SEOUL - Just a few months ago, when it came to discussing North Korea's
immediate future, newspaper headlines were sounding alarms such as "North Korea
food crisis worst in a decade" and "North Korea may be hit by a new famine".
These worries seemed well-founded and the journalists who penned them were
often among the most knowledgeable on North Korean issues. Furthermore, most of
these stories were based on reports produced by reputable international
organizations. By early September, North Korean watchers agreed almost
unanimously that a great disaster was set to strike North Korea this coming
winter.
Now it has become clear, however, that these were false alarms. The predicted
famine has not materialized and does not appear
likely to do so in the near future. North Korea has had its best harvest in
years, and until next summer no North Korean is likely to starve to death -
although some may remain severely malnourished.
This is good news. However, the contrast between the reality and recent
predictions is remarkably stark. In recent years, we have come to believe that
there are at least a few things about secretive North Korea which are known for
sure. Yet the recent turnaround of events has again shed light on the severe
limits of outside information about the Hermit Kingdom.
The history of North Korea-watching is hardly filled with brilliant
predictions. This is unsurprising as North Korean leaders go to exceptional
lengths to make their society as non-transparent as possible.
British statesman Winston Churchill once famously described dictator Joseph
Stalin's Soviet Union as "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma".
North Korea originally modeled itself after Stalin's empire, but in the early
1960s its leaders decided that Stalin's policy was too permissive and created
what has become the most secretive regime in the world. The past 15 years or so
have seen considerable relaxation in the system, but North Korean leaders are
still foremost in their ability to hide even the most trivial data about their
country.
Statistics tell the tale
To feed its population of roughly 23.5 million, North Korea requires some 5
million tons of grain and potatoes. Since the early 1990s, the domestic harvest
has fluctuated between 3.5 and 4.7 million tons and generated a significant gap
between domestic production and actual needs.
When North Korea became a recipient of foreign food aid in the late 1990s, the
shortage was covered by international donations. Initially, the United States
played a major role, but around the year 2000 the South Korean government
replaced Washington as the top aid provider, shipping some 400,000 tons
annually. In recent years, China has also become a major food donor.
North Korea also needs fertilizer. Until the current crisis began to unroll in
the early 1990s, it had one of the most fertilizer-intensive agriculture
sectors in the world. In recent years, South Korean has shipped 350,000 tons of
fertilizer each year. It is believed that these shipments increase the average
annual harvest by roughly a million tons.
The December 2007 presidential elections in South Korea put an end to a decade
of left-leaning administrations in Seoul. The new right-wing government, more
critical towards North Korea, decided to decrease the amount of aid provided to
its northern neighbor. The North reacted to the reduction in the most
aggressive manner, closing down certain bilateral projects and dramatically
curbing others. Meanwhile, Pyongyang showered the South with broadsides of
rhetorical abuse.
In the end, Pyongyang chose not apply for food and fertilizer aid, even though
Seoul had repeatedly said such aid would be delivered on request. As a result,
no fertilizer or grain from the South arrived this year.
Around May, grim predictions of a looming disaster began to appear. In May, the
United Nations World Food Program (WFP) stated that the food shortage was
similar to the late 1990s when North Korea was amid the most disastrous famine
in the country's history.
The Good Friends, a South Korean non-governmental organization, confirmed this
estimate. Good Friends has a large clandestine network of correspondents in the
borderland areas inside North Korea and its reports have been proven to be
reliable.
Sensing an urgent situation, Good Friends launched a campaign to increase food
aid to the North. In subsequent months, the WFP and Good Friends were among the
most active proponents of the looming famine theory. As recently as late
October, the WFP repeated its predictions, stating that "2.7 million people on
the west coast of the country face serious food shortages due to the continuing
effects from devastating floods in 2007".
Good Friends and the WFP were not alone in spreading gloomy expectations. In
late spring and early summer, official delegations from a number of countries,
including the US, were allowed to tour the North Korean countryside. Their
estimates differed, but most agreed that the prospects for the next harvest
were grim. The absence of fertilizer looked like a decisive factor and it was
widely assumed that the harvest would fail.
Yet not everyone supported the famine theory. From mid-summer, the South Korean
government began to question statements about a pending food crisis in the
North. Seoul maintained that available intelligence seemed to indicate that the
2008 harvest would be satisfactory. Still, many believed that the South was
downplaying the urgency of affairs to justify its stringent position on
concessions. As a result, South Korea's stance was ignored, and throughout last
summer and early autumn worldwide media continued to report on an impending
famine.
Unlikely donors, unanswered questions
It was against this backdrop that the US decided to deliver food aid totaling
some 500,000 tons - a large part of which has already been shipped. An unknown
amount of food aid from China has arrived as well.
These developments altered the famine scenario drastically. Throughout October
and November new data emerged from the North that debunked the alarmist
reports. Estimates of the 2008 harvest vary, but most observers agree that its
yield is well above average. (The South Korean Ministry of Agriculture
estimates that the North harvested between 4.3 million tons, and the most
recent Chinese appraisal puts the yield at roughly 4.7 million tons.)
In the end, North Korea has had perhaps its best domestic agricultural output
in a decade or more. The harvest still fell short of the more than 5 million
tons required, but with the addition of American and Chinese aid, North Koreans
may fare unusually well this winter.
The predicted humanitarian disaster has been averted, but the entire affair
leaves a number of difficult and unresolved questions.
For example, why did reputable international organizations make such a serious
mistake in estimating the North's food shortage? It cannot be ruled out that
international observers were deliberately misled by their North Korean minders.
Perhaps foreign observers were shown the worst fields because the North wanted
more food aid then would otherwise be available?
It also seems that some basic assumptions about North Korean agriculture are
wrong. Unless the 2008 harvest was the result of incredible luck, it seems to
indicate that fertilizer is far less important than previously believed. It is
possible that North Korean farmers have devised strategies to deal with
fertilizer shortages.
The false alarms of a disastrous famine in North Korea are a sober reminder
that when dealing with the world's most secretive society, predictions should
be treated with the greatest caution.
Andrei Lankov is an associate professor at Kookmin University in Seoul,
and adjunct research fellow at the Research School of Pacifica and Asian
Studies, Australian National University. He graduated from Leningrad State
University with a PhD in Far Eastern history and China, with emphasis on Korea.
He has published books and articles on Korea and North Asia.
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