SPEAKING FREELY
The last gambling chip
By Anna Konopatskaya
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say.
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North Korea's May 25 nuclear test near Kilju, and the country's subsequent
short-range missile launch, has thrown the region into a heated frenzy. The
blast registered 4.5 on the Richter scale by South Korean measurements and is
now officially confirmed as a nuclear detonation by the Russian Defense
Ministry.
The South Korean military in response put its forces on a heightened alert -
canceling a planned three-day meeting of general-grade officers, calling an
emergency national security council meeting, and organizing a "crisis
management" team of
senior commanders to formulate a response. The Japanese government set up a
"crisis task force".
The United Nations Security Council was do to meet later on Monday to
coordinate its next response - having already censured what North Korea said
was a satellite launch in early April; some international reports and
commentators viewed it as a launch of a ballistic missile.
The question of the moment is how the international community will react North
Korea's actions on Monday; with negative condemning words, or supportive
actions?
Pyongyang's move was not unanticipated. The North Korean government had in late
April stated its intention to carry out both this second nuclear test and the
additional tests of its Taepodong missile (a satellite launch vehicle; not a
ballistic missile). Moreover, Pyongyang, just days before the test, warned
ships and aircraft away from its northeastern coast - the area where its
nuclear and missile facilities are located.
Pyongyang's political calculations can also be speculated on with some degree
of certainty. The country had lost face in 2006, when the legitimacy of its
first nuclear test was called into question. The May 25 test was thus important
for definitively establishing its nuclear capabilities.
Yet what is interesting about the current moment is the changing political
significance of nuclear non-proliferation as advanced by US President Barack
Obama and his defense policy of nuclear disarmament.
In early May, Obama was working to coax Pakistan's President Asif Ali Zardari
and Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai into a more cooperative approach
towards safeguarding against al-Qaeda gaining access to Pakistan's nuclear
arsenal. Obama has also been courting the assistance of Russian President
Dmitry Medvedev to identify steps towards reducing the number of operational
strategic warheads on each side down to 1,500 from the present 2,200 held by
the US and 2,780 held by Russia. (It should be noted that discrepancies between
the US and Russian nuclear parity estimates are one factor complicating the
preparation Obama's new agreements on Strategic Offensive Arms - both START II
and START III.)
In the view of the Obama administration, these steps could be taken first by
the Americans and Russians in regard to their nuclear arsenals, and then be
followed by nations such as China. They hope the United States Senate will
ratify the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; for the 1968 Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty to be strengthened; and the establishment of an
international ban on the production of fissile materials intended for use in
nuclear weapons.
Of course, a clear deterrent to other states following the route of reduction
of nuclear arsenals is the remaining perceived threat that it would
undermine their own security concerns. Countries like North Korea - and China
and Pakistan, as well as would-be nuclear powers such as Iran - therefore need
positive incentives.
North Korea has long leveraged its nuclear program and missile tests in
negotiations with its neighbors and the United States to assure that the
country will not be attacked and its leaders not overthrown by external forces.
By many measures, this strategy has been successful: the international
community has consistently limited its responses to censure and sanctions.
Indeed, if anything can be read into Pyongyang's May 25 tests, it's that
the country's leaders need to establish that they still have chips with which
to bargain.
North Korea abandoned the six-party nuclear disarmament talks in April after
the UN Security Council unanimously condemned the April 5 long-range rocket
launch. The rocket - although carrying only a satellite that would have
transmitted the revolutionary Song of General Kim Il-sung and Song of
General Kim Jong-il, but which according to US and South Korean sources
failed to orbit - was deemed to be a test of weapons technology contravening a
UN ban. It was at this time that Pyongyang announced it would restart its
plutonium-making program.
Such theater is a tried-and-true tactic of the North Korean government. It
realizes a US-led attack is highly unlikely to destroy its existing nuclear
weapons capability, as the US remains unaware of the location of its uranium
enrichment facilities, and the military retaliation the North could wage
against Japan and South Korea would be devastating - even if ultimately futile.
Military attacks might also wreck havoc on US relations with Russia and China,
which still has a security treaty with North Korea.
The North thus relies instead on the belief that belligerent actions might reap
political rewards in the long run. Given that its alternative political
leverage points are very weak, Pyongyang cannot be expected to change its tack
until the international community can present it with better alternatives. This
is a lesson that perhaps only the Chinese have come to fully appreciate.
Of course, as was demonstrated by the failure of Beijing's last attempt to
start non-proliferation talks, the US and its allies are similarly unwilling to
make concessions without North Korea taking the first steps toward disarmament:
so the situation remains gridlocked.
Is it possible to expect any changes if the Obama administration is so bent on
ending the nuclear era? Time will tell. But one shouldn't expect too much from
North Korea; it sees the test is a matter of inspiration: "The successful
nuclear test is greatly inspiring the army and people of the DPRK all out in
the 150-day campaign, intensifying the drive for effecting a new revolutionary
surge to open the gate to a thriving nation," Pyongyang's official Korean
Central News Agency reported early on Monday. "The test will contribute to
defending the sovereignty of the country and the nation and socialism and
ensuring peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and the region around it
with the might of [the military-first policy] Songun."
The trouble is they might be right.
Anna Konopatskya is graduating this June from St. Petersburg State
Polytechnic University with a specialist degree in International Relations. She
can be contacted at knopinette@gmail.com.
(Copyright Anna Konopatskya 2009)
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say.
Please click hereif you are interested in contributing.
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