US urged to overhaul nuclear arsenal By David Isenberg
WASHINGTON - It may seem plausible that with American troops busily engaged in
fighting insurgents on the ground in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, that
Washington's policies on nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence would take a
lower priority. That would be an incorrect assumption.
The handling of US nuclear weapons and policy were recently center-stage due to
two different events. First was the release on October 24 of a report billed as
a nuclear weapons roadmap for the future by the US Air Force. Titled
"Reinvigorating the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise", it called for the
establishment of a global strike command and a headquarters for air force staff
to handle nuclear assets.
This in itself is not a bad thing, and it is worth remembering what
led to it. The secretary of the air force created the air force nuclear task
force to develop a strategic roadmap after air force officials discovering
three serious security miscues. First, in August 2007, a B-52 Stratofortress
bomber mistakenly flew six warheads from Minot air force base, in North Dakota,
to Barksdale air force base in Louisiana. Second, during the same incident
there was an unauthorized transfer of nuclear cruise missiles munitions from
Minot to Barksdale. Additionally, an inadvertent shipment of sensitive nuclear
missile components, labeled as helicopter batteries, was shipped to Taiwan in
2006.
Even before the B-52 security misadventures at Minot had so badly eroded US
nuclear security, things had already digressed to such a level that instead of
using orange cones and multiple placards to distinguish racks of non-nuclear
missiles from nuclear-tipped ones, the 5th Bomb Wing was using 8-by-10-inch
sheets of paper placed on the pylons.
To improve current operations and properly train personnel, air force officials
will undertake a series of action plans to address the root causes of the
recent problems. The action plans implement approximately 100 recommendations,
including:
Increase institutional focus and oversight by establishing an air force global
strike command, led by a lieutenant general, and a strategic deterrence and
nuclear integration staff office.
Consolidate sustainment functions under air force materiel command's air force
nuclear weapons center.
Implement a centralized nuclear surety inspection process.
Implement a global deterrent force approach for bomber operations that balances
current global commitments with dedicated periods for personnel to focus on
nuclear operations training and proficiency.
Consolidate planning, programming, budgeting and execution of nuclear
enterprise elements.
Create strategic investment plans that address long-term nuclear requirements,
including those for cruise missiles, bombers, dual-capable aircraft and
intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Establish positive inventory control measures for nuclear weapons-related
material.
It is intriguing to read the "roadmap" to see what officials believe is the
reason for lax security over US nuclear weapons. In what could be described as
Strangeglovian reasoning, many blame the Cold War, or to be more precise, the
Cold War's end. The executive summary reads:
The primary cause of the
systemic breakdowns in the Air Force's nuclear enterprise was the failure of
leadership at many levels to provide proper emphasis on the nuclear mission.
The loss of focus stemmed from changes in the operating environment at the end
of the Cold War, exacerbated by the profound changes in the security
environment following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In 1992, the Air Force
implemented the largest organizational change since its inception leading to
the organizational and supervisory fragmentation of the nuclear enterprise.
This was reinforced by the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure decisions that
dispersed depot support for nuclear systems and components. As a result, the
Air Force's nuclear sustainment system became fragmented, the pool of nuclear
experienced Airmen atrophied, and nuclear expertise eroded as less time was
allocated to maintain nuclear operational proficiency. The Air Force failed to
properly resource many nuclear mission areas effectively relegating the Air
Force's nuclear enterprise to a "care-taker" status with limited modernization
or recapitalization.
Still, if the end of the Cold War was bad,
the concept of nuclear deterrence is still good. The roadmap finds that,
"Credible nuclear deterrence is essential to our security and that of our
allies and friends". In fact, it claims that "Many allied and friendly
countries continue to depend on the security umbrella provided by the nuclear
deterrence capability of the United States. In the absence of this 'security
umbrella', some non-nuclear allies might perceive a need to develop and deploy
their own nuclear capability."
The other noteworthy recent event concerning US nuclear weapons and policy was
an October 28 speech by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace in which he said it was important to
modernize the nation's nuclear arsenal as a hedge against "rising and resurgent
powers" like Russia or China, as well as "rogue nations" like Iran or North
Korea and international terrorists.
Gates argued for modernizing the nation's nuclear arsenal because "as long as
other states have or seek nuclear weapons - and potentially can threaten us,
our allies and friends - then we must have a deterrent capacity".
His speech was taken as the latest signal that the George W Bush administration
was moving in its closing months to embrace more far-reaching notions of
deterrence and self-defense.
Prior to this, the last public indication that the administration was expanding
the traditional view of nuclear deterrence came in October 2006, following a
test detonation of a nuclear device by North Korea. In a statement, Bush said
North Korea would be held "fully accountable" for the transfer of nuclear
weapons or materials to any nation or terrorist organization.
The president was not as explicit as Gates in saying that the administration
would extend the threat of reprisals for the transfer of nuclear weapons or
materials to all countries, not just North Korea. Gates also expanded the
threat to nations or groups that provide a broader range of support to
terrorists.
Gates also said that unless the United States modernizes its inventory of
nuclear weapons and develops a replacement warhead, the atomic arsenal's
long-term safety and reliability will deteriorate.
However, Gates did break with the Bush administration by saying the United
States "probably should" ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, an
international agreement prohibiting new testing of nuclear weapons. The treaty
was signed by the Clinton administration in 1996, but is opposed by Bush and
has not been ratified by the Senate.
David Isenberg is an analyst in national and international security
affairs, sento@earthlink.net. He is also a member of the Coalition for a
Realistic Foreign Policy, an adjunct scholar with the Cato Institute,
contributor to the Straus Military Reform Project, a research fellow at the
Independent Institute, and a US Navy veteran. The views expressed are his own.
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