SEOUL - The North Korean demand on the face of it was unimaginable. The United
Nations Security Council had to issue "an immediate apology", said the
spokesman, or risk such "measures as nuclear tests and test-firings of
inter-continental ballistic missiles".
This raises the issue of what type of apology, given its value and
significance, would the North Koreans accept? Would it be placated by a "very
sorry" but "we had to do it" from the UN Security Council president, a rotating
position now held by the ambassador from Mexico?
What about, "It was (or is) with great regret" - etc?
Or would they go for the basic, "I'm sorry, I'm sorry," from each of the 15
ambassadors on the Security Council - or maybe from just
the five permanent members from the United States, China, Russia, the United
Kingdom and France?
In a culture in which the depth and gradation of the bow are scrutinized for
signs of sincere versus hypocritical sorrow, the "apology" desired by the North
Koreans carries significance. Think of all the hot-headed disputes that end in
violence when both sides stand their ground - or in smiling farewells after one
or the other says they are very sorry.
And remember all those apologies rejected as "meaningless" unless accompanied
by a formal note. "I need a written apology", is the outcry of many an
aggrieved party after a shouted exchange of insults and accusations.
So what would it take for the UN Security Council to decide that an "apology" -
a written statement of retraction of its condemnation of North Korea's
test-firing on April 5 of a long-range missile - would not be a bad idea after
all? Might the Security Council, in the face of more North Korean threats,
decide the condemnation was a little harsh, pull back and say maybe we made a
mistake?
And would North Korea in return rescind everything it's doing to alarm the
world with another underground nuclear test? Could that portion of the world
that exists within range of North Korea's fearsome missiles then be confident
that North Korean technicians were not fashioning warheads small enough to
affix to their tips and fire across thousands of miles of water?
In the great bargaining game for that elusive permanent relaxation of tensions
on the Korean Peninsula, for total freedom from the fear of North Korea's
nuclear arsenal, for the certainty that a second Korean War will never happen,
all the rhetoric suggests the standoff will get a lot worse before it gets
better. It's still hard to believe that North Korean rhetoric, or even missile
and nuclear testing, would do more than provoke the usual tremors of alarm in
TV bulletins, newspaper headlines and emergency meetings of ministers and
diplomats - but the signs worsen by the day.
Three factors lie at the heart of the problem, as separate but related elements
in a great drama with possibly more far-reaching repercussions than the
conflicts and wars currently making all the headlines from Gaza and the West
Bank through Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan to the Swat Valley and Pakistan.
Not necessarily in order of importance, these range from the struggle for
succession in North Korea, questions about US Korean policy in Washington, to
the conservative outlook of South Korea's government. None of these necessarily
is evolving in ways likely to relieve tensions.
If Kim Jong-il were to leave the scene in the near future, it's far from
certain if whoever holds power after his departure would really change policy
for the better. He's got his brother-in-law, Jang Song-taek, lined up to take
over as regent while grooming his youngest son, Kim Jong-un, still in his 20s.
But the Hermit Kingdom's military leaders will be vying for control behind the
cover of the elite of close relatives now at the apex of the structure.
The certainty of military assumption of power, regardless of the titles the
generals are given, rests in the military-first policy that Kim Jong-il, as
chairman of the National Defense Commission, has been promoting ever since he
inherited overall national leadership after the death of his long-reigning
father, Kim Il-sung, in July 1994.
True, Jang was elevated to membership of the commission several days after the
latest missile test when the Supreme People's Assembly ritualistically elected
Kim Jong-il to another term as defense commission chairman. He will, however,
will have to contend with a military leadership whose command of the country's
1.1 million troops gives them an automatic power base.
Kim Jong-un, moreover, may be a weak leader - even if his father has adjudged
him better qualified than his two older brothers. Educated in Switzerland, he
has never had to endure the hardships of the military people around him.
Moreover, like his ailing father, he's reportedly somewhat overweight and may
be suffering from diabetes - a condition that does not augur well for his
long-term future as the first third-generation leader of any socialist country.
The struggle for right of succession in North Korea presumably has much to do
with the North's increasingly hardline policy. No one in the North Korean power
structure is going to win points, or improve his own standing, by advocating
reconciliation.
North Korea, having spent a few hundred million dollars to demonstrate the
long-range capability of the Taepodong-2 missile, is spending hundred of
millions more on public works projects in the run-up to the 100th anniversary
in 2012 of the birth of Kim Il-sung. More missile and nuclear tests would
appear to be appropriate birthday presents, regardless of the dietary and
medical needs of the country's long-suffering people.
In the rivalry to show who's toughest, North Korean strategists would like to
view South Korea as an irritant easily intimidated by threats and warnings.
They say they are now investigating the case of the Hyundai engineer who was
arrested at the Kaesong Industrial Complex a month ago for insulting North
Korea, and they are warning South Korea to stop making a fuss about their right
to see him and talk about his case.
They also are warning South Korean leaders to stop investigating activists
groups that advocate reconciliation with the North.
These warnings, like the threat of another nuclear test, may not be mere
rhetoric. It's quite possible North Korea will follow them up in the next month
or two with armed confrontation, possibly in the West or Yellow Sea, as has
happened in bloody shootouts in June 1999 and June 2002. Or North Korea could
go one better than that and stage an incident along the demilitarized zone
between the two Koreas.
The ultimate challenge, though, is against the United States. Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton is proving somewhat tougher than anticipated. When she
was here in February, she provoked a flutter among analysts by suggesting the
need to consider what would be happening in North Korea when Kim Jong-il is no
longer around.
Most recently, she's said North Korea can forget about economic aid unless it
returns to the six-party talks that it said it would "never" attend again.
Right now, she said, it "seems implausible if not impossible" that they will do
that - or "begin to disable their nuclear capacity".
That's big talk, reminiscent of some of the language from the White House of
president George W Bush during his first term as Bill Clinton's successor. The
big talk is somewhat surprising since Clinton's secretary of state, Madeleine
Albright, was a staunch advocate of reconciliation, as seen in her visit to
Pyongyang in October 2000 when she schmoozed with Kim Jong-il three months
before the end of Clinton's term.
At the crux of North Korean strategy is the fight again to bring about a change
in US policy, as happened during Bush's second term when he accepted
concessions recommended by secretary of state Condoleezza Rice, on the advice
of envoy Christopher Hill, in six-party talks.
As the threat level increases, the North Koreans, Kim Jong-il, prodded by the
generals, are betting the US will finally assent to two-way talks in which the
North will press for all the billions promised in the 1994 Geneva agreement and
then the six-party deals of 2007. Demands for a UN Security Council "apology"
provide background noise in a rising chorus of rhetoric that may end in the din
of explosions.
Journalist Donald Kirk has been covering Korea - and the confrontation of
forces in Northeast Asia - for more than 30 years.
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