Explaining United States domestic politics
to international audiences is never easy. It is
particularly difficult during election years. The
proposal to grant US statehood to colonies on the
moon is hardly the most outlandish proposal to
emerge from the ongoing primary contest. Such
statements should be taken with a grain of salt as
they will presumably be moderated as candidates
move to the middle for the general elections and,
if elected, face the realities of governance.
As South Korea's own vibrant democracy
gears up for general elections in April and a
presidential election in December, political
parties are similarly seeking to distinguish
themselves. While it is important for US observers
to place such pre-election posturing in context,
one recent pledge by South Korea's main opposition
parties is particularly
dangerous, shortsighted, and unrealistic.
On February 8, the Democratic United Party
(DUP) and the Unified Progressive Party (UPP) held
a joint press conference and read out a letter
signed by 96 opposition lawmakers and delivered to
President Barack Obama and other US leaders
through the US Embassy in Seoul.
The
letter threatens that "If we win the presidential
election and if our demands for renegotiations are
not met by that time, the KORUS FTA will be
terminated by Clause 2, Article 24.5 of the
agreement." (Article 24.5 states, "This Agreement
shall terminate 180 days after the date either
Party notifies the other Party in writing that it
wishes to terminate the Agreement.")
Currently, opposition to the Korea-United
States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) centers around
10 provisions in the agreement that have been
termed "poisonous" even though nine of the 10 were
negotiated by the progressive Roh Moo-hyun
administration and despite the fact that the most
sensitive provision on Investor-State Dispute
Settlement (ISD) is included in nearly all other
Republic of Korea (ROK) trade agreements,
including one with the European Union.
Opposition concerns over the process of
ratification and certain provisions of KORUS are
understandable, and US and South Korean officials
should be able to discuss and address such
concerns in the normal course of diplomacy. But
when senior leaders such as Democratic United
Party chairwoman Han Myeong-sook - who was prime
minister when the deal was negotiated - calls
KORUS a "treacherous deal" there is a danger that
what is a domestic political issue in Seoul will
negatively impact US-ROK relations.
KORUS
was broadly supported by Asia specialists,
government officials with responsibility for Asia,
and business leaders across the political spectrum
in the US. Its ratification in both Seoul and
Washington was the product of considerable effort
over the course of five years, overcoming numerous
economic and political challenges.
In the
end, KORUS was rightly viewed as more than just a
trade deal. It was and is a strategic agreement
intended to strengthen and deepen the US-ROK
relationship. For the opposition in Korea to lead
with a pledge to "take every measure possible to
repeal" KORUS is a clear indication that they do
not understand or do not value the strategic
importance of the deal.
While critics may
think that opposition to KORUS is good politics -
similar to Republican pledges to repeal what they
call Obamacare - their sweeping and hyperbolic
denunciations risk being interpreted as
anti-American. Is this the perception that leaders
of a potential new government in Korea wish to
give to the individuals and institutions most
committed to US-Korea relations? And remember it
is precisely those individuals and institutions
who were most vested in KORUS as a strategic
initiative that will provide the primary prism
through which a new government in Korea will be
viewed.
Whatever their motivations,
opponents of KORUS are likely overestimating their
leverage: there is almost no appetite or political
capacity to re-open negotiations in Washington. In
October 2011, the United States had a strategic
mandate to move forward with KORUS. Then, failure
to ratify an agreement of this quality with an
ally as close as South Korea would have undercut
the US position in the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation, prospects for the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) Trade Negotiations, and US
credibility in the East Asia Summit and the region
more broadly.
But the US has now ratified
KORUS. Regardless of whether the ROK decides to
back out, the US strategic mandate and its
credibility in leading a trade and investment
liberalization agenda in Asia have been secured.
Moreover, the primary impact of withdrawal would
fall on Korea: there would be real economic costs
and missed opportunities for the ROK as well as
damage to its soft power, since Seoul has never
before repealed an international treaty; to do so
would cause the ROK's international position and
reputation to suffer.
While opposition to
KORUS may prove to be political posturing, the
effort to repeal the deal will have the immediate
impact of limiting the ROK's prospects to join
negotiations over the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Not only are ROK officials unlikely to take on the
added challenges of TPP negotiations in the
current environment, but it is hard to imagine
other members of the TPP being interested in
including South Korea if it is attempting to
repeal a similar trade deal with the United
States.
As a nation deeply dependent on
international trade, the ROK has played a key role
in recent years in promoting international trade
and investment liberalization. Not only has the
ROK been a leader in the Group of 20, but having
successfully negotiated and ratified in KORUS a
prototype for the "21st Century" free trade
agreement envisioned by the TPP, the ROK could be
a leading voice for further trade and investment
liberalization in the region. Repeal deprives the
US and the ROK of a positive narrative and an area
of close cooperation in the international arena.
The successful negotiation of the KORUS
free trade agreement was one of the signature
accomplishments of the Roh Moo-hyun
administration. Despite political strains in the
alliance and very real differences between US and
ROK approaches to North Korea, the fact that our
two nations could agree upon such a significant
and mutually beneficial agreement served as
evidence of our shared interests and strategy.
It is a shame that in an effort to reclaim
the legacy of president Roh the current generation
of opposition leaders in South Korea is
jeopardizing that very accomplishment.
L Gordon Flake
(lgflake@mansfieldfdn.org) is Executive Director
of The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation.
(Reposted from Pacific Forum CSIS's PacNet
Newsletter No. 10 Tuesday, February 14,
2012)
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