South Korean President Lee Myung-bak's bold diplomatic mission to punish North
Korea has stumbled on its first major roadblock. After meeting outgoing
Japanese prime minister Yukio Hatoyama and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao last
weekend at the Trilateral Summit on Jeju Island, Lee was unable to extract
anything more than condolences on the sinking of the Cheonan.
Furthermore, Beijing pointedly refused to criticize North Korea and turned down
South Korea's invitation to participate in the ongoing investigation of the
sinking of the South Korean naval corvette on March 26. An additional slap in
the face for South Korea came as Beijing condemned the fatal Israeli attack on
Monday on an aid ship heading for Gaza without hesitation. Meanwhile,
Hatoyama's resignation on Wednesday and the political row over the relocation
of a United States military base off Okinawa made Japan an unreliable partner
in Lee's quest for retribution. South
Korea's position seems increasingly vulnerable, in the absence of support from
regional powers. However, Lee has yet to exhaust all his options.
The prospect of greater Russian participation in the crisis over the Cheonan
emerged on June 1 as the 11th Korean-Russian Forum came to an end in St
Petersburg. Although the mood at the forum was tense, political and
intellectual authorities on Korean-Russian relations supported greater Russian
involvement in resolving the current dispute.
South Korea's ambassador to Russia, Lee Yun-ho said Russia would bring positive
influence to bear on regional stability. Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia
Alexei Borodavkin suggested placing the North-South discussion and the Cheonan
investigation under the umbrella of the six-party talks on North Korea's
nuclear program, hinting at Russia's desire to be more involved in resolving
the crisis.
Paralleling the discussions in St Petersburg, four submarine and torpedo
experts from the Russian navy arrived in South Korea on May 31 to participate
in the ongoing international investigation into the Cheonan sinking.
Although South Korean diplomats interpret Russian participation as an
indication of Moscow's support for Lee, Russia's direction and motive may be
less than obvious.
The decision by China, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, against
making a firm stand with South Korea over the Cheonan has made Russia a
clutch player in Seoul's diplomatic mission. However, the Russian delegation
did not come to Korea merely to join the Barack Obama-Lee bandwagon, but to
further its own interests in the region.
Russia has three key policy objectives when it comes to the two Koreas:
firstly, to use the Korean Peninsula as a bridgehead into the Pacific Ocean for
greater interaction with economic organizations such as the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, and the
United Nations' Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific; secondly,
to develop a market for arms and energy; and third, to establish a partnership
for the development of Siberia. [1] These objectives are subsumed under a wider
Russian foreign policy objective of counterbalancing the unilateral influence
of the United States in the world.
Russia has given up on military and nuclear parity with the United States since
the end of the Cold War. However, this does not mean that Russia has given up
on upholding its status as a "great power".
Instead of military coercion, Russia has sought a diplomatic path to maximize
its political capital in the international community (caveat Georgia).
Initially, the Boris Yeltsin administration in the early 1990s attempted to
achieve a high standing in the world through a partnership with the United
States. However, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members' rejection
of this stance and American unilateralism in Yugoslavia ultimately forced
Russia towards counterbalancing the United States.
Moscow today seems protective of states like Iran and North Korea that
defiantly stand against Washington; they present obstacles for the US and
opportunities for Russia's vision of a multipolar world.
This was apparent in Russia's defense of North Korea during the aftermath of
Pyongyang's decision to withdraw from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in
1993. A year later, when both South Korea and the United States were bent on
starving North Korea into submission, Russia acted as a key player in
negotiating the "agreed framework" under which it was responsible for creating
the formula of compensating North Korea for freezing nuclear activity with much
needed fuel supplies. Russia again played a crucial mediating role in
establishing the now frozen Six Party talks in 2003 as North Korea refused to
initiate negotiations without Russia's participation.
Russia has also shown itself capable of reprimanding North Korea, especially
over the development of nuclear arms. The last thing Russia wants is further
instability created by a nuclear arms race in the Far East. However, unlike the
US, Moscow does not want to see the regime collapse under the strain of
economic impoverishment. What Russia needs is a moderately belligerent,
non-nuclear North Korea that could facilitate Russia's objectives while
standing against American influence in the Pacific Rim.
Moscow has proven itself consistent and balanced in seeking its own
self-interest abroad. It would not make sense to ignore North Korea's richer
southern neighbor when seeking foreign investment for development in Siberia or
a more intimate economic relationship with the other Asian tigers. The Foreign
Policy Concept of the Russian Federation from June 2002 outlined Moscow's need
to maintain a balanced position in Northeast Asia. This was evident in Russia's
outreach to both countries with the New Russia-North Korea Friendship Treaty
and increased economic cooperation with South Korea. Russia's posture towards
the Koreas has not changed since.
In the Cheonan crisis, Russian dialogue was not granted exclusively to
South Korea. Deputy Foreign Minister Borodavkin also spoke with North Korea's
ambassador to Russia, Kim Yong-jae on the need to prevent the escalation of
conflict on the peninsula. At the same time, Russia has taken a greater role in
the investigation of the Cheonan sinking, establishing itself to be a
more balanced and open party than China.
Russia is proving to be an honest broker on the peninsula, seeking mutual
benefit while recognizing the consequences to its own security should tensions
escalate into military action. Perhaps this is why Russia tends to create or
support more realistic and workable solutions for the Koreas.
It is most likely that no major developments will come about from the Russian
side until Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov meets with his Chinese counterpart
Yang Jiechi on June 4. However, it is extremely unlikely that Russia will
support a policy like economic sanctions that threatens to further destabilize
Pyongyang. Nor is it likely that Russia will be blindly soft to North Korea.
What is certain is that the introduction of this ambitious power into the fray
will invite more initiatives from across the Pacific.
Note
1. Yongchool, Ha and Shin Beomshik "Non-proliferation and Political Interests:
Russia's Policy Dilemmas in the Six-Party Talks" Akihiro, Iwashita, Ed. Eager
Eyes Fixed on Eurasia: Russia and Its Neighbors in Crisis (Sapporo: Slavic
Research Center Hokkaido University, 2007): 173-198.
Yong Kwon is a Washington-based analyst of international affairs.
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