Dangers in North Korean dual-track strategy
By Niklas Swanstrom
North Korea would appear to have somewhat softened its confrontational stance in favor of a more constructive policy in recent weeks, a development which has seen the normalization of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, talks with Seoul on the issue of family reunions, and discussions initiated on reopening Mount Kumgang tourist resort. The impression is that Pyongyang is leaning toward greater engagement and interested in seeking out collaborative solutions, especially in the economic field where it is trying to boost investments.
However, concerns about North Korea's nuclear facilities persist, not least that its status as a nuclear state was recently enshrined in the country's constitution. Viewed as a consolidation of its nuclear policy, this would seem to lie at odds with the recent trend of constructive engagement. For the outsider, therefore, there would appear to be a contradiction in North Korea's strategy
between pursuing both nuclear and economic development.
The fact is that North Korea is attempting to achieve both at the same time. Moreover, it is apparent from DPRK officials that they do not view a contradiction in pursuing both tracks. The government is desperately trying to boost economic growth and diversification, and the simultaneous strengthening of its nuclear capacity is perceived as a tool to accomplish this as well as safeguarding national security. Moreover, issuing thinly veiled threats of another nuclear test is viewed by Pyongyang as a tool to get the US back to the negotiation table.
North Korea argues that moving away from costly conventional military forces to nuclear deterrence increases the amount of resources it can devote to the economic sector. Money that was previously plowed into maintaining the country's military first policy can now, as the argument goes, be increasingly channeled into economic development. Indeed, Kim Jong-eun has staked much of his credibility on improving livelihoods for ordinary citizens, much in line with Kim Il-sung's initially successful economic policy. With conjecture that Kim Jong-eun lacks the same prestige within military circles compared to his father and grandfather, he will have to find alternative ways to consolidate his power. Part of this entails therefore boosting economic development to create a larger middle class.
A diversification of the economy would enable local economies and civilian institutions in North Korea to strengthen their economic (and political) power within the country. The government has already implemented a far-reaching diversification and broadening of the economic zones to include inland areas to attract more foreign investment. This is being done in an effort to bolster the economy but also arguably to decrease military control of foreign investments. The Korean People's Army controls a great deal of the border trade and by diversifying the investment pattern, the civilian government hopes to increase control of foreign currency revenues which today dominate the economy.
Pursuing economic and nuclear development simultaneously, however, is not a logic shared by the international community and will backfire on North Korea with negative consequences for both its security and economy. In fact, if the North's nuclear development continues apace, the result could be a strengthening of US and Chinese nuclear preparedness in the region as well as serious discussions being initiated among more hardline groups in South Korea and Japan on the necessity to develop their own nuclear capacity. Regardless of how realistic this scenario is, mere discussion of such will undoubtedly undermine the betterment of relations both on the Korean Peninsula as well as regionally.
North Korea has to a large degree refused to acknowledge the regional and international impact of its policy choices. North Korea looks at the Middle East and sees a clear connection between the (non-)possession of weapons and the risk of international - read US - intervention. To persuade it to dismantle its current capacity, Pyongyang would require far-reaching security guarantees such as a peace treaty and American and Chinese guarantees that all nuclear capacity would be removed from the Korean Peninsula. Neither is possible under the current circumstances.
However, it will be immensely difficult for any foreign government to assist North Korea economically - beyond providing humanitarian aid - without first a significant commitment to the denuclearization process. Indeed, the latter represents a continued stumbling block with further nuclear testing likely to beget stiffened economic sanctions amid a failure to comply with international demands. For its part, Pyongyang will have serious issues with complying with the denuclearization process without commitments from the US and China on both security and economic issues.
There is a risk, therefore, that any process toward a normalization of relations, economic reforms, and denuclearization will be stalled due to a very narrow definition of what constitutes progress. It would be preferable if the agenda for discussions between North Korea and the outside world was broadened and greater concern attached to the regional impact as well as North Korea's internal situation so as to increase leverage and potential for compromise.
While the outcome of current dialogue between North and South Korea as well as informal discussions between the US and North Korea remains to be seen, North Korea's dual-track strategy and principally contention over its nuclear program will continue to serve as an impediment to normalization and conflict resolution on the Korean peninsula.
Dr Niklas Swanstrom is Director of the Institute for Security and Development Policy and one of its co-founders.
(Copyright 2013 The Institute for Security and Development Policy)
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