BEIJING - The plan to build a trans-Siberia gas pipeline through North Korea to
South Korea, highlighted by Kim Jong-il's recent visit to Russia, appears to be
on a fast track as Russia's largest extractor of natural gas Gazprom's
officials head for Seoul to discuss the matter. It's fair to describe it as an
inter-governmental project because the Russian government holds a controlling
stake of the company.
Seoul is enthusiastic. On Monday, a key Foreign Ministry official told Yonhap
News Agency that the gas pipeline project was not a violation of United Nations
sanctions against Pyongyang that restrict economic engagement with the North,
saying "The focus of the UN sanctions against North Korea is on weapons of mass
destruction [WMD]. The gas pipeline project has no direct relations with WMD."
Lately, Russia has been highlighted in South Korean media, which is curious to
know what role the former empire can play with regard to North Korea. The
Kremlin and Seoul, the two Cold War adversaries, established diplomatic
relations in 1990, under the initiative by then South Korean president Roh
Tae-woo. Roh reached out to the communist bloc as a strategy to press North
Korea.
"To resolve the South-North Korean tension, I decided to adopt the old Chinese
Emperor Qin's strategy of unifying the entire China: Befriend the far and
attack the near ... we should have a comprehensive plan to elicit opening up of
North Korea," Roh said in his two-volume memoir released on August 9.
The memoir, released at a time when the role of Russia on the Korean Peninsula
has come to the fore, is a first-hand account of the many hidden diplomatic
backstories between Seoul and the Kremlin, leading up to the knotting of
diplomatic ties, and Seoul's intentions in applying "the Russian card" to its
rivalry with Pyongyang.
One of North Korea's signature diplomacy strategies, then and now, is to "skip"
South Korea to clinch direct deals with world powers, including the United
States. It's partly a product of inter-Korean rivalry and assertion of state
legitimacy. For example, South Korea's constitution does not recognize North
Korea as a state, although both are members of the United Nations.
Roh, who held office as president of South Korea for four years from February
1988, launched an ambitious "Northern Diplomacy" to reach out to the communist
bloc on being sworn in. He signed diplomatic relations, including with China
and Russia - former Cold War enemies - to counter the North's strategy. The aim
was to change Pyongyang's habit of detouring Seoul in international affairs and
press it to deal directly with Seoul. "It's a strategy to corner North Korea
from its rear and to goad it to dialogue [with South Korea]," Roh explained in
the preface of the memoir.
The same philosophy has since been adopted by subsequent South Korean
governments. Seoul, for example, has been lobbying hard to bring Beijing onside
and persuade it to see the North Korean issue from Seoul's viewpoint, by
closely linking China's economic interests to those of South Korea.
The successful completion of the Seoul Summer Olympic Games in 1988 was a
golden opportunity for Seoul to impress the Kremlin with its industrial
development and make the Soviet leadership think twice about South Korea, which
during the 1950-1953 Korean War had been one of the world's poorest countries.
One month after the Seoul Olympics, the Soviet politburo, attended by Mikhail
Gorbachev, unanimously adopted a policy shift to normalize relations with South
Korea, describing South Korea as "the most promising economic partner in the
Far East".
As the Soviet Union was leaning closer to South Korea, Roh calculated that it
would also help in thawing the Cold War relationship with Beijing. "The Chinese
leadership has a closer relationship with North Korea's Kim Il-sung [the
founder of the country and current leader Kim Jong-il's father] than the Soviet
Union ... But China is prudent. If we first establish diplomatic relations with
the Soviet Union, China will follow suit," predicted Roh (p. 193).
His preference for the Kremlin had also to do with his belief that the
Kremlin's interest was mainly economically driven, while China had political
ambition on the Korean Peninsula. This fear by South Korea toward China comes
from historical experience and runs deep even today.
The Kremlin actually did have a political calculation in mind as it leant
closer to South Korea: to check Japan. Around a century ago, the rival imperial
ambitions of Russia and Japan led to a war (1904) over their dominance over the
Korean Peninsula. Japan defeated Russia at that time, greatly hurting the
Russian empire's pride. The two also have had a territorial dispute over the
Kuril Islands since the 1950s. The economic giant Japan was perceived by the
Kremlin as arrogant and hesitant to broaden economic ties with Russia.
Roh's aides at the presidential Blue House began to meet secretly with a KGB
agent in Tokyo, who had a cover as a magazine reporter, to fine-tune the
process of establishing diplomatic relations. Later, Roh and Gorbachev met in
San Francisco in June 1990. At that time, Gorbachev told Roh, "It would be a
big mistake for Japan to think that we need Japan more than Japan needs us."
(p. 205) Later in Moscow, Gorbachev also told Roh, "South Korean leaders are
different from Japanese leaders. Japan expects us to kneel down. Nothing could
be further from the truth!" (p. 212).
Three months later in September 1990, Seoul and Moscow signed diplomatic
relations. This was originally supposed to take place in January 1991. But it
was Pyongyang that sped up the process by insulting a senior Russian
interlocutor. Russian foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze visited Pyongyang
and notified its intention to establish diplomatic ties with Seoul.
He "received blatantly insolent treatment from the North Korean leadership,
which was close to a threat. That made the top Russian envoy deeply indignant."
(p. 209). When Shevardnadze met with the South Korean foreign minister, Choi
Ho-joong, at a UN session and when Choi expressed a desire to speed up the
diplomatic process. Shevardnadze readily agreed. A few days later on September
30, the two met again. Shevardnadze personally changed the printed date of the
official diplomatic document on the spot from "January 1, 1991" to "September
30, 1990."
"It was a gift from angry Shevardnadze," Roh recalled (p. 207).
In the negotiations leading to the establishment of diplomatic relations,
Seoul's major demand on Russia was on North Korea. Seoul wanted Moscow to stop
military assistance to the North. Moscow honored the request. Expectedly, that
put Pyongyang in great difficulty. According to Roh, "not a single fighter jet,
a single tank, a single missile went to North Korea after." (p. 217).
Perhaps a greater irony was that Russia soon changed its weapons export
destination: from North Korea to South Korea. Despite North Korea's protest,
Russia in 1995 proposed to Seoul that loans could be paid by providing Russian
tanks, helicopters and missile parts. Russia's attitude toward North Korea was
also becoming "business-like". It scrapped trade favors that had been granted
to North Korea and demanded Pyongyang pay its debts in hard currency. The
series of gestures by Russia put the Moscow-Pyongyang relationship to test.
Experts point out that the duo's relationship has not been fully repaired
since.
Sunny Lee (sleethenational@gmail.com) is a Seoul-born columnist
and journalist; he has degrees from the US and China.
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