North Korea: Calculus of an
existential war By Yong Kwon
The general lack of knowledge regarding
North Korea and its security concerns has forced
observers into a dangerous habit of establishing
conclusions based on limited information. The
resulting trend has skewed analysis of North
Korean history and foreign policy to confirm the
characterization of North Korea as a state solely
driven to sustain the hereditary regime of Kim
Jong-il.
This widely propagated
interpretation of the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea's (DPRK's) raison d'etre precludes that
the North Korean state does not share the needs
and wants of other sovereign states. However,
North Korean foreign policy appears to be
fundamentally driven by "state-survival," rather
than the often touted "regime-survival". More
specifically, all of Pyongyang's
pursuits focus on
simultaneously deterring and undermining its
existential foe, South Korea.
North
Korea's heir apparent Kim Jong-eun is due to visit
the People's Republic of China and analysts have
already begun to dispense a cloud of speculation
on the ramifications of his visit. Small details
such as Beijing's request for the young Kim to fly
into China instead of taking his father's armored
train are attracting a lot of attention. At the
same time experts on international security and
weapons control speculate that North Korea may
conduct a third nuclear test in the near future.
[1] In the case that these two events coincide,
even if out by a few months, the media will be
choked with theories on the cursory connection
between the regime's succession and nuclear
weapons.
Nonetheless, until explicitly
verified by documented evidence, this kind of
analysis should be considered a hasty
misinterpretation of Pyongyang's national
interest. North Korea is unlikely to play the
nuclear ticket to simply justify succession to its
own people.
There is a legitimate debate
among scholars of North Korean history regarding
the influence of domestic conditions on
Pyongyang's foreign policy. Mitch Lerner posited
the hypothesis that Pyongyang's provocations in
1967-1968 targeted North Koreans themselves, to
convince the public that self-defense was a cause
worthy of economic sacrifice. [2] However, even in
this example, the end-goal of the state remained
deterring and undermining the regime in Seoul by
focusing North Korea's industrial capacity on
militarization.
Recognizing the hierarchy
of motives poses difficulties when analyzing the
behavior of most other states. Alexander George
termed this the "value trade-off dilemma" and
criticized analysts who implied that states
compromised one "irreducible" national interest
for another. [3] North Korea stands as a strong
counter-example to the norm; the central tenant of
any North Korean policy can be reduced to
defending itself against the existential threat
posed by South Korea.
Nuclear weapons were
not produced spontaneously as a reaction to any
one particular domestic or external condition, but
as a calculated long-term strategy to ensure
deterrence against South Korean-American forces.
Archival evidence compiled by the North Korea
International Documentation Project in Washington
reveals a long-term effort by Pyongyang to acquire
nuclear weapons and missile technology,
disregarding Sino-Soviet relations, inter-Korean
dialogue, detente, etc. [4] New evidence on North
Korea's nuclear regime remains consistent with the
theory that South Korea poses such threat through
its sheer existence that North Korea cannot accept
peaceful coexistence under the existing political
paradigm.
Taking this historic assessment
into account, Narushige Michishita posited key
points that should form the basis for analyzing
North Korean military and diplomatic strategy.
First, "an element of surprise has almost
always been an important ingredient in North
Korea's military actions, implant[ing] in our
minds an impression that the North Koreans are
'crazy.'"
Second, "none of North Korea's
major military-diplomatic actions have been
primarily caused by domestic political factors".
Third, "the contention that North Korea
tends to undertake military actions when it faces
a hostile international environment is not true.
History suggests it has initiated military
[actions] when the international environment was
favorable as well as when it was not." [5]
Taking these assessments in mind, the
sinking of the South Korean corvette
Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong
Island must be understood within context of North
Korea's long term military strategy going back to
the formative years of Pyongyang's military
doctrine. From Pyongyang's perspective, the South
Korean military with staunch US support and far
greater capital could easily overwhelm the
military firepower of the impoverished North. In
order to maintain deterrence, random attacks on
South Korea demonstrating its military
capabilities increasingly become a necessary facet
of Pyongyang's military strategy.
However,
both Pyongyang and Seoul recognize the fact that
the DPRK could not possibly maintain the balance
of power on the Korean peninsula. Seoul is
currently pursuing the purchase of Russian-made
Murena assault hovercrafts and American Apache
attack helicopters, both of which are expected to
radically tilt the military parity in the favor of
the South Korean military. [6] In addition, South
Korea is expected to deploy a missile defense
system by 2015, further undercutting North Korea's
conventional deterrent offensive capabilities. [7]
The North Korean leadership came to the
conclusion that it could not maintain conventional
military parity with its southern counterpart in
the 1970s after observing South Korea's impressive
economic growth and the China's reluctance to
support the DPRK. Subsequently, it abandoned the
policy of waging a "people's war" in the South and
opted for nuclear warfare. This consideration was
made outside domestic reasons such as succession
or other political interests. It was a visceral
decision to maximize North Korea's prospects for
survival.
In retrospect, the North Korean
rationale proved incredibly prescient. It
recognized early on that it would not be able to
compete with South Korea's industrial output and
will fall behind in military buildup. Therefore,
the construction of nuclear weapons offered a
pragmatic solution to maintaining an effective
deterrence and allowing Pyongyang to continue
military provocations against Seoul.
The
failure to recognize North Korea's perception of
South Korea as an existential threat yields
confusion as to why Pyongyang cannot simply
denuclearize or stop provocations against the
South. Therefore, analysts search for the answer
elsewhere: in the North Korean succession issue.
However, the nuclear issue will continue to
dominate the regional political scene whether or
not Kim Jong-eun succeeds his father. At the same
time, regime change in Pyongyang will not alter
the established military doctrines and strategy of
North Korea. The same goes for the prospects of
the six-party talks yielding anything constructive
as North Korea will not ever genuinely eliminate
its nuclear weapons program and abolish its
doctrine of deterrence unless it is prepared to
abolish itself. Nuclear weapons have become a part
of North Korea's identity.
The question of
whether Pyongyang expresses a rational fear aside,
the real question is how to change the fundamental
political dynamic to both sustain South Korea and
stop provocations from the North. For now, it does
not seem like anyone has an answer.
Notes
1.) Katz, Lee
Michael. "Ex-U.N. Panel Head Worries
About Another North Korean Nuke Test." Global
Security Newswire, April 11, 2011. 2.) Lerner,
Mitch. "'Mostly Propaganda in Nature:' Kim Il
Sung, the Juche Ideology, and the Second Korean
War." NKIDP Working Paper #3, Dec. 2010 3.)
George, Alexander L. Presidential Decision-Making
in Foreign Policy. Boulder: Westview Press, 1980.
4.) "North Korea's Nuclear Program" NKIDP
Virtual Archives 5.)
Michishita, Narutshige. North Korea's
Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966-2008. London:
Routledge, 2009: 3. 6.) Byeongseon, Chung.
"'Our Russian high speed hovercraft…' North-South
war over the 'Murena.'" Chosun Ilbo, April 2,
2011. 7.) Yong-won, Yu. "In four years we will
strike down missiles targeting out capital and
nuclear reactor." Chosun Ilbo, April 16, 2011.
Yong Kwon is a Washington-based
analyst of international affairs.
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