Another month has passed without a firm answer from the United States
government on whether it will be providing the food assistance requested by the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the World Food Program and
several US based non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that witnessed North
Korea's food crisis in February and September this year.
The State Department spokesperson claim that Washington is still assessing
whether providing food aid would be consistent with US policy. However, after
more than seven months of deliberation, it must be assumed that Washington
intends to stay its hand.
There is no escaping the constant dearth of data from North Korea, but
carefully considering what observers have gathered over the years, basic
economic principles suggest that
widespread starvation and malnutrition are real. I have already elaborated on
why it is in Washington's best interest to help North Korea (see
The importance of being earnest, Asia Times Online, September 24, 2011)
but I would like also to advance the premise that relieving North Koreans from
uncertainty today will help them prepare for the long-term transition to a
freer society.
One obvious concern that is preventing any decisive action from Washington is
the suspicion that Pyongyang is stockpiling food for Kim Il-sung's centennial
next year and that the food crisis is exaggerated. Recent visits to North Korea
by a group of American scholars in June seemed to lend weight to this
possibility.
At an event hosted by the Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington DC,
three North Korea analysts who participated on the trip attested to observing a
country that has become visibly more affluent with no evidence of hunger in
several cities and counties. [1]
At first glance, the witness reports by humanitarian NGOs and the North Korea
scholars appear to be incompatible; however, policy makers and the American
public should note that widespread starvation and increased affluence can
develop simultaneously, especially in a totalitarian state like the DPRK. Even
if one ignores the fact that the scholars visited North Korea prior to
devastating floods in July, their testimony on the unexpected prosperity of
some parts of North Korean actually bolsters the economic explanation on how a
major food crisis could occur in tandem.
There are three aspects of the North Korean economy that one should keep in
mind. First, the notable increase in the well-being of a portion of the North
Korean population, noted by several observers including the above mentioned
scholars; second, the currency reforms in November 2009 that wiped out the life
savings of many average North Koreans; third, the increasing importance of
small scale and underground retail of merchandise to the distribution of goods
in North Korea since the collapse of the Public Distribution System (PDS). [2]
These three facets in conjunction could create the perfect condition for a
serious shortage of goods, in particular of food stuffs. Amrtya Sen, a Nobel
laureate in economics, noted that starvation occurs not necessarily in the
strict absence of food in the society, but in individuals not having the
entitlement to physically have and consume the necessary nourishments. [3]
Therefore, the essential question is not whether North Korea has enough food
for everybody, but rather how the stock of food is being distributed.
Responding to difficult financial conditions following the Great Famine of the
late 1990s, Pyongyang initiated economic reforms in July of 2002, raising the
price of basic goods. In this vulnerable market condition, one portion of North
Korea's population clearly experienced a relatively sudden and noticeable
increase in its income. As a consequence, the price of everyday goods probably
rose to meet the rise in demand from this privileged group. Meanwhile, this
would completely disenfranchise anyone who did not enjoy similar growth in
purchasing power, rendering retail goods unaffordable and forcing the group to
rely on the dysfunctional state rationing system. To make matters worse, the
disenfranchised are unable to fall back on their personal savings to supplement
the income/price gap after the currency reforms in 2009 eviscerated their
accounts. This is the most likely outcome of income imbalance without assessing
the added shock to the supply of food via harsh winters and floods.
In a relatively insular economy like North Korea's, one cannot expect a society
to go from starvation to affluence in a 10-year period without experiencing
serious consequences. If the visiting scholars observed genuine increase in the
living conditions of the North Koreans in Pyongyang and few other places, then
the above scenario was unavoidable. The estimate by UN endorsed groups that
anywhere between one third to a quarter of the North Koreans face food
(consumption) shortage and the reports by humanitarian NGOs of widespread
malnutrition among children are well within the realms of reality.
Pyongyang is most likely baffled by the extent of the food crisis. Unable to
assess the full impact of the private and underground food distribution chains,
the economic planners will be unable to fully grasp the amount of food it needs
to supply regions suffering from starvation. The massive command economy had
been defunct from the beginning, but the ability of the organic market within
North Korea to occasionally absorb the consequences of destructive economic
policies most likely spoiled the inept system.
Much of this remains speculative, based on piecemeal information provided by a
handful of defectors and visiting foreign observers. At the same time, one
should note that the visiting scholars were not allowed inside markets in
Pyongyang. In the absence of any noteworthy information on the price of elastic
goods that would contradict the above analysis, the economic rationale for
"starvation in affluence" should be seriously considered.
This is not to suggest that scholars did not provide several crucial and
essential insights on the DPRK. The trip revealed significant cracks in North
Korea's ideological homogeneity; everyday North Koreans were skeptical of
government propaganda and showed great interest in the outside world. These are
nascent sprouts of plurality and although food security is unlikely to be the
only harbinger of liberalization, freedom from uncertainty of one's own
physical survival will necessarily increase an individual's freedom of choice.
Many analysts of the People's Republic of China noted that an increase in
agricultural production and food security in the late 1970s significantly
contributed to the unleashing of productive opportunities and the freeing of
the market. [4] The DPRK is certainly not China; the perception that South
Korea poses an existential threat to the North is still real to the current
leadership in Pyongyang. However, when this generation retires or expires,
there is no reason why the United States should not expect a gradual thaw. The
coming generations on both sides of the demilitarization zone are more willing
to accept peaceful co-existence without unification. The fundamental political
paradigm that dominated the Korean Peninsula since the end of the Second World
War is finally changing.
If one is to accept two basic assumptions, that the food crisis is very real
and that uncertainty in collective survival strengthens the resolve of the
totalitarian regime, then human security is tantamount to the foundations of a
peaceful and freer North Korea.
In addition, observing the struggles of the post-Soviet space to build a
functional society while dealing with the ruinous burdens of demographic
disintegration and insurmountable public health problems, making a significant
investment in North Korea today is both prudent and farsighted. Washington
should not dismiss the present opportunity to leave the basis for a peaceful
and stable Northeast Asia for its own posterity.
Notes
1. Webcast.
A changing North Korea? A trip report. North Korea International Documentation
Project, September 14, 2011.
2. A good account of the collapse of the PDS is given in: Andrei Lankov.
North Korea's antique food rationing. Asia Times Online, January 15,
2005.
3. Amartya Sen. Ingredients of Famine Analysis: Availability and Entitlements.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol 96, No 3 (Aug, 1981), pp. 433-464.
4. Amartya Sen. Food and Freedom. Sir John Crawford Memorial Lecture,
Washington, DC October 29, 1987.
Yong Kwon is a Washington-based analyst of international affairs.
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