A secret US handshake with Pyongyang
By Ralph A Cossa
United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice recently announced that North
Korea will soon release its much-anticipated (and long overdue) "complete and
correct declaration" of all its nuclear activities. In return, the George W
Bush administration will remove Pyongyang from the State Sponsors of Terrorism
list and Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) restrictions; actions that could be
reversed if the North's list proves to be inadequate or if cooperation on
verification is "insufficient".
Some have argued that it would make more sense to wait until the list is
delivered and verified before restrictions are lifted, and they are probably
right. Unfortunately, that was not what Washington promised. If we have learned
nothing else about North Korea, we
should know one thing by now: while Pyongyang might not be too good at living
up to its own promises, it will not budge an inch if it perceives that others
are not living up to theirs.
As a result, it is useful to review what has actually been promised, first
during the landmark September 2005 six-party talks joint statement and later
during two "breakthrough" declarations that took place in February and October
of 2007.
Under the 2005 joint statement, all sides agreed to the "verifiable
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner", with Pyongyang
specifically committed to "abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear
programs".
Denuclearization was to be accomplished in a phased manner in line with the
principle of "commitment for commitment, action for action". The six parties
(China, Japan, North and South Korea, Russia and the US) also agreed to discuss
the subject of the provision of light-water reactors (LWRs) to North Korea "at
an appropriate time".
For a variety of reasons, including a dispute over frozen North Korean funds in
a Macau bank - the result of earlier US Treasury action aimed at halting
suspected money-laundering activities - the process became stalled until
February 13, 2007, when a new agreement outlined a 60-day "phase one" action
plan that (eventually) resulted in the shutting down of the North's Yongbyon
nuclear facility.
In return, North Korea received an initial shipment of 50,000 tons of heavy
fuel oil (HFO) as the first installment on a total emergency energy assistance
package representing the equivalent of 1 million tons of HFO. Washington also
promised to "begin the process" of removing Pyongyang from the state-sponsor of
terrorism list and TWEA restrictions.
Of interest, when North Koreans speak about the February agreement, they claim
that it included the release of their funds, even though there was no reference
to frozen bank accounts in the agreement - the release was apparently promised
at a side meeting between chief US negotiator Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asia Christopher Hill and his North Korean counterpart, Vice Foreign
Minister Kim Kye-gwan, in Berlin in January 2007.
At any rate, the 60-day phase ended up taking about four months to complete, as
the North waited until the funds were securely in its pocket before proceeding.
This apparent Hill-Kim secret handshake also created anxiety among the Japanese
and other six-party members, who now openly wonder what else may have been
promised.
The year's second "breakthrough" agreement, the October 3, 2007 "Second-Phase
Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement" was likewise preceded by
another bilateral Hill-Kim session, in Geneva in early September.
North Korea again agreed, during phase two, "to disable all existing nuclear
facilities" with disablement of the three main facilities at Yongbyon - the
5-megawatt experimental reactor, the reprocessing plant and the nuclear fuel
rod fabrication facility - to be completed by December 31, 2007. Pyongyang also
"agreed to provide a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear
programs" by year's end and "reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear
materials, technology, or know-how".
In return, Pyongyang would receive the already promised "economic, energy and
humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of 1 million tons of HFO" and the
US promised to "fulfill its [TWEA/terrorist list] commitments to the DPRK
[Democratic People's Republic of Korea - North Korea] in parallel with the
DPRK's actions".
Since then, Pyongyang has made it clear that it expected (and perhaps was
promised in Geneva) that the US delisting actions would take place simultaneous
with the release of its nuclear declaration, hence Rice's decision to begin the
delisting process with the handing over of the nuclear declaration by Pyongyang
to China (the six-party talks host) and before the verification process can
proceed. The declaration will presumably be made public at the next six-party
talks session (rumored for the end of June), but this has not been specified.
Intertwined in all the above is the North Korea-Japan normalization process,
which both are committed to making "sincere efforts" to address. A dispute over
"full accounting" regarding Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea in the
1970s and 1980s has resulted in a bilateral stalemate.
Pyongyang acknowledged the kidnappings in 2002 but then claimed the issue was
"settled" (with the return of five abductees and the announcement that eight
others had died). Tokyo disagrees: it refutes both the accounting of how the
eight died and believes there are more abductees still not acknowledged or
accounted for. More importantly for Washington, Tokyo believes it has a
commitment from Bush that the US will not remove North Korea from the terrorist
sponsors list until there has been "progress" in resolving this dispute.
Suspicions in Japan about Washington's perceived over-eagerness to accommodate
Pyongyang continue to make this a sensitive alliance issue.
As a result, the agreement in early June 2008 by Pyongyang to "reinvestigate
the abduction issue" is seen as a major step forward (and a diplomatic victory
of sorts for Hill), even if it comes with no promise of actually providing more
information, much less more abductees.
The mere fact that Pyongyang has reopened discussions constitutes some form of
"progress", thus allowing Japan to begrudgingly endorse the removal of
Pyongyang from the state sponsors list, provided there really is a "complete
and correct declaration".
Note that the February and October agreements both specify that the million
tons equivalent of aid is in compensation for the disablement of all
nuclear-related facilities and material, including those yet to be identified
but which are expected to be included in the anticipated declaration.
This would include the facility where North Korea's bomb or bombs are actually
produced (specialists say this did not take place at Yongbyon) plus the nuclear
test site, etc. It should also include "disablement" of Pyongyang's plutonium
assets, presumably including any plutonium residing in actual weapons, although
it is unclear if this interpretation is shared by Pyongyang (or even by
Washington).
Nonetheless, Pyongyang now claims (thus far without contradiction from
Washington) that the energy aid is related only to the disabling of Yongbyon,
asserting: "While the [Yongbyon] disabling has been completed for more than
80%, overall energy cooperation business is going very slowly - at 30% to 36%."
It would seem that Pyongyang has "renegotiated" the February and October
agreements and now expects the full million ton equivalent of oil and
assistance for the disablement of Yongbyon and nothing more.
Disablement of other nuclear facilities (presuming they are listed on the
"complete and correct" declaration) will apparently now fall into phase three -
the dismantlement and abandonment phase. During US congressional testimony in
February, Hill admitted that "we don't know what kind of money will be needed
for phase three", but it will no doubt be considerable.
Also missing of late has been any reference to the North's suspected uranium
enrichment program or to the centrifuges purchased from the network of
Pakistan's former nuclear head, Abdul Qadeer Khan, presumably for this purpose.
While there were no specific references in the agreements, Washington had
previously insisted that the North had agreed in Geneva to "address US
concerns" related to uranium enrichment.
Don't expect to see an accounting of proliferation activities (to Syria or
elsewhere) in the North's declaration. While the North has promised "not to
transfer nuclear materials, technology or know-how", the agreements do not
require them to fess up for past sins. Technically speaking, Washington's
proliferation concerns could be addressed in a bilateral side agreement or
through the earlier unilateral (uncontested) US declaration. Whether this would
suffice politically in Washington (especially during a presidential campaign)
is, of course, another matter.
Another lingering concern is the absence of any reference in any of the
agreements to Pyongyang's current inventory of nuclear weapons. No one
currently knows how many exist and where they might be. Of course,
"denuclearization" means giving up weapons as well as programs and facilities,
but we should not be surprised if Pyongyang chooses to make a distinction
between the two and tries to hold on to any actual weapons until all other
milestones, including normalization of relations with the US and Japan and the
provision of LWRs, have been realized. Is a "phase four" also in the cards?
Ralph Cossa (pacforum@hawaii.rr.com) is president of the Pacific
Forum CSIS in Honolulu.
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