North Korea's succession gets twisted
By Andrei Lankov
SEOUL - In the past decade or so, the small army of Pyongyang watchers have
been looking for signs of a coming great event, which most expected to happen
at any moment. They waited for Dear Leader Kim Jong-il's decision on the power
succession in the world's only communist monarchy. There were false alarms,
waves of unconfirmed and mutually exclusive rumors, but finally, early this
year, signals emerging from the North seemingly confirmed: the succession was
finally decided.
The first reports were met with some skepticism. However, by April there were
no doubts: Kim Jong-un, Kim's youngest son, began to be frequently mentioned in
the North Korean classified propaganda materials. These publications are
off-limits for common North Koreans, but the message was clear: the virtues of
the "brilliant comrade" Kim Jong-un were extolled in way which would be proper
only for the next leader. So, Kim Jong-il finally
made up his mind about succession - or at least that is what most observers
came to believe.
But in August the situation took an unexpected turn; today, the prospect of a
power transition to Kim Jong-un looks far less certain than a month ago.
These days, while North Korean borders are transparent enough, it takes a few
weeks for the rest of the world to learn what is going on behind the closed
doors of supposedly "classified" indoctrination sessions for junior officials
(the situation at higher levels is far less transparent). But a few days ago,
entrepreneurial journalists smuggled from North Korea classified propaganda
materials which were issued in July for military indoctrinators.
The materials describe the charisma of the "Young General Kim" and call him a
"genius of military affairs". They also explained his strategy was "the
strategy of shock and offense" and told their listeners that the boldness of
the "young general" caught the "enemy" (obviously, the United States) by
surprise.
It is hinted that the missile launch in April and nuclear test in May were
manifestations of the brilliant new strategy, created by Kim Jong-un.
Meanwhile, members of the North Korea's Communist Youth Union were instructed
to sing "Footsteps", a new song that extolled the virtues of an unnamed young
general, whose surname happened to be Kim. North Koreans got the message: the
titles which were used in the song are different from those which are normally
applied to any of two older "General Kims", so the person must have been a new
Kim.
Functionaries of the Communist Youth were also told that the ongoing "150 days
battle" (a Maoist-style shock labor campaign, quite normal for North Korea) is
managed by Kim Jong-un and hence will certainly lead to a major success.
Interestingly, the North Korea material reported that Kim Jong-un was 30 years
old: obviously, any idea of an heir who just turned 26 was seen as offensive in
a Confucian country.
Nonetheless, no references to Kim Jong-un's name, let alone to his promotion,
have appeared in North Korea's general access media. The propaganda campaign
was conducted behind closed doors, and targeted either military personnel
(largely officers) or activists of the Party Youth. The average North Korean
still has no clue about who Kim Jong-un is. If he or she does, it is probably
due to exposure to marketplaces where merchants actively exchange rumors that
have filtered in from overseas.
However, about a month ago the entire campaign was halted abruptly. Sources
inside North Korea report that since early August the name of Kim Jong-un is
not heard any more. Even "Footsteps", his "promotional song", suddenly ceased
to be performed, and people are now advised not to sing it - for the time
being, at least. The "150 day battle" continues, but without references to the
decisive role of Kim Jong-un's managerial genius.
No explanations have been given - this is North Korea, after all. In a
different country such turn of events would produce a tidal wave of rumors, but
North Koreans are well aware that matters of succession (as well as things
related to Dear Leader's family and health) are too dangerous to be discussed
or even mentioned.
A few days ago, North Korea Today, a weekly bulletin of "Good Friends",
reported that local party officials had received a set of the "Central
Committee instructions" dealing with the succession issue. While this report
cannot be confirmed yet, the track records of the "Good Friends" is impressive:
a number of times their news bulletin was first to bring the news of great
significance.
According to the report, the recent instructions - obviously issued in late
August - explain that it is premature to discuss the succession issue. The Dear
Leader, they insist, is in perfect physical shape, and he will be able to
exercise his duties for a long time. Hence, the instructions continue, it is
politically incorrect to attract attention to the succession issue.
It seems clear that Kim Jon-un's promotion has been stopped. It can restart
eventually, to be sure - but for the time being, the decision about successor
has obviously been put on hold. What are the reasons behind this unexpected
turn? Nobody can really answer this question with certainty, but some guesses
are possible.
It has been widely assumed that Kim Jong-il wants to continue his father's
dynastic tradition, so some day he will install one of his children as a next
"Sun of the Nation". However, this assumption is not supported by the evidence.
On the contrary, it seems that due to some reasons Kim Jong-il is not too eager
to appoint an heir.
Had he really wanted to do so, he should have made this appointment about a
decade ago. Kim Jong-il himself became heir-designate in 1972 when his father
turned 60, and in 1980 this appointment was made into a law by the Party
Congress.
Kim Jong-il is not only older than his father was in 1972 - his health is
markedly more fragile, as even official photos testify, and it seems certain
that about a year ago he had an acute medical emergency (perhaps, a stroke).
Nonetheless, no signs of coming appointment have been seen until early this
year.
One can suggest a number of explanations for such reluctance. It is possible,
for example, that Kim Jong-il has deep doubts about the abilities of all
available candidates. One cannot rule out the influence of an ongoing factional
struggle, with rival factions blocking appointments of candidates.
Finally, one cannot rule out that Kim Jong-il does not want to continue with
the tradition of hereditary rule at all. It is not as improbable as it sounds.
He is perfectly aware about the sorry state of his country, and hence might
suspect that sooner a later the system will become unsustainable and implode.
Being a good family man who probably puts his family's interests above that of
his regime, Kim Jong-il might want to ensure that his family will not be in
control of the country at the time of the system's collapse. If his children
and grandchildren meet the inevitable crash as private citizens, they will have
far greater chances to continue with their individual lives and, with some
luck, even keep some part of their ill-gotten wealth.
This is speculation, but it is clear that, for whatever reasons, Kim Jong-il is
reluctant to make decision about succession. Kim Jong-un's appointment was
confirmed in January (or a bit earlier) when Kim Jong-il was seriously ill. One
can surmise that the decision was forced on him by his entourage whose interest
this particular choice obviously serves very well.
The promotion of the youngest and the least-experienced of all candidates
virtually ensures that in case of Kim Jong-il's death, Kim Jong-un will remain
an obedient puppet, easily manipulated by the old guard. However, it seems that
Kim Jong-il, after briefly yielding to the pressure of his officials, changed
his mind as soon as his health improved.
One cannot predict how the "Kim Jong-un affair" will develop. However, the
entire incident should remind us about the need to be careful when it comes to
succession issues.
It is also important to remember that decisions about succession is easily
reversible until the name of the successor makes it to the pages of Nodon
Sinmun, the party mouthpiece, and other official media outlets. It is possible
(and not very difficult) to stop a propaganda campaign which targets only
officials.
It is much more difficult to change the decision once it is made public and
official, after the praises of the heir-designate appear widely in media. In
other words, when it comes to the succession issues, unless it is on the front
page of Nodong Sinmun, it is not that relevant.
Andrei Lankov is an associate professor at Kookmin University in Seoul,
and adjunct research fellow at the Research School of Pacifica and Asian
Studies, Australian National University. He graduated from Leningrad State
University with a PhD in Far Eastern history and China, with emphasis on Korea.
He has published books and articles on Korea and North Asia.
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