Page 1 of 2 North Korea enjoys the attention
By Georgy Toloraya
In my trip to Pyongyang in late April 2009, I got the impression - through both
official and unofficial contacts - that North Korean decision-makers were in
their hearts quite satisfied with the controversy about their country in the
wake of the April "satellite launch".
North Korea had once again become the focus of world politics. They seemed to
have grown tired of the multilateral diplomatic process and frustrated with its
"uselessness", feeling that such a process would hardly help them attain their
final goal of regime survival. They said repeatedly that Pyongyang had come to
the conclusion that only the deterrent of weapons of mass destruction could
guarantee their safety.
The North Koreans didn't spare any harsh words for South Korean
"traitors", and stressed the fact that Seoul is just 50 kilometers from the
Demilitarized Zone in order to underline the advantageous position the North
enjoys in military terms.
My interlocutors criticized one Russian researcher who had stated that North
Korea was weak and would certainly be defeated in a conflict. They argued that
an all-out war would destroy both Koreas and much of the adjacent territories,
so there would be no winners. In any limited local conflict near the border,
meanwhile, they asserted that North Korea would certainly be victorious.
North Korea has threatened to conduct another nuclear test and continue
improving its missile capabilities. In the coming months, this threatened
nuclear test is almost certain to become a major global challenge. The leading
players in the Korean game will have to determine their positions and suggest
strategies to avoid such an unwelcome development.
It's a challenging task. The current situation in and around Korea is
reminiscent of the early 1990s, when the peninsula was on the brink of military
conflict. At that time the cause was the international community's pressure on
Pyongyang to contain its attempts to acquire nuclear weapons.
This time the tension is more the result of intentional actions taken by North
Korea in accordance with its own strategic rationale. North Korean behavior is
the consequence of dissatisfaction with the policies and the actions (or lack
of them) of its adversaries. It cannot be explained simply in terms of the
"unpredictability" of the Pyongyang regime or its attempts at "blackmail". What
might be the motives of North Korean authorities and how should the concerned
parties act in light of these new developments?
Deteriorating situation
Just two years ago, the improvement in the Korean situation seemed, if not
irreversible, at least long-term. The progress of the six-party talks and
deepening North-South cooperation were grounds for guarded optimism. The
modalities of a "package deal" - eventual denuclearization in exchange for
security guarantees and economic aid - had become the underlying presupposition
of the agreements reached in 2005 and 2007 at the six-party talks.
Of course, serious experts didn't believe there was any short-term prospect of
a complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea, but at least further
nuclear development was arrested, and the long and painful process of working
out a compromise between the United States and North Korea on a modus vivendi
seemed to be underway.
Although much had been done during the final period of the George W Bush
administration to bring about a change in the relationship with North Korea,
the likelihood of a future Democratic party approach under President Barack
Obama seemed to offer an even brighter prospect. The Democratic presidential
candidates demonstrated (in varying degree) a readiness for dialogue with North
Korea. When North and South Korea reached important agreements in October 2007
at the second inter-Korean summit, it appeared the two Koreas were finally
about to significantly reduce hostilities and move toward peaceful coexistence.
However, the negative changes that instead followed were swift and profound.
North Korea reverted again to playing its own game - in the hope of eventually
getting what it wants.
The deterioration started with the advent of a conservative government in
Seoul. Many experts, including myself, underestimated the degree of animosity
and distrust the Grand National Party's "old guard" would provoke in Pyongyang
even before the predictable victory of Lee Myung-bak in the presidential
elections of December 2007.
North Koreans seemed to believe that the "engagement" rhetoric of the South
Korean ruling class had a "false bottom" - that its real desire was to use
engagement to undermine the Pyongyang regime and cause it to collapse. Indeed,
such a view isn't completely at odds with what I have heard from some quarters
in Seoul.
Northerners became worried lest further cooperation with Seoul amount to
letting in a Trojan horse. Prevention of such a development is much more
important to them than the possible economic benefits that some South Koreans
naively believe play a role in the political calculations of the Pyongyang
elite. The elite has what it needs. Improvement of the economic situation for
the general population is not a matter of life and death, but political
stability is.
North Koreans believe that the usefulness of the six-party talks has been
exhausted. Further down the road they would have to discuss - and probably be
pressed for concessions on something really tangible, such as their reprocessed
fissile materials and actual nuclear weapons. That, most likely, formed no part
of their calculations, at least at the early stage of searching for a strategic
compromise with the West.
Understandably, North Koreans became frustrated as their tangible gains from
the multiparty process were marginal. They did not come much closer to getting
substantial security guarantees, and even the largely symbolic "delisting" of
North Korea as a terrorist state caused much controversy in the United States
and elsewhere, and led to demands for new concessions from it in return.
North Koreans saw that as a breach of trust. Modest economic assistance was
indeed promised when the accord was sealed, but only Russia carried out its
obligations (200,000 tons of heavy oil), while other countries either totally
abstained (Japan) or dragged their feet. North Korea felt that its concessions
were not fully recognized and valued. Hawks in Pyongyang might also have
suspected that the West perceives such concessions as a sign of weakness and
testimony to their pressing need to normalize relations. No one was impressed,
at least to the extent that North Koreans had probably expected, with the
actual opening of its nuclear program and even the disabling of some objects,
though such things were unimaginable just a few years ago.
Little in return
North Korea had gone much further than in former president Bill Clinton's time,
but received much less in return. It had gained neither promises of
normalization nor even any glimpse of the hoped-for light water reactors,
though these had been part of the 1994 deal. Small wonder that the voices in
Pyongyang saying that engagement policies were ineffective became louder. The
crucial factor probably was the reported illness of Kim Jong-il, which came as
a shock to the elite. Without Kim Jong-il's guidance, they were too scared to
continue the elaborate "chess game" with the West. "Opening" seemed to present
a real and immediate danger.
To increase the vigilance, and boost the flagging spirits of the population, an
external enemy was needed. So the country followed the familiar pattern of
closing up and tightening the screws, as demanded by the military and
ideologues. At the same time, from a pragmatic point of view, the raising of
tensions attracted world attention - and the attention of the new US
administration above all - and thus served to raise the stakes for future
diplomatic negotiations.
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