SEOUL - The contest was really no contest. When the South Koreans spotted the
North Korean patrol boat in their waters, they rained fire on it as if it were
a target in a shooting gallery.
By South Korea's own acknowledgement, four of its patrol boats fired more than
5,000 rounds into the target: 250 shots from 40-millimeter guns, the rest from
20-millimeter Vulcan models. How many of those were warning shots is not clear,
but certainly no more than the first few.
It seems the presence of a North Korean boat on Tuesday morning about a
kilometer south of the South's "No Limit Line" in the West (Yellow) Sea
presented a great opportunity for South
Korean gunners to test their skills in a two-minute fusillade. The North
Koreans fired off only 50 rounds, 1% of the total pumped into their hapless
vessel and crew, at least one of whom is believed to have been killed, with
several wounded.
By the time the shooting was over, the North Korean vessel was "engulfed in
flames", as a top South Korean official put it, and began limping back to its
home port. Before it got there, the North Korean vessel had to put out a
distress signal, and another North Korean boat tugged it the rest of the way.
If the North Koreans wanted to make a point before United States President
Barack Obama's arrival in Tokyo on Friday at the start of a week-long swing
through the region, the South Koreans countered more dramatically. It may have
been an ideal chance for real live-fire, shoot-to-kill operation, but the
episode may go down as a case of overkill by the South Koreans.
Pyongyang is now vowing revenge, accusing the South Koreans of a "rash act" for
which they will have to "pay dearly". North Korea may not want to risk another
encounter right away with a South Korean flotilla seemingly armed with far
superior weaponry, including the latest computerized sighting devices. However,
one thing is sure: the encounter won't make efforts at getting North Korea to
give up its nuclear program - or weapons - any easier.
Obama, after the happy talking and toasting is said and done, is unlikely to
make much progress on the nuclear issue in talks with Japanese, Chinese and
South Korean leaders before his return on November 19 from the first Asian
foray of his presidency. How could he, after laying out his view in remarks in
an "interview" - responses all in writing, presumably by aides - to South
Korea's Yonhap news agency even as he was on his way to Japan.
Obama wanted it known that he is totally in line with South Korea's President
Lee Myung-bak, whom he will see at an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum
in Singapore this weekend and again when arrives in Seoul on Wednesday. He and
Lee "are in full agreement on the need to achieve a comprehensive resolution of
the nuclear, missile and proliferation problems", he said, picking up on the
"grand bargain" that Lee has been talking about, though not quite using that
same term.
The shootout in the Yellow Sea may not stop the US special envoy, Stephen
Bosworth, from going to Pyongyang for bilateral talks in an effort to persuade
North Korea to return to the six-party talks that it last attended in Beijing
nearly one year ago. North Korea is eager to host him, and Bosworth seems
almost as eager to go, but what do they need to discuss if "cooperation"
between the US and South Korea is as "extremely close" as Obama claimed in his
message to Yonhap?
Obama's swing through Asia, moreover, is complicated by other issues that are
sure to impinge on North Korea and its fearsome weapons of mass destruction,
which also includes biological and chemical weapons that get far less
publicity.
He and Japan's new Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama are already at odds on the
sensitive issue of the presence of American forces on Okinawa and elsewhere in
Japan. Hatoyama based much of his drive for power as leader of the Democratic
Party of Japan on his promise to re-think, review and revise the US-Japan
alliance. This includes the deal reached three years ago under which the
Americans would move US Marines not to less-crowded parts of Okinawa, and now
the Japanese seem to want them moved all the way to Guam. (See
Japan: A new battle over Okinawa, Asia Times Online, November 13,
2009.)
No way is either side likely to back down, but by the time the two leaders are
done artfully getting around those differences, they're not going to have a lot
of room left for talking about Korea. Anyway, sensitivities about North Korea's
abduction of Japanese citizens from Japanese soil in the late 1970s and early
1980s go so deep that the Japanese may be upset about any hint of the US easing
up on Obama's stated demand for the North to take "irreversible steps towards
the complete elimination of its nuclear program".
Obama faces still more difficulties when he gets to Beijing. The Chinese may
not like the idea of North Korea existing as "a nuclear power on their
doorstep", as the Americans keep saying, but they've got other priorities.
As far as the Chinese are concerned, North Korea presents no military threat.
The North Koreans, dependent on China for food and much else, may be difficult
to deal with, as the Chinese acknowledge, but they are not really dangerous as
long as Dear Leader Kim Jong-il, his family members and top aides remain in
power.
North Korea would pose a real danger, however, if the ruling structure of the
country collapsed. The specter of hundreds of thousands of impoverished,
hungry, out-of-work North Koreans pouring across China's border as the nation's
leadership dissolves is a nightmare that Chinese leaders do not want to
contemplate.
Then there is North Korea's economic potential. Its mountains and valleys are a
treasure trove of mineral wealth, including gold, zinc, titanium and uranium.
It is not certain how much really exists, but the Chinese would like to have
access to all of it.
The Chinese are not going to ruin relations with North Korea, which could
complicate the influence, if not control, they have already gained over
Pyongyang's state mining interests, just to mollify the US over the nuclear
issue. Nor does China, riding the crest of a wave of exports to the US, want to
anger the Americans by appearing uncooperative on North Korea's nukes. Thus it
is probable that Obama and China's President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao
will come up with nothing other than lofty statements bereft of real meaning.
Obama may have to reserve his most skilful diplomatic dance for Seoul. He and
President Lee should have no trouble finding common ground between the stated
US desire for a "comprehensive package" and Lee's talk about a "grand bargain",
but there is another major issue to face: the South Korea-US free-trade
agreement (FTA), which was hammered out before either of them attained their
present high posts.
Lee had nothing but bad words for his predecessor, the late Roh Moo-hyun, when
it came to Roh's handling of either the economy or North Korea, but he
subscribes to what many see as the most enduring achievement of Roh's
presidency, the "KORUS FTA", as it's known in South Korea. He badly wants the
US Congress to approve the deal, worked out in 16 months of sometimes
acrimonious negotiations on both sides.
Both Obama and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton criticized the FTA when
they were senators from industrial states - Obama from Illinois, Clinton from
New York, campaigning for the Democratic nomination for president in 2008. US
motor vehicle manufacturers, and the unions that control their work forces, see
the deal as hugely unfavorable to the US auto industry. Obama has said he still
sees problems in the FTA, and top Korean officials have said there's no way
they're going to go along with revisions.
How or if the Americans and Koreans work their way through this impasse may be
the biggest unanswered question of the trip. We can expect double-talk about
the great US-Korean alliance, and total agreement on the nuclear issue, but
there's no quite telling the outcome of this one.
Under the circumstances, the North Koreans, if they are at all smart, will
avoid any more shootouts in the Yellow Sea, as these only drive the US and
South Korea closer together. For North Korea, the best strategy may be to see
the US and South Korea at odds on the FTA - a topic that observers place right
up there with the nuclear issue as the most important item on the agenda when
Obama gets here.
Journalist Donald Kirk has been covering Korea - and the confrontation of
forces in Northeast Asia - for more than 30 years.
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