SPEAKING FREELY Two steps forward, four back on North Korea
By Niklas Swanstrom
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows
guest writers to have their say. Please click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
North Korea’s third nuclear test was far from unexpected; in fact it was the single most advertised test the North Koreans have conducted. The climax of this advertising campaign was the production of a short film which depicted just such a launch and what appears to be the destruction of New York City.
Reactions from the outside world have been swift and hard, even
China, North Korea’s long-term ally, was unforgiving in its comments on Monday’s test. North Korea has reacted very strongly to such comments as they consider the test to be justifiable and in the national interest, something that is not accepted outside of North Korea.
It is still unclear how much of a success the test was. North Korea claims that this was a successful attempt to miniaturize a bomb that could be loaded into a long-range missile. If we accept that this was a successful test, then the North Korean nuclear program has taken two steps forward. Yet it is not entirely clear at this time if it was in fact successful, as it seems the explosive yield of the bomb was below 12,000 tons and could potentially be seen as a technically failed test.
What is clear is that the blast impact was much larger than the tests carried out in 2006 and 2009, suggesting the test should be seen as a success.
Regardless, the test has resulted in important steps forward for the North Korean nuclear program, something that has created a great deal of concern.
Is this then a game-changer? It is still debatable if this will create a major change in a military sense as the implications are unknown, but on the political side it will have a major impact in terms of the further deterioration of relations with North Korea.
If North Korea is judged capable of applying this costly test, costly both in political and monetary terms, in a real weapons scenario it would be a considered more of a threat. But any nuclear technology would be perceived as a threat to neighboring states even - if it "only" makes it possible to create a "dirty" bomb.
Even if many people in Washington DC lost sleep over this latest test, it will not fundamentally alter the US or any other country's position in the North Korean issue. It is an important step for North Korea although it seems the ability to fully miniaturize the payload and effectively use it is still some time away.
The biggest change is that the impact on the international community will be very negative. Condemnations of Pyongyang will be followed by increased sanctions and decreased contact with the international community.
Japan, the US and Europe will cancel their political contacts in North Korea for some time, which is something that will be expected in Pyongyang. More worrisome is that South Korea's government elect will have major problems in working with North Korea, just as greater dialogues were in the pipeline.
The South Korean population as well as its political leadership will be more negative than ever and improving contact over the border will be much more difficult. This runs in the face of the situation, given that now is the time when more contact would be needed as information about the intent behind this test and the impact on their capacity is needed more than ever.
China will remain one of the only partners for North Korea in the foreseeable future, even if it will also be more difficult for Beijing to deepen any engagement with Pyongyang. The nuclear test was a major embarrassment for the Chinese government and in many ways China could be the biggest loser here, as the US-Japan-South Korea military cooperation will most likely improve significantly.
A probable scenario is that Beijing will be forced to, at least officially, decrease contact and trade with North Korea, even though it remains very unlikely that China would do anything that could further destabilize North Korea. China could very well become, in the short-term, the only relevant state with continued relations with North Korea. And this is not to say that these relations will be good.
The test will open up a number of sensitive discussions in South Korea and Japan regarding the need to develop ballistic missile defenses or even potentially their own nuclear technology. Even if nuclear weapons are unlikely to be sought by these countries the test most definitely creates a situation where Japan and South Korea will need to go back to the US and actively seek protection, while also developing their own defenses.
The impact on regional security could be very negative over time, with increased spending but also an increased positioning, especially if China continues to protect North Korea. Military cooperation between the US, Japan and South Korea will improve to the chagrin of China that will be forced to view a potential strengthening of the US military role in the region.
The test could in essence be a technological gain with some military implications, but the political and economic costs will be very high for North Korea and it could risk putting Pyongyang in an even more isolated position. The suggested reforms that have been proclaimed in North Korea will have no significance at all as foreign capital will disappear from North Korea at an even faster rate now.
Even the renminbi may become scarcer from the country. Pyongyang will undoubtedly view this as a victory but with more victories like this they might lose the war. North Korea is in need of economic development rather than military capacity.
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have their say. Please click here if you are interested in contributing. Articles submitted for this section allow our readers to express their opinions and do not necessarily meet the same editorial standards of Asia Times Online's regular contributors.
Dr Niklas Swanstrom is Director of the Institute for Security and Development Policy and one of its co-founders. This piece is a revised version of a Policy Brief for ISDP at www.isdp.eu
(Copyright 2013 The Institute for Security and Development Policy.)
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
