SPEAKING
FREELY Pyongyang's freeze-dried
nukes By Ben Kolisnyk
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please
click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
Well, that didn't
take long. The recent deal in which North Korea
had agreed to halt its nuclear weapons program in
exchange for nutritional assistance had inspired a
lot of debate about whether it was truly serious
this time. North Korea's plan to launch its
Kwangmyongsong-3 satellite into orbit in
celebration of Kim Il-sung's centenary, which, to
the international community, means
test firing a long-range
missile, has the negotiating nations up in arms
and observers rightly speculating that the deal
will fall through.
The naysayers probably
didn't expect to be able to say they told us so so
quickly; and even the usual apologists are
discreetly admitting that maybe they were a little
too optimistic.
The cycle of good nature
and bellicosity has once again brought to the fore
the usual questions and assumptions about
Pyongyang's quest for the bomb. What does it need
nuclear weapons for? Is it only concerned about
existential threats or are there other less
obvious reasons it wants them? And why is it
pursuing them when its people are starving?
Examining the conditions under which the
regime has actively pursued the bomb gives some
indication of the threshold at which North Korea
has been driven to pursue it. While these
motivations have shifted over time, it has
remained at or above the threshold for most of its
existence. Understanding the conditions the
current regime faces should give us clues about
whether or not the freeze is likely to
continue.
Deep roots The
historical roots of the program are much deeper
than we tend to remember, just one reason it is a
legacy that will be challenging to overcome.
Contrary to the common line, the North's program
did not emerge in the 1990s or even late 1980s as
a panicked response to the demise of the communist
bloc. Instead, North Korea's interest in and quest
for nuclear weapons can be traced back to the
years following the Korean War when the regime
faced the prospect of ongoing security threats
especially from the US and South Korea; threats
which continue to this day.
It is
often suggested that Pyongyang had no reason to
seek nuclear weapons at this time because it was
assumed that China would provide extended nuclear
deterrence. But experiences like Pyongyang's early
exposure to the power and influence the weapons
gave proliferators, the Sino-Soviet split in the
1960s, and Pyongyang's perception that Moscow
abandoned its communist ally in Cuba during the
missile crisis were key factors in Pyongyang's
choice to seek a reliable, independent deterrent.
Pyongyang rightly felt vulnerable and developing
its own arsenal made sense on many
levels.
Existential security
threats Security is frequently offered as
the only real factor in considerations of any
state's motivations to seek nuclear weapons which,
intentionally or not, sweeps all other potential
motivations under the rug by relegating them to
secondary drivers. Historically, the security
catalysts which have been identified as driving
the North's nuclear weapons pursuit include: US
conventional and nuclear threats to the North
coupled with US politico-military aggression; the
South's conventional military capabilities as well
as past attempts at establishing an indigenous
nuclear capability, together with threats to
absorb the North in case of collapse or to
forcefully reunify the peninsula; the perceived
threat of the trilateral alliance between
Washington, Seoul and Tokyo; and a lack of,
weakened, unreliable, or the loss of security
guarantees from its allies as a means to deal with
these perceived threats.
As such, North
Korea at different points in history has arguably
pursued nuclear weapons for various purposes: to
extract extended deterrence courtesy of its
allies; as an independent capability to deter
conventional or nuclear attacks by other states;
as a military tool to pre-emptively attack one or
more of its enemies; or, combinations of these.
With all of the bombast and propaganda
emerging from the North we sometimes forget that
the regime is actually comprised of some pretty
intelligent policymakers, and that they have a
unique and deeply ingrained view of the
international system and its role in it. So far,
this worldview persists under Kim Jong-un. It is
indeed very rational for the regime to feel
threatened. The failure of the key players to
secure a peace treaty and properly end the Korean
War is a good example. And while the continued US
hegemonic posture in the Asia-Pacific region is
thought by many to be a result of instability in
the region, to Pyongyang and others it is actually
a cause. As the China-US dynamic puts increasing
pressure on the US to demonstrate that it still
matters to its allies in the region, Pyongyang
will continue to the feel the brunt of attempted
manipulation and aggression, guaranteeing the
security driver for Pyongyang's nukes
indefinitely.
On the home
front Very often the domestic pressures
which can lead a state to pursue nuclear weapons
are viewed as merely contributing to its already
entrenched security driven desire for nuclear
weapons. Domestic sources of motivation include
ensuring regime preservation, into which can be
grouped the regime's use of the weapons as a
bargaining chip for economic and political
purposes, and using the program for various ends
related to ensuring the transfers of power to Kim
Jong-il and to Kim Jong-un go as planned. Once
programs take root, there is also a certain
element of cadence created by domestic actors in
the political and military-industrial complex
spheres who push the nuclear agenda because it
benefits their wallets or career aspirations.
With the transition to Kim Jong-eun came a
rethinking of how struggles within the regime,
especially between the WPK and KPA, might be
influencing the hereditary transition and
policymaking. Some analysts seem to think that a
monumental shift in the balance of power from the
KPA to the WPK is currently underway and that this
will inevitably determine whether Pyongyang ushers
in reforms or not. However, even if the WPK
regains its stature as the most powerful entity in
North Korea this does not preclude nuclear weapons
from remaining a top political
priority.
Songun (Military First
policy) remains a central component of Pyongyang's
domestic and foreign behavior: Kim Jong-eun has
now been officially tied to the shelling of
Yeonpyeong Island; he is making visits to military
sites on a regular basis; he ordered the KPA to
wipe out all enemies in the event of war or
provocation; and, North Korea is moving full steam
ahead with its Kwangmyongsong-3 launch plans.
What is more, the nuclear weapons program
could be just as important for his success as it
was for his father. Linking the nuclear weapons
program to Kim Jong-il was an essential factor in
creating a personality cult for a man that had no
genuine leadership qualities. This decision was so
critical that the domestic drivers for the weapons
probably became even greater than the bearing the
external pressures had on Pyongyang's quest. This
was an historic shift.
To build Kim
Jong-eun's image he has been touted as the
mastermind behind the uranium nuclear program even
though it may have emerged as far back as 1996
when Kim was still in middle school. Making
matters worse, Kim Jong-il's legacy has been tied
to the nuclear weapons program. To be sure,
domestic considerations are as relevant as they
have ever been.
Prestige, identity and
norms The primary drivers that have been
identified within this area relate to the violent
historical circumstances in which North Korea came
into existence, the state ideologies of Juche and
Songun, the psychological dispositions of all
three Kims, and, the desire for both domestic and
international prestige. As far as international
norms go, North Korea clearly continues to ignore
them.
As Scott Sagan has noted, states
sometimes pursue nuclear weapons for their
symbolic power. In North Korea this has been
exploited systematically to demonstrate to the
people the value of the regime in using nuclear
weapons to fight back against the US and the
South, and to tout itself as a member of the
nuclear club, which, in reality, is a pretty elite
group. Of course, the weapons have also brought in
much needed aid and put the North at a higher
diplomatic bargaining position than if it were a
non-proliferator.
In 1998 it didn't
matter that the first Kwangmyongsong satellite
failed to launch properly. The KCNA was filled
with elaborate stories about how the satellite was
"transmitting the melody of the immortal
revolutionary hymns "Song of General Kim Il-sung"
and "Song of General Kim Jong-il" and that it will
"add to the common treasure house of humanity." In
a couple of weeks we can expect to hear the same,
along with the continued pursuit of enhanced
nuclear and military capabilities. North Koreans
have been told for decades about the value of
these weapons, and the need to be militarily
vigilant. Smuggled South Korean DVDs and cell
phone conversations along the Chinese border might
make their mouths water for liberty and the
comforts of the outside world, but they will not
easily upend this deeply ingrained identity.
Freeze dried - add water and
use There is every reason to believe that
for the time being Pyongyang will not relinquish
its nukes. North Korea's reasons for going nuclear
are inextricably linked which creates big hurdles.
As long as the Party and military elites jostle
for power, it will be challenging for Kim Jong-eun
to feel confident that he could usher in reforms
and maintain power and not open himself up to coup
attempts, assassination, or regime change by other
states and reunification on South Korean terms.
Some have expressed hope that Kim Jong-eun might
be reform-minded, but going to school in
Switzerland is not going to be enough to make him
see the light. Even if the US agreed to negotiate
a peace treaty with Pyongyang effectively ending
the Korean War, and even if all of Pyongyang's
imaginable security concerns disappeared
overnight, there is still a strong likelihood that
it would pursue nukes because it felt them
necessary for domestic control.
But
throwing our hands in the air in exasperation
claiming we will never solve the North Korea
problem will get us nowhere. In grad school I
attended the Student Conference on United States
Affairs (SCUSA) at WestPoint Military Academy. My
table was chaired by John S. Park of the United
States Institute of Peace. To get us thinking on
the right track to come up with solutions on a
challenging issue he used an analogy: in the
height of the space war the US was
(unsuccessfully) spending tens of thousands of
dollars, and a lot of time and energy on
developing a ballpoint pen that could write in
space. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was using a
pencil and focusing their energies on other tasks.
As simple as it may sound, North Korea's
drivers must be eliminated before it is truly
willing to renounce nuclear weapons. To that end,
there are many things that the international
community can be doing to move this agenda,
including not overreacting to a satellite launch,
and not expecting aid to end Pyongyang's nuclear
program. To be sure, a large part of the outcome
depends on what occurs within North Korea's
borders. Until then, Pyongyang's nukes are freeze
dried; all the regime needs to do is find an
excuse to add water.
Ben
Kolisnyk holds two degrees in political
science and is an avid North Korea watcher. He
currently works as a policy analyst for a
non-profit organization in Canada.
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say.Please
click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
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