars, buses and trains
crossing it on a daily basis. The growing air and
maritime traffic between South and North Korea is
another achievement of the Sunshine policy.
What can be done better to achieve more?
Lee is set to push for his own "Vision 3000"
policy toward the North. It is designed to provide
conditional economic assistance to the North over
the next decade with the purpose of helping to
boost its per capita national income to US$3,000
(currently it is estimated as $1,800).
Assuming that the country's economy starts
growing at 10%, it can achieve $3,000 per capita
income in less then 10 years. In the meantime,
South Korea could provide the North with a
comprehensive package in five major sectors -
industry, education, finance, infrastructure and
welfare. For example, in the case of industry, the
South can cultivate 100 North Korean companies
that could export goods worth more than $3
billion. In education, the South can assist the
North by training 300,000 industrial workers and
investing about $40 billion through international
development funds.
No doubt, Lee's Vision
3000, if implemented, would turn North Korea's
economy into an export-driven one. However, the
conditionality of this plan is built on the
premise that the joint statement adopted at the
fourth round of the six-party talks on September
19, 2005, in Beijing must be completely
implemented before any developmental and financial
aid is offered to North Korea.
This is
called a "complete and flexible approach" and is
supposed to serve as incentive in inducing the
North to scrap its nuclear programs. In other
words, the issue of denuclearization turns into
the primary policy goal, which is set to dominate
other policies and regulate the speed and nature
of inter-Korean cooperation, including South
Korean investments in North Korea's existing and
future special economic zones.
The new
presidential administration in Seoul plans to
divide all inter-Korean cooperation projects into
three categories according to their importance and
cost. For instance, it is promised that
humanitarian aid (in the form of rice, fertilizer,
medical equipment, forestation and environmental
support) will be continued. Second category
projects, which include commercially viable
ventures directly benefiting the South (such as
development of natural resources, cooperation in
transport and communication) will be saved but
regulated by the new Inter-Korean Cooperation
Fund. Suspended will be projects requiring
significant financial investment, among them
reconstruction of the dilapidated North Korean
infrastructure and the creation of a special
"peace and cooperation zone" in the West (Yellow)
Sea.
Almost everything that Kim Jong-il
and Roh Moo-hyun agreed on at the October 2007
inter-Korean summit falls into this "third
category". The key development plan aimed at the
construction of an economic center in and around
Haeju, the North Korean port city about 75
kilometers west of Gaesong. Experts believe that
modernization of Haeju and the creation of the
West Sea Economic Center would be the
second-largest project after the Gaesong
Industrial Complex.
It is conceivable that
a proper feasibility study did not precede the
signing of this multi-billion dollar agreement.
Honoring or postponing this deal is now in the
hands of Lee's administration. A delay or
cancellation will certainly prompt protests from
Pyongyang, which is probably expecting the
earliest implementation of the 2007 summit, and
will leave a deep scar of mistrust on inter-Korean
relations.
Among other things likely to
seriously aggravate relations with the North is
the plan to reconsider an earlier agreement with
Washington that Seoul would resume wartime
operational control of its own military by 2012.
Despite the agreement reached by the previous
government, Lee has hinted at the possibility
that, should North Koreans further delay the
complete and verifiable dismantlement of their
nuclear weapons program, South Korean military
forces might remain under US war-time command even
after this date.
Lee's complaints that
South Korea-US ties had been neglected for the
sake of North-South Korean relations have a
certain legitimacy. However, his assumptions that
strengthening ties between South Korea and the
United States would help make North-South Korean
relations better and that if South Korea-US
relations improved, then North-US relations would
also get better cannot but raise doubts. Experts
in Korea and overseas see the main weakness of
Lee's North Korea policy in that he does not
specify South Korea's role in the denuclearization
process other than strengthening its cooperation
with the United States.
The new South
Korean president plans to make human rights a top
priority in the government's policy on North
Korea. The North is customarily criticized for
serious violations of human rights and its refusal
to cooperate with the United Nations human rights
commissioner or special investigators. Lee has
promised that he will not shy away from telling
North Korean leaders the truth about their
society's "shortcomings" and emphasized that
"constructive criticism, if pointed out with
affection, would go a long way toward improving
North Korean society". Certainly, this decision is
morally right and honorable, but its effectiveness
is highly dubious, given the long-standing record
of the North being immune to international
criticism.
Based on the above, the
revamped Unification Ministry under Lee is likely
to play a new role, at odds with its purpose as
formulated by the previous two governments - "to
promote co-prosperity and peaceful coexistence
through the expansion of reconciliation and
cooperation between South and North Korea".
On the contrary, by pursuing the
denuclearization and democratization of North
Korea, Seoul will risk further alienating the
North and, by so doing, will risk making its
economic recovery and political opening even more
problematic. Sadly, in the case of a "hard
landing" (North Korea's collapse and ensuing
domestic conflict and chaos) South Korea will
suffer more than any other neighbor.
It is
a mistake to believe that the North can be
persuaded to denuclearize and disarm by a mere
promise of economic assistance afterwards. For
North Korea the existing nuclear program is not
only the means for military deterrence but also
the way of economic survival (cheap energy,
smaller army and less conventional weapons). Also,
South Korean "conditional economic aid" can be
easily replaced by unconditional economic aid from
China or Russia with, probably, better chances of
face-saving for Pyongyang.
It is pointless
to criticize the North for domestic inadequacies
and human rights abrogation unless that country is
given a proper security assurance by the United
States, its main and long-time adversary. Until
then the North leadership will continue to feel
insecure and maintain the wartime-like regime
inside the country where popular mobilization
against "state enemies" is the order of the day.
Any strengthening of South Korea-US security
relations (such as the present joint military
drill) will be interpreted by Pyongyang as
preparations for an invasion.
What the
North Korean leadership wants least is foreign
intervention into its domestic affairs,
specifically in the areas of ideology and human
rights. It is equally futile to demand from North
Koreans any degree of "openness" or to offer them
"full-fledged economic exchanges". The North's
economy is centrally planned and not transitional;
only some of its segments are regulated by the
market. Quick depressurization of the
old-fashioned economic and political system will
lead to terrific shock with catastrophic
consequences for the people and the leadership.
Kim Jong-il and his close advisors are well aware
of the Russian and Romanian experiences, and
abstain from experimenting with reforms.
If something is a valid incentive to North
Korea for good behavior that might lead to
solution of the nuclear issue, it is a complete,
verifiable and irreversible security assurance
given to Pyongyang by the US against any military
action. Broader diplomatic recognition and the
rapid removal of the North from the list of
terrorism-supporting states are also urgent.
Enhanced cooperation between North Korea
and its closest neighbors (South Korea, China and
Russia) in the production and distribution of
energy, the coordinated development and usage of
transport networks, and the joint exploration of
natural resources would also be desirable. Without
comprehensive engagement and cooperation, Seoul
has little or no leverage on the North. That makes
any incentives or penalties meaningless.
Right now, while agonizing over the
appointment of a new Unification minister, Lee and
his associates should resolutely decide on what
they want to achieve - short and long term.
Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are
vitally important for peace and security.
Nevertheless, excessive emphasis on
denuclearization in the context of inter-Korean
dialogue may well lead to disengagement and
resumed confrontation. Working toward a
nuclear-free regime on the Korean Peninsula, the
new government in Seoul should not discard the
decade of engagement efforts.
It is also
expected that the "pragmatism" of the new
administration in Seoul will not be limited to
simply copying the well-known neo-conservative
model, where the search for weapons of mass
destruction routinely prevails over common sense.
Crusades to protect the democratic values from the
"dark forces of evil" often bring about new
hostility and escalation of tension.
During the past decade, the dynamics of
inter-Korean cooperation have made unprecedented
progress. It would be unforgivable to slow down
this process only because someone may find a
peaceful compromise excessively expensive. Let us
not forget that this matter is about the future of
the Korean people, and attempts to economize on
the future of the people sooner or later leads to
political bankruptcy.
Leonid A Petrov,
PhD, is a research associate, Division of Pacific
and Asian History, Research School of Pacific and
Asian Studies, Australian National University.
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