Analysts are rightfully skeptical of recent efforts to reboot the six-party
talks on North Korea's nuclear program. [1] Neither Seoul's offer of a "grand
bargain" nor Washington's "partial approach" will fundamentally change
Pyongyang's historical position on nuclear weapons.
However, the North will continue to use the spotlight as a forum to express its
world views and advance its political agenda. Consistent with this traditional
trend, Pyongyang's newest foreign
policy agenda appears to be aimed at leveraging Moscow's desire to retain
influence in Northeast Asia for political and economic gain.
Despite Russia's refusal to undermine North Korea's position in the frequent
clashes between the two Koreas, North Korea has offered to engage in
denuclearization talks under a new framework that excludes Japanese and Russian
participation. [2]
Analysts have suggested that North Korea may be focused on replacing the
armistice at the end of the Korean War in 1953 with a formal peace treaty while
keeping the double attacks on South Korea off the table; however, if this is
the case, removing Russia from the table will reduce maneuverability in keeping
the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island attacks out of the negotiations.
Another, more convincing and direct, objective must be at play in Pyongyang's
purposeful decision.
Pyongyang proposed the new framework days before Russian officials revealed
that President Dmitry Medvedev was due to travel to Vladivostok to meet with
the ailing North Korean leader. It also comes after years of Russian efforts to
move closer to South Korea, cooperating in not only trade matters but also in
military collaboration; both endangering North Korea's position in the
existential conflict.
Russia's proximity to South Korea is no secret. Even before the collapse of the
Soviet Union, the Kremlin moved to establish a close relationship with Seoul.
The Soviet Union took massive loans from South Korea and, to North Korea's
dismay, participated in the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympic Games. These ties were
deepened when the new Russian Federation advanced plans for greater economic
and military cooperation.
Russia's shift towards the Republic of Korea in the early 1990s had ideological
and practical motives; first, it was consistent with president Boris Yeltsin's
and foreign minister Andrey Kozyrev's policy of integrating Russia with the
West; second, South Korea's loans to Russia and Moscow's ability to play the
"Korean card" against Japan in its territorial dispute proved politically
advantageous. [3] In addition, it was the dominant viewpoint that Seoul would
control the entirety of the Korean Peninsula in the near future. With Kim
Il-sung's death in 1994, further investment in ties with North Korea appeared
counter-intuitive.
However, Russia's and South Korea's ties slowly deteriorated alongside Russia's
increasing economic problems and fallout with the West in the mid-1990s. Old
issues such as the downing of Korean Airlines Flight 007 over Sakhalin Island
in 1983 resurfaced to further complicate the relationship.
Finally with the rise of a more independent and nationalist foreign policy
doctrine under Yevgeny Primakov and Vladimir Putin, Russia began concentrating
its efforts in balancing its relationship with the two Koreas. By 2000, the
Kremlin's "Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation" explicitly stated
Moscow's focus on maintaining both economic partnership with Seoul and security
guarantees with Pyongyang. [4]
However, managing this balance continued to be a serious challenge. Both the
Soviet Union and the Russian Federation had vehemently discouraged North Korea
from building nuclear weapons. The Russian Foreign Ministry rightly recognized
that North Korea's nuclear weapons capacity will create a condition where both
South Korea and Japan will seek the same capability. At the same time, in order
to preserve the image of an "honest broker", Moscow had to prevent Washington
from descending on Pyongyang unopposed.
During the 2002 crisis following US assistant secretary of state James Kelly's
visit to Pyongyang, Russia stood by North Korea and demanded hard evidence of
Pyongyang's nuclear activities from the United States. In part, Moscow has
convinced itself that Pyongyang sought nuclear weapons not to establish nuclear
deterrence, but to ensure regime survival in reaction to the overthrow of
Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq by the United States. [5]
Whether the Kremlin actually believes that North Korea is comparable to Iraq,
where the dissolution of the state or its absorption by Iran were farfetched
ideas, remains dubious. Nonetheless, the situation facilitated Russia's move to
propose its own "package deal" solution to secure stability and denuclearize
the Korean Peninsula.
In 2003, Russian ambassador Alexander Losyukov proposed the following measures
to resolve the crisis:
1. Both the United States and North Korea observe the "North-South Joint
Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" and the Agreed
Framework of Geneva.
2. Both the United States and North Korea resume bilateral and multilateral
talks and provide security assurance for North Korea.
3. The United States and other states resume humanitarian and economic support
to North Korea.
These measures were proposed as a realistic option as a total non-aggression
pact or a peace treaty between North Korea and the United States and South
Korea seemed out of reach. At the same time, the Kremlin pushed the view that a
framework that excluded the Russian Federation was insufficient to create a
lasting solution. In a way, Moscow benefits from both peace and conflict on the
Korean Peninsula; however, exclusion from the process will be to the detriment
of Russia's newly asserted political influence in Northeast Asia.
The problem with Russia's position is that ties to South Korea are far more
lucrative and North Korea remains far too volatile for Moscow's balanced
position to be maintained. Starting with increasing economic exchange to the
joint space program, South Korean-Russian relations appear to be getting
stronger under Medvedev's administration while Russia's tolerance for North
Korea's belligerent behavior grows thinner by day.
One major sign of this inevitable shift can be seen in the changes in Russia's
college-level history curriculum, which now openly admits to North Korea's
initiation of the Korean War (1950-1953) and reevaluates president Park
Chung-hee's military coup in 1961 as having yielded economic progress and
having established the foundations for democratization. [6]
In essence, Russia cannot protect North Korea forever. Moscow does disavow the
Stalinist nature of Pyongyang's regime and wants to prevent proliferation of
nuclear arms in East Asia. Furthermore, Russia cannot carte blanche defend
North Korea's provocations without risking its own standing in the
international community.
North Korea probably recognizes Russia's desire to maintain influence while
standing with the moral majority. If this is the case, then North Korea's
interest in excluding Russia from the denuclearization process is nothing short
of political extortion. And it seems to have succeeded in producing a positive
result for Pyongyang.
Following Medvedev and Kim Jong-il's meeting in Vladivostok and in response to
devastating floods in North Korea, Moscow promised Pyongyang 50,000 tons of
grain in aid. [7] While the floods were devastating, Russia's food aid to North
Korea had never exceeded 10,000 tons.
In addition, the new amount surpasses the amount of food aid that Seoul
promised to Pyongyang by 20 times. Considering Russia's interests in Northeast
Asia, its "humanitarian effort" constitutes a US$17.7 million investment
towards regaining Moscow's traditional influence on the Korean Peninsula.
Two things are evident from this whole situation. First, North Korea is
adroitly playing its nuclear card. Second, Russia will remain a significant
party in the whole process as long as the North Korean state holds on.
Notes
1. North Korea: Calculus
of an Existential War Asia Times Online April 20, 2011.
2. "N Korea proposes new framework for nuclear talks: report." July 25, 2011.
Kyodo News. Online.
3. Bazhanov, Eugene; Bazhanov, Natasha. "The Evolution of Russian-Korean
Relations: External and Internal Factors." Asian Survey, Vol 34, No 9 (Sep,
1994), pp 789-798.
4. Ha, Yongchool; Shin, Beonshik; "Non-proliferation and political interests:
Russia's Policy Dilemmas in the Six Party Talks." (Sapporo: Slavic Research
Center Hokkaido University, 2007): 173-198.
5. Cited in Ha and Shin; from Nikitin, Alexander. "The Changing Priorities of
Russian Foreign Policy and new mechanisms for security in Eurasia," the First
KPSA-RPSA/MGIMO Joint Annual Conference Proceedings. Korean-Russian Cooperation
for Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia (Seoul: IFANS, Nov 30-Dec 1, 2005).
6. Kwon, Gyeongbok. "Russian College Curriculum, Korean War shifts from
Southern Invasion to Northern Invasion." September 20, 2010, Chosun Ilbo Online
(Article in Korean).
7. "Russia to send 50,000 tons of food aid to North
Korea." August 8, 2011. Voice of America. Online.
(Special thanks to Luke Fisher, a Los Angeles/Washington DC-based analyst of
international affairs, for his notes on the formative years of USSR/Russian
federation's ties with South Korea.)
Yong Kwon is a Washington-based analyst of international affairs.
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