The term "purge" is probably most intimately associated with soviet dictator
Joseph Stalin. His rise to power was accompanied by a series of assassinations,
show trials and decisions that caused the suffering of millions. However, his
grasp on absolute power was always tenuous, disturbed by outside forces,
domestic rivals and his own paranoia. The "man of steel" ruled as the general
secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for 31 years, but when he
died in 1953, after the initial public hysteria and remorse, de-Stalinization
started within the decade.
The rise of North Korea's ruling Kims has much in common with Stalin's bloody
campaign of political consolidation. Even the great famine that struck North
Korea in the mid-1990s shares uncanny
characteristics of Ukraine's Holodomor - "murder by hunger", the tragic
famine caused by Stalin's collectivization drive from 1932 to 1933.
North Korea's repression tests the resolve of not just its people, but the
elite of the Korean Workers' Party as well. With an economic crisis,
international pressure and political uncertainty over leadership succession,
North Korea is heading down a dangerous path. To make matters even more dire,
every crisis in North Korea's recent history has been followed by a bloody
purge. Caught in the grip of uncertain survival, the way in which the elite of
the Korean Workers' Party acts in response to the impending purge may very well
dictate the flow of events on the Korean Peninsula.
French Philosopher Michel Foucault opened his masterpiece Discipline and Punish
with grizzly details from the public execution of an 18th-century French
regicide. The prolonged dismembering, quartering and burning of the criminal
sought to inspire fear in the audience.
Three centuries on, on March 10, 2010, elite members of the Korean Workers'
Party were driven out to a shooting range at a military school in Pyongyang.
According to witness accounts, North Korea's 76-year-old director of the
Planning and Finance Department, Pak Nam-gi, and his deputy, Kim Tae-young,
were tied to a post on the shooting grounds, unable to open their eyes or speak
due to bruises and wounds. The two individuals were held responsible for the
economic hardships that followed "unrealistic" currency reforms enacted last
November. Both were sentenced to be shot for "treason against the people". Nine
bullets were fired on each man simultaneously in the presence of significant
party members.
Foucault revealed that the brutal display of corporal punishment on the "enemy
of the state" provided a focused forum for the discontented audience. What is
transpiring among North Korea's political elite in the aftermath of Park
Nam-gi's execution is not entirely dissimilar to Foucault's anecdote.
After the torture, show trial and summary execution of Pak (also sometimes
spelt "Park"), Pyongyang dismissed hundreds of party leaders on charges of
corruption. Faced with dire economic woes following the November currency
reform, which left many people with worthless notes, Dear Leader Kim Jong-il
began a major propaganda campaign in North Korea to persuade people that the
dishonesty of party elites caused the economic difficulties in the country.
According to informants in the North, this lack of respect and the insecurity
over one's life has led to growing anger among party elites.
Kim Jong-il may have pushed his luck too often. In October 1992, even before
his father Kim Il-sung's death, the Dear Leader executed 20 officers with
Soviet training and dismissed 300 when it was revealed that they criticized
"the system". Analysts say that this was a ploy by Kim Jong-il to take control
of the military, which at the time was dominated by Soviet-trained officers, to
secure his position in the line of succession.
In April 1995, after the death of Kim Il-sung, the Dear Leader consolidated his
military and political authority by executing those accused of plotting a coup
and embezzling funds used for foreign exchange. Popular narratives estimated
several hundred army officers were executed. The man in charge of the 1995
purge, Kim Yong-chun, is currently chief of the general staff of the North
Korean People's Army.
The most repressive purge ran parallel to the most dire moment in Kim Jong-il's
regime, the 1995-98 famine. While millions starved to death in the "Arduous
March", the regime accused agricultural secretary Seo Gwan-hee of being an
American spy and summarily disposed of him.
Along with the agricultural secretary, 2,000 others (along with their families)
were purged for crimes of espionage dating to the Korean War in the early
1950s. In the aftermath of this purge, and recognizing the extensive damage to
party loyalty caused by excessive killings, Kim Jong-il eliminated those who
were responsible for the purge by accusing them of "alienating the party from
the people for the selfish pursuit of power".
It was a grim parody of Stalin's own purges, which in the end claimed the lives
of those who were the most adamant supporters of the murders (Genrikh Yagoda
and Nikolai Yezhov).
On May 7, 2010, the Korea Development Institute (KDI), a South Korean
think-tank, published a report on the North Korean economy that carried an
ominous premonition of another purge. According to the report, the unusually
cold spring this year and a shortage of fertilizers in North Korea point to
another extensive crop failure.
The KDI expects the currency reform last November, which sought to control
hyperinflation, to be nullified by this year's food shortages. The food
situation in North Korea is already extreme - one Chinese businessman claimed
he couldn't find any food in Pyongyang outside Koryo Hotel and Yanggakdo Hotel.
It has been revealed that the current food crisis in North Korea is so
appalling that rations for the military are being distributed to the general
public.
The recent history of North Korea indicates that this crisis will not pass
without another purge of the party leadership and the North Korean elite
themselves are probably aware of that fact. Especially with Kim Jong-il making
preparations to hand over power to his son Kim Jong-un, the political scene of
North Korea may soon be awash with blood.
Stalin was never overthrown during his tenure at the head of the Soviet Union.
But nor did his rule continue for 62 years, and nor did he gain power through
monarchial, father-to-son, succession. It is hard to predict what may happen in
the next few months in North Korea, but what is certain is that it will
definitely play a role in the development of tensions on the Korean Peninsula
after the sinking in March of the South Korean corvette Cheonan.
Yong Kwon is a Washington-based analyst of international affairs.
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