North Korea
stoic in the face of famine
By Andrei Lankov
SEOUL - Recent news from North Korea reminds many observers of 1996, when the
country was on the eve of a disastrous famine. Throughout the past two months,
food prices have exploded, and in mid-April the cost of rice reached the
unthinkable height of 2,500 North Korean won (US$1) per kilo. The normal spring
price, fairly stable for the past five years, is about 900 won.
Food distribution was partially stopped lately, even in the capital Pyongyang.
In some provincial cities rationing coupons haven't been accepted in exchange
for food since last year. There are reports of farmers eating grass and tree
bark, and many accounts of an increasing exodus of refugees.
Among the North Korean population there is widespread talk
about a "second Arduous March" (the "Arouse March" being a somewhat pompous
official name for the "Great Famine" which killed between 500,000 and 1 million
people between 1996-1999). International experts seem to agree. Tony Banbury,
the World Food Program (WFP) regional director for Asia, said in mid-April:
"The food security situation in the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of
Korea] is clearly bad and getting worse. It is increasingly likely that
external assistance will be urgently required to avert a serious tragedy."
This change of mood is dramatic. Merely a year ago, North Korean leaders were
optimistic. The good harvest of 2005 persuaded them that food shortages were
behind them, and that North Korean agriculture had begun to recover. The 2005
harvest was merely 4.6 million tons, well below the 5.2 million tons which are
necessary to keep the entire population alive. Still, it was clearly an
improvement.
In addition, for a decade South Korean administrations have maintained their
Sunshine policy of unilateral concessions and unconditional food aid. Since
2000, about 450,000 tonnes of food have bee delivered to North Korean granaries
from the South every year, free of charge. Its distribution was almost
unmonitored. Pyongyang leaders came to believe that such aid would continue for
the foreseeable future. Additionally, increasing Chinese involvement with North
Korea, while not necessarily welcomed by Pyongyang, was seen as a sign that
additional food would be coming - and Chinese shipments were roughly equal to
those of South Korea. Finally, the basic agreement with the US on the nuclear
issue was perceived in Pyongyang as a sign of Washington's willingness to pay
generously for rather minor concessions.
Encouraged by this new situation, for three years North Korean authorities have
been trying to turn back the clock and revive the old Stalinist social
structure that was seriously damaged by the economic disaster of the late
1990s. Although there are reasons to doubt whether this goal is indeed
reachable, they tried hard.
In 2005, authorities claimed that the public distribution system would be
completely revived, and banned private trade in grain. This ban was generally
ignored and eventually failed, but subsequent moves were more successful. In
late 2006, authorities banned male vendors from the country's marketplaces. In
2007, women under 50 years old were also prohibited from engaging in business
in markets. The assumption is that every able-bodied North Korean should go
where he or she belongs, specifically to the state-run factories of the
Stalinist economy.
The government also staged some campaigns against semi-legal private businesses
that had been tacitly tolerated since the late 1990s. After 2005, authorities
successfully cracked down on the trafficking, smuggling and illegal labor
migration occurring on the border with China. There was also a remarkable
increase in the volume of anti-market rhetoric in the official Pyongyang
propaganda.
But, things turned sour and last year saw plenty of bad luck for the North
Korean leadership.
First of all, the 2007 harvest was a failure. It was estimated at only 3.8
million tons, well short of the critical 5.2 million ton benchmark. As usual,
floods were officially blamed (as if the impoverished North does not share the
same small peninsula with the prosperous South, where no signs of food shortage
have been seen in decades). The actual reasons were different: authorities
chose not to launch agricultural reforms and North Korean farmers worked in
conditions reminiscent of the infamous kolkhoz of Joseph Stalin's Soviet
Union. Predictably, productivity remains abysmally low. The 2005 harvest seems
to be a rare exception, as there has been no noticeable upward trend in North
Korean agriculture.
The presidential elections of December 2007 led to a change of leadership in
Seoul. The new government, led by right-of-the-center pragmatist Lee Myong-bak,
said that the era of unconditional concessions to the North was over. Some
people suspected these statements were merely a campaign trick. They were
wrong, but it seems that this was the opinion of North Korean leaders as well.
Pyongyang media remained silent about the regime in Seoul for nearly three
months - obviously on the assumption that Seoul would resume the old line.
This, however, did not happen.
The new South Korean government has not refused to provide food aid to the
North. In fact, Lee has said many times that such aid would be delivered once
the North lodges an official request. Other projects, including the large
Kaesong Industrial Park, where North Korean workers are employed by South
Korean companies, continue with their usual business. The real change is the
refusal of the new government to further increase the scale of unilateral aid.
But for Pyongyang, this was bad enough and North Korean leaders eventually
decided to make their point. From about a month ago, the Pyongyang media went
ballistic at the "reactionary war-mongering clique of Lee Myong-bak" and
special indoctrination sessions were convened for common citizens to explain
the hellish nature of the new Seoul leadership.
The situation was aggravated by the explosive rise of international food
prices. The North Korean press has reported the trend widely obviously in an
attempt to,place the blame for the current crisis on factors clearly beyond the
government's control. On April 20, Nodong Sinmun, the major official daily
newspaper, ran an article that described food supply difficulties worldwide and
mentioned a dramatic increase on food custom duties in "certain countries".
The worldwide price hike means that the amount of food coming to North Korea
via foreign aid channels is likely to decrease. China, preoccupied with the
Summer Olympic Games in August, and increasingly annoyed by North Korean
antics, is not too willing to help the North out of its trouble which, as some
people in Beijing believe, were brought on Pyongyang by its own stubborn
resistance to the Chinese reform model.
Meanwhile, relations with the US remain uncertain. The 2006 nuclear test led to
what North Korean interpreted as a surrender of Washington. Now, however, it
seems neither side will be able to reach a mutually acceptable compromise. The
matter has been worsened by the ongoing scandal surrounding North Korea's
alleged involvement with a nuclear program in Syria and there is little
immediate chance of improved relations with Washington.
North Korean leaders have obviously decided that now is the time to take a
tough stance towards the South Korean administration as well. Pyongyang
believes that a request for aid will be understood in the South as a sign of
weakness; a confirmation of Pyongyang's willingness to comply with Seoul's
conditions. This is not acceptable and North Korean diplomats understand that
such conditions will decrease their ability to divert aid money to maintain the
regime's stability and elite privilege.
The anticipated appeal for food aid from the South has yet to materialize - and
now it may be too late. North Korea is showing that the country doesn't need
this food that much, after all. The price for this decision is likely to lead
to harsh conditions, starvation and deaths in the distant northeastern parts of
the country, but the survival of the common folks has never been high in Kim
Jong-il's list of strategic priorities.
Pyongyang also did not apply for free fertilizer, even though North Korean
agriculture is heavily dependent on the product it cannot produce itself. In
recent times only regular shipments of South Korean fertilizer, to the tune of
300,000 tons a year, saved the situation. Now it isn't coming and this means
the 2008 harvest will be probably even worse than the current one. The threat
of famine is becoming real again.
It is remarkable that late March was marked by a series of provocative moves.
North Korean fighter jets made provocative sorties near the South Korean
border, missiles were fired in the sea, and the remarks of a South Korean
general were presented as a sign of considering a "pre-emptive strike" against
North Korean nuclear facilities. Pyongyang strategists perhaps hoped to scare
South Korean voters before the parliamentary elections.
The strategy failed as evidenced by elections in which the "anti-Pyongyang"
parties scored another major success. However, the crab-catching season is
coming, and there is a chance that in May new North Korean provocations may
occur in the Yellow Sea. This time, they'll perhaps hope to scare away foreign
investors whose presence is important as the new South Korean government hopes
to achieve high-speed economic growth.
In North Korea, the domestic food situation is deteriorating fast. The sudden
hike in food prices seems to be a sign of deepening crisis. There were reports
about farmers who refuse to toil the state-owned fields, stating that they are
too weak to work (but still willing to work on their private plots). There are
rumors of villagers starving to death even though observers believe the food
shortage has not yet developed into a famine. If the shortage of fertilizer
damages this year's harvest, a famine may develop by the end of this year.
The political consequences are unclear. Knowledge about the situation inside
North Korea remains grossly inadequate. If the past is an indication, however,
nothing of great political significance will happen if a few thousand fresh
graves appear in the hills of North Hamgyong province. In all probability, Kim
Jong-il's government will use its time-tested tactics: the political elite and
the best units of the army will receive full rations; the residents of major
cities, police and common soldiers will get barely enough to survive; and the
"politically unreliable", largely villagers from the remote northwest, will be
left to their sorry fate.
There is hope the government will momentarily halt its counter-offensive
against free market economics, and will ease its border controls to allow more
people to China - but even such moderate measures are unlikely. Isolated
revolts are possible, but the government seems to be supremely confident. After
all, the disorganized, isolated population, deprived of any opportunities to
organize or even communicate between themselves, is not capable of challenging
the system.
Dr Andrei Lankov, associate professor,
Kookmin University, Seoul, Korea.
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