SEOUL - Last week, world media reported that two key North Korean officials
were executed a few months ago. One was Kim Yong-sam, the former minister for
railways. Reportedly, he was held responsible for a mysterious explosion that
in 2004 wiped out the entire railway station of Ryongchon a few hours after the
armored train of Dear Leader Kim Jong-il had passed through - a suspected
assassination attempt.
The other North Korean official was Mun Il-bong, the finance minister. His
alleged crime was the inability to handle the
currency reform that in late 2009 nearly brought the North Korean economy to a
complete standstill.
This news was first broken by the major South Korean newspaper Chosun Ilbo,
which cited its North Korean sources. The newspaper has good connections among
the North Korean refugee community, whose members are in touch with officials
in North Korea.
These reports were widely discussed in the media, and produced the usual wave
of speculation about supposed factional disagreements in the North Korean
leadership. However, such speculation might be premature. There is no way to
verify with sufficient confidence whether the alleged executions actually took
place. We do not know - and, in all probability, are not going to know anytime
soon - whether the North Korean ex-ministers indeed met their ends.
Those who do not deal with North Korea seldom realize how little outside
observers know about its high politics. North Korean media stretch the
definition of state secret to an extent that would likely appear excessive even
to Joseph Stalin. There have been numerous cases where North Korean media chose
not to report some very important (and, interestingly, very public) events that
had a profound impact on the lives of every North Korean.
For example, the 2009 currency reform which, if the above-mentioned reports are
to be believed, led to the lethal downfall of Mun Il-bong, one of its major
planners. Generally speaking, the reform emulated the Soviet currency reform of
1947 that for decades has served as a prototype of currency reforms in all
communist countries. There was an important difference, though.
In 1947, all major Soviet newspapers ran lengthy front-page stories about the
currency reform, extolling its timeliness and explaining the need to improve
the lives of the good common Soviet citizen by wiping out the ill-gotten cash
holdings of shameless profiteers.
In 2009, no North Korean media even mentioned the planned reform, which was by
far the most important news of the time and had a dramatic impact on the lives
of every North Korean. Information about the changes and their conditions was
delivered via public notices pinned to the doors of banks, as well as through
confidential messages to local authorities.
Foreign embassies were notified by a short official letter. Finally, the
Pyongyang-sponsored Korean newspaper in Japan ran a couple of stories about the
reform. But mainstream media within North Korea remained completely silent
about the dramatic upheaval.
Those who keep a track of North Korean affairs might remember the so-called
"July 1 reforms" of 2002. These were once heralded (wrongly, as it turned out)
as a sign of Pyongyang’s willingness to emulate the Chinese reformist policy.
Few people are aware, though, that North Korean media first mentioned the
ongoing reform in September, a few months after its launch.
This is especially relevant in regard to promotions and demotions, as well as
purges and persecution of the regime’s top officials. The North used to stage
open show trials in the 1950s, but this Stalinist tradition was discarded. In
subsequent decades, disgraced officials simply ceased to be mentioned in media
and disappeared from the public view, so the general public - including the
lower reaches of the elite - could only guess the reasons behind the sudden
disappearance of some powerful minister or, say, a Central Committee secretary.
The disappearance of a dignitary is nearly always interpreted as a sure sign
that he or she has been purged. The North Korean public inevitably starts to
circulate a rumor that the hapless official was not just removed from office,
but arrested or even executed.
After some time these rumors reach foreign media, often through the North
Korean refugee organizations that have good networks inside the North.
Consequently, the world's media run another story about a North Korean minister
who was allegedly executed for his wrongdoings or as a result of alleged
factional strife.
Very often, impressive details are added - for example, it is frequently stated
that the alleged execution was public or, at least, held in the presence of
other top dignitaries (as a matter of fact, the present author has never seen
any reliable evidence of a public or semi-public execution of a former
dignitary - this type of brutal show seems to be reserved only for humble
folks).
There have been a number of cases, to be sure, when these rumors were
eventually confirmed. For example, we now know for certain that the state
security minister Kim Pyong-ha, who disappeared in 1982, was either executed or
committed suicide during his arrest (his downfall was followed by a large-scale
purge of the North Korean secret police).
There is little reason to doubt that So Kwang-him, the party secretary for
agriculture, was indeed executed in 1997. The aging bureaucrat was accused of
espionage and subversion. The charge was that he had deliberately ruined the
North Korean agriculture sector and provoked a disastrous famine, being on the
payroll of the US Central Intelligence Agency and other foreign intelligence
agencies.
However, things are not that simple. There have been numerous cases when
prominent dignitaries first disappeared and were universally believed to be
arrested and executed - but then made a comeback and re-entered North Korean
politics. A good example of such political resurrection is the fate of Pak
Chong-ae, a Soviet Korean who was dispatched to Korea for intelligence
gathering and subversion in the early 1930s.
After 1945, she became a prominent member of the North Korean leadership.
Unlike a majority of Soviet Koreans, Pak Chong-ae survived a mass purge of
pro-Soviet elements in 1956-1961, but suddenly disappeared in 1985. At the
time, everybody, including the Soviet diplomats, were certain that she had been
shot or probably died in prison - and this is what the rumors confidently told.
However, in 1986, Pak Chong-ae re-emerged in the Korean political scene, albeit
in secondary roles.
Even more interesting is the case of Ch'oe Kwang, a former chief of staff.
Ch'oe Kwang disappeared in 1969, and rumors held that he was shot soon
afterwards. This was hardly the case, since in the late 1970s, Ch'oe Kwang
first appeared in secondary positions, then re-launched his career and in 1988
was again appointed chief of general staff!
So how should one treat the reports about the execution of Kim Yong-sam and Mun
ll-bong? With caution. There is no reason to reject the reports completely -
they might indeed be true. There is no doubt that rumors about the execution of
ex-ministers are now circulating widely among North Korean officials. The 2009
currency reform was indeed a disaster, arguably, the worst prepared currency
reform in the entire history of communist countries.
The 2004 Ryongchon explosion also was an exceptional event, irrespective of
whether it was an assassination attempt targeting the Dear Leader, or a result
of bad luck and remarkable negligence. Therefore, one may well expect the
severe punishment of people who were responsible for both disasters. However,
the experiences of previous decades demonstrate that such rumors be taken with
healthy skepticism.
Incidentally, about a year ago, rumors persisted that another high-ranking
official, the head of the party finance department, Pak Nam-gi, had been
executed for his alleged mishandling of the currency reform. This story was
universally believed, but so far no definite evidence of his sorry fate has
emerged.
To complicate things further, a few weeks ago a well-informed defectors' group
reported that Pak Nam-gi, alive and well, was spotted in Europe where he is
managing the personal funds of the Kim family. So, is Pak Nam-gi dead, with all
his family shipped to a prison camp? Or is he running a multi-billion dollar
business from a North Korean embassy in Switzerland? We know not. But this is
another reminder of the many uncertainties a North Korean watcher has to deal
with.
So, the rumors (and rumor-based reports) about Kim and Mun’s execution may well
be true, but at the moment it is virtually impossible to talk about this with
certainty. Things will become clear eventually, but this will happen, probably,
only after several years. Sooner or later some relevant documents will be
leaked.
Even before that, some trustworthy witness of their execution will emerge. It
is also possible, though, that one day the allegedly executed ex-ministers will
reappear, alive and healthy for their advanced age. However, by that time this
entire story will be of greater interest for historians, not journalists or
policy analysts.
Andrei Lankov is an associate professor at Kookmin University in Seoul,
and adjunct research fellow at the Research School of Pacifica and Asian
Studies, Australian National University. He graduated from Leningrad State
University with a PhD in Far Eastern history and China, with emphasis on Korea.
He has published books and articles on Korea and North Asia.
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