SPEAKING
FREELY The
genius of propaganda By Ben
Kolisnyk
Speaking Freely is an Asia
Times Online feature that allows guest writers to
have their say. Please
click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
The death of Kim
Jong-il raised many questions about stability in
North Korea, especially concerning the regime's
tactics to ensure Kim Jong-eun's ascension goes
smoothly in the face of internal and external, and
real and imagined threats. No less important and
inextricably linked to these key questions is how,
after the collapse of most communist regimes,
North Korea has managed to survive. As Bruce
Cumings noted recently, North Korea will soon have
existed as a state longer than the Soviet Union
did.
S N Eisenstadt in his seminal piece
on the collapse of Eastern
European communist
regimes identifies the general conditions, or in
his lexicon, contradictions, which contributed to
the demise of former communist regimes: economic
stagnation; the disenchantment of large sectors of
the population; a weakening of regime legitimacy;
and, the regime's diminished international
standing. But he also highlights the importance of
examining the unique causes in each case to
explain why particular regimes failed.
In
North Korea's case, the general conditions which
could lead to collapse have existed to various
degrees at different points in time. There are
many reasons it has not only been able to avoid
collapse and revolution, but also prevent even the
hint of significant dissent. One especially
esoteric factor is its capacity to use propaganda
to counteract consciousness of its contradictions.
Part and parcel of this practice is paying extra
attention to massaging Kim Jong-eun's image at
home.
Influences on
propaganda North Korea, like many
autocratic regimes, uses numerous mediums to
control ideas and information. This includes, but
is not limited to, state run media, art (film,
posters, theatre, mass games) and the educational
system. As Jane Portal has pointed out, using art
to persuade people to think that they live in the
best possible world is not new. Augustus Caesar
used art in the 5th century BC to perpetuate a new
and lasting vision of Rome as the ideal world.
The stylistic elements of North Korea's
socialist realist propaganda art, according to
Portal, have been influenced strongly by the
Soviet Union. The primary characteristics of this
art form are “accessibility to the masses, class
consciousness, relevance to current issues and
faithfulness to the Party.” Although this art is
realist in its life-like depictions of subjects,
it is idealistic in the content and messages it
portrays. Socialist society and quality of life is
hyper-inflated, and the people in it are given
almost superhero qualities as a means of
encouraging the masses to strive for this
perfection. Leaders are portrayed as omnipresent,
great soldiers, and benevolent fathers to assure
the masses that they have their leaders to thank
for successes and comforts, and are in capable
hands.
Thus, a common goal of autocratic
regime propaganda is mobilizing support for the
leader. Eisenstadt stresses that support for a
leader is not only based on individual columns of
interest but also a foundation created by the
“articulation of different conceptions of the
common good.” This mobilization is commonly
anchored in collective rallying symbols like
social, political or ethnic identity, many of
which are evident in North Korean propaganda.
Racial purity, national distinctiveness,
self-sufficiency, and freedom from foreign rule
are just some examples.
Producers and
consumers Does the average North Korean
believe what they see and read, and do they take
seriously the symbols and messages being fed to
them? Since this can be challenging to know
definitively, a more constructive approach might
be to consider to whom exactly the propaganda is
primarily directed.
It is said that there
are three classes of people in North Korea - core,
wavering, and hostile, determined primarily by
one's family background. Andrei Lankov makes a
strong case that the growing pervasiveness of an
underground economy is chipping away at the
importance of family background, the result of
which is that success and quality of life are
increasingly determined by entrepreneurial
prowess. Nevertheless, the three class structure
is a legacy that will take many years to dissolve
completely; if ever, if the regime has its way.
Each of these classes is composed of
individuals about whom the regime has particular
ideas and different levels of trust. As such, the
regime has developed different tools of
authoritarian control to deal with each class. The
core class, for example, which is comprised of
privileged party and military elites and their
families, are provided a decent and in some cases
a luxurious quality of life. As Daniel Byman and
Jennifer Lind have noted, this class is also the
subject of co-optation and other tools to help
preserve the quality of life of the class that is
probably in the best position to dissent but won't
as long as they continue to prosper under the
regime, and as long as an infrastructure for
genuine civil engagement and political discourse
is not permitted to blossom.
Although
Byman and Lind rightly point to the ubiquity of
propaganda to influence the thoughts of the
people, they don't discuss the layers of
propaganda aimed at various classes within
society. Socialist realist art may be designed to
appeal to the masses but in this case George
Orwell is instructive - some North Koreans are
more equal than others; or in other words, some
just need more convincing than others. Even those
who produce the propaganda are bureaucrats with
stable jobs and a quality of life unseen outside
of Pyongyang. It matters less that they actually
believe what they are producing and instead that
they disseminate the images of the benevolent
leader and socialist paradise - after all, their
job and livelihood depends on it.
This is
not to suggest that the core class is not a
concern for the regime; as an extra measure
propaganda is promulgated to this part of the
population too. Wherever possible the regime must
mask the contradictions of the system in order to
prevent the seeds of dissent from taking root, and
part of this masking involves political
indoctrination at all levels. However, it is
clearly the hungry, destitute, politically
marginalized and oppressed wavering and hostile
classes that need the most convincing.
Getting the message across There
is a widespread view that successful leadership
transition hinges on power brokering and purges in
the circle of Party and military elites. While
this may be the case, the regime is certainly not
ignoring the threat posed by rest of the
population.
According to Portal, national
characteristics were naturally woven in when
adopting Soviet propaganda artistic style and
messaging. In North Korea this has been especially
true of the messages the regime has perpetuated
regarding the importance of bloodline and racial
purity, historically predominant socio-political
rallying points on the entire Korean peninsula.
Conceivably, part of the 2012 Strong and
Prosperous Nation campaign's coinciding with the
100th anniversary of Kim Il-sung's birth is to
reinforce the importance of bloodline, in
particular that of the Kim dynasty, by associating
big celebrations and achievements with the
founding father. This in itself is an important
part of the regime's messaging to ensure that all
North Koreans, but particularly the majority of
the wavering and hostile classes, support dynastic
succession. This enables the regime to gloss over
Kim Jong-eun's shortcomings as a leader and divert
attention away from the contradiction of regime
legitimacy. The bloodline element of the 2012
campaign is just one of many noticeable attempts
to reinforce this notion.
What is
frequently overlooked is that the Strong and
Prosperous campaign demonstrates how brilliant the
North Korean propaganda machine really is. While
analysts have obsessed with the prosperous half of
the equation, the regime has already convinced not
only the entire North Korean population, but many
in the international community as well that it is
genuinely strong; at least militarily. As for
prosperity, everything is relative. The core class
needs no convincing; and getting the wavering and
hostile classes on side is nothing that extra
rice, a few apartment complexes, large public
statues and other architectural feats like the
completion of the Ryugyong hotel can't solve. A
majority of North Koreans may be starving, but it
doesn't take much to create the image of
prosperity. This contributes greatly to
camouflaging the contradiction of economic
stagnation.
North Korea has also
distracted the population from the regime's
diminished international standing, if it ever had
it. North Koreans are repeatedly told about the
international influence the nuclear weapons
program has generated. While the weapons have
given Pyongyang increased bargaining power, the
international community is mostly united on
condemning the North's weapons. And on the topic
of North Korea's standing vis-เ-vis South Korea,
again Lankov is enlightening noting that regime
propaganda has adapted to increased information
inflow. Where the south was once portrayed as a
“land of hunger and poverty” it is now attacked
for the drawbacks of its capitalist system like
income disparities.
The key propaganda
themes of benevolent father and military man are
also being played out in photographs and televised
media. Observers have lamented that the images of
Kim Jong-eun inspecting weapons and riding in
tanks and horses are shameful copies of the
Vladimir Putin image boosting campaign. Since
North Korea has borrowed much of the Soviet
propaganda tradition the similarities should
really come as no surprise. The key difference, of
course, is that Kim Jong-eun acts out these scenes
while being made to look like his grandfather,
down to the hairstyle and uniform, something that
has not gone unnoticed.
And just what is
it about the frequent use of horses in North
Korean propaganda? The first statue ever erected
of Kim Jong-il is him riding a wild steed, the
first statue we are told because he was too humble
to have one erected while he was alive (although a
towering likeness is reportedly in the works). And
as mentioned, Kim Jong-eun has frequently been
pictured riding horses by state media.
White horses, in particular, have a
special meaning in Korean mythology in the story
of Silla. In this story a white horse emerges from
a bolt of lightning and bows to a shining egg from
which a boy emerges. The boy then goes on to unify
six warring states. While many scoff at the idea
that North Korea is working towards a unified
peninsula, the regime excels at linking Korean
unity with racial purity, resistance to foreign
intrusion, and how the Kim family lineage gives it
the legitimacy to lead this charge.
Another example is the Chollima movement,
North Korea's version of China's Great Leap
Forward, named after a mythical horse which could
apparently leap 1,000 ri (approximately 250
kilometers). The motivation for naming this
movement after a symbol of extraordinary dexterity
is no doubt partly behind the ongoing use of
horses. Much like the depiction of superhuman
qualities in socialist heroes, urging progress in
leaps and bounds gives the masses something to
strive for, and images of Kim Jong-eun riding
horses give the impression that the Kim family is
comfortably in the saddle of overseeing North
Korea.
Although North Korea's internally
directed propaganda is just one slice in the
leadership succession pie, it is important
nonetheless. The regime may be able to conceal
contradictions to some degree, but realistically
propaganda is not enough on its own to make North
Koreans forget their hunger. This certainly makes
it challenging for the regime to ultimately veil
the contradiction of discontent amongst a large
portion of the population. Of course, this is
where the regime's other tools of authoritarian
control come into play, a rather successful
venture to date.
Ben Kolisnyk
holds two degrees in political science and is
an avid North Korea watcher. He is currently
working as a policy analyst for a non-profit
organization in Canada.
(Copyright
2012 Ben Kolisnyk.)
Speaking Freely
is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest
writers to have their say. Please
click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
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