2010 was a hard and dangerous year in Korea. Alas, 2011 might become even
worse.
At first glance, this statement might appear excessively pessimistic. After
all, in the last weeks the tensions on the Korean Peninsula were decreasing,
North Korea suggested negotiations, and South Korea also said that talks might
be a good idea.
However, the appearances are misleading. If one has a better look at the recent
crisis, as well as at the current mood in Seoul and Pyongyang, there is little
ground for optimism. It seems that both
North Korean strategic calculations and South Korean assumptions about ways to
handle its uneasy neighbor will bring the crisis back - and with a vengeance.
What we have seen throughout the last year was another exercise in the habitual
North Korean brinkmanship – yet another attempt to apply tactics which have
been used many times and usually with great success.
When North Korean strategists want to squeeze some aid or political concessions
from other side, they follow a simple but efficient routine. First, Pyongyang
manufactures a crisis, and does everything to drive tensions high. The missiles
are launched, islands are shelled or nukes are tested, while the usual verbal
bellicosity of the North Korean media reaches almost comical heights. Sooner or
later both the "target audience" and international community begin to feel
uneasy, and when this point is reached Pyongyang suggests negotiations. Its
neighbors and adversaries alike feel relief and start talks, which usually end
with Pyongyang getting what it wants - in exchange for restoring the status
quo.
In the past, this tactic has worked well (for example, this is how in 2007
North Koreans managed to push the George W Bush administration to switch to a
soft line and resume aid). However, this time things are different. So far,
North Korea is not getting what it wants.
But what does the North want to achieve with this seemingly dangerous (but
actually very calculated) military/political theater? As usually is the case
with Pyongyang's foreign policy, it is about money. In 2008 South Korea and
United States dramatically reduced the amount of unilateral and unconditional
aid to the North.
It had to turn to China instead. China obliged, and it seems that the North
Korean economy - while still very poor by current East Asian standards - is in
better shape than at any time since the early 1990s (albeit this modest
recovery seems to be, first and foremost, brought about by domestic
transformation rather than by Chinese aid). However, this made North Korean
leaders excessively dependent on China, whom they do not like and whom they do
not trust (this seems to be a mutual feeling).
So, they want the US and South Korean aid back. First, it will increase the
size of the entire aid pie, controlled and distributed by the regime. Second,
it will provide Pyongyang with ample opportunities to distance itself from
dangerous China, and acquire a number of sponsors whose contradictions can be
used to North Korea's advantage. The North Korean diplomats are very good at
this game, which they learned in the 1960s when they exploited the Sino-Soviet
schism with remarkable success.
The North decided that this was a time to exercise pressure on both Seoul and
Washington (actually, this is what it has been doing since 2008). It is not
often noticed that North Korea actually conducts two separate, if related,
blackmail programs - one aimed at the US and another aimed at South Korea. The
ways of exercising pressure should be different, because the concerns of these
two countries are dissimilar.
In the case of South Korea, the North decided to take advantage of Seoul's
dependence on the international markets. Foreign investors and trade partners
of South Korean firms are not going to be amused by the newspaper headlines
which talk a war "which is going to erupt on the Korean Peninsula".
These tensions are likely to have a negative impact on the South Korean
economy, making the South Korean voter worse off. On top of that, the average
South Korean voter does not usually care too much about North Korea, but still
expects its government to be capable at handling the North, in order to avoid
major confrontations. Therefore, the North Korean leadership expects that
sooner or later South Korean voters will penalize an excessively stubborn
government by supporting the opposition.
To the US, the North's selling point is its ability to proliferate. Since for
the Americans the major (almost only) reason they care about North Korea is its
potential for nuclear and missile proliferation, the North Korean regime
demonstrated to Washington that even without aid and in spite of the
international sanctions, North Korean engineers and scientists managed to make
considerable progress in areas of military significance.
In mid-November, just before the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, a group of
American nuclear scientists led by Dr Siegfried Hecker from Stanford, was shown
a state-of-the-art uranium-enrichment facility whose scale and sophistication
exceeded what the US experts believed to be possible. This is a major step
towards a full-scale military uranium program, which is, incidentally, more
difficult to control than the old plutonium program.
Now, after a few months of tension building, the North Koreans decided to test
the ground and check whether the adversaries (and potential donors) are ready
to give in. Frankly, Pyongyang's decision seems to be surprising, since the
answer is obvious: neither Washington nor Seoul is ready to make concessions.
Why didn't the old tactics succeed this time? In short, because the attitudes
in both Washington and Seoul changed in recent years.
Talking about the US side, the main reason why Washington was in past willing
to give concessions and unilateral aid, was the once widespread (albeit
unfounded and na๏ve) belief that this was a way to facilitate the
denuclearization of North Korea. It was assumed that Pyongyang could be
persuaded/bribed/pressed into surrendering its nuclear program. This belief
evaporated in 2008, after the second nuclear test.
American policymakers have finally realized that North Korea is not going to
surrender its nukes under any circumstances. North Korean leaders are ready to
talk about arms control, not about disarmament. In other words, North Korean
leaders hope to get paid (generously) for freezing their nuclear program while
still keeping the existent nuclear devices. The US is not ready to discuss this
yet.
With South Korea, the situation is more complicated. The Lee Myung-bak
government was in favor of a hard line from the very beginning. After the Cheonan
sinking and Yeonpyeong shelling, the South Korean public, usually cautious when
it comes to matters of peace and war, switched to support of the hard line.
In a poll in late November, some 80% of participants said they were in favor of
a massive military retaliation in the case of the next North Korean attack (and
a considerable minority even said that they did not mind a war). This unusual
bellicosity of the public, reinforced by the even harder position of the
military, puts additional pressure on the government.
Paradoxically, the events (or rather non-events) of early December contributed
towards Seoul's shift to a hard line. Then, soon after the Yeonpyeong shelling
of November 23, the South Korean military staged large drills in the disputed
waters near the North Korean coast. Before the exercises, the North Koreans
threatened a mighty counterstrike, but when Seoul decided to go ahead on
December 20, nothing happened.
North Korea's decision not to execute its threats was seen as a sign of
weakness. A triumphant South Korean official said in a private conversation:
"They are with their tail between their legs now. This is what we should have
done from the very beginning."
Therefore, the dominant view in Seoul now is that if North Korean leaders know
that their new strikes will be met with a mighty response, Pyongyang will not
dare to stage another attack. So, Seoul politicians believe that harshness is
the best option, since North Korean leaders will surely duck a fight.
This seems to be an illusion - and, perhaps, a dangerous one. Like it or not,
there is no valid reason why Pyongyang strategists should be afraid of a
Southern counterstrike. It is true that North Korea does not want a full-scale
war, but due to the peculiarities of its political system North Korea can
sustain a minor military confrontation far more easily than its southern
counterpart - or, to be more precise, in the case of such a confrontation the
domestic consequences for the North Korean government will be far less serious.
Needless to say, even if a South Korean counterstrike kills many hundreds of
North Korean soldiers or sailors, the leaders will not feel too sorry of them
(and children of the leaders do not serve in the North Korean military). The
loss of a few pieces of rusty military equipment of 1960s vintage will not
upset them too much, either.
It is sometimes stated that an efficient counterstrike will at least lead to a
loss of face for the North Korean leadership, and that fear of such humiliation
could serve as a deterrent against future attacks. Unfortunately this seems to
be wishful thinking as well. The North Korean government is in full control of
the media, so such a defeat will remain unknown to almost everyone outside the
military elite.
If this is the case, why did the North avoid a fight in December, after so many
threats and bellicose statements? Because there is no reason why it should
agree to fight at the time and place chosen by its adversaries, when these
adversaries were ready to strike back. It makes much more sense to wait for a
while and then deliver a sudden and powerful strike when the North Korean
political leadership decides that the time is ripe.
It seems that we are not going to wait for long. Recent events leave little
doubt that the North Korean charm offensive will be ignored by Seoul (and,
perhaps, by Washington as well, even though signals are slightly mixed). The
first sign of this position became visible on January 6 when the US and South
Korea rejected North Korea's call for unconditional talks with South Korea as
"insincere" and repeated their usual set of demands, which are, alas, clearly
unacceptable for the North Koreans.
The North Korean leaders will probably do what they did before in similar
situations: they will stage a provocation or two in order to increase pressure
on the stubborn Americans and South Koreans, in hope that sooner or later they
will give in. After all, contrary to what Seoul wants to believe, the
associated political risks for the North Korean elite are small and rewards in
case of eventual success are significant.
This coming round of military/diplomatic might be more dangerous than usual,
largely because of Seoul's newly acquired belief in the power of
counterstrikes. Now it seems likely that in case of another North Korean strike
the South will retaliate mightily. This counterstrike is likely to trigger a
counter-counterstrike, and there is even a probability (albeit very minor) that
such an exchange will escalate into a real war or at least some intense
fighting.
Far more likely, though, is that the situation will remain under control. In
this case, the excessive reaction by the South Koreans is likely to amplify the
message their North Korean adversaries want to deliver.
North Korean strategists want to damage the South Korean economy as well as
create domestic tension, which will eventually turn the South Korean public
against the current South Korean government and its North Korean policy.
However, if such an exchange of fire happens we can be certain that the
international media will not be merely writing about a "war that is about to
start in Korea" but rather will declare that a "war started in Korea". The
impact of such reports on the world markets and, eventually, on the South
Korean economy is easy to predict.
The South Korean government should not be misled by the current bellicose mood
of the voters. This mood is not likely survive a major confrontation, and once
the situation becomes really tough, the same people who now cry for revenge are
likely to start blaming the government for its inability to maintain a stable
and secure situation on the peninsula.
Alas, not much can be done now. The North is likely to follow the usual line of
a professional (and usually successful) blackmailer: since pressure has not
worked, even greater pressure should be applied. The South, confident in the
power of deterrence, is likely to over-react, thus further aggravating the
situation and increasing the scale of the next crisis.
Well, it seems that the year 2011 will not be especially tranquil in Korea. And
the subsequent few years might be even worse.
Andrei Lankov is an associate professor at Kookmin University in Seoul,
and adjunct research fellow at the Research School of Pacifica and Asian
Studies, Australian National University. He graduated from Leningrad State
University with a PhD in Far Eastern history and China, with emphasis on Korea.
He has published books and articles on Korea and North Asia.
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