SPEAKING
FREELY Old
rogues take different
trajectories By Ben Kolisnyk
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please
click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
With the major
developments in North Korean affairs over the past
several months it would not be surprising if you
failed to consider the impact the fragile
transition in Myanmar (Burma) is having on its
relationship with North Korea, and how it is
reshaping the geopolitical landscape in East Asia.
From the announcement of a uranium nuclear
program to the death of Kim Jong-il and the
ascension of Kim Jong-eun to the North Korean
throne, and the mess of the recent aid for nuclear
deal, to be sure, bigger
things are prevailing in the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK).
The relationship
between North Korea and Myanmar became pretty
friendly over the years, which is significant
given the severing of ties following the infamous
1983 Yangon (Rangoon) bombing in which, allegedly,
North Korean commandos targeted the South Korean
president for assassination during a ceremony to
mark the assassination of Aung San.
In the
years since, North Korea and Myanmar have been
often compared because they share a lot in common
including, among other things, untapped resources,
being two of the most repressive regimes in Asia,
having societies in which the military plays a
central role, and having tremendous geostrategic
importance in the seemingly perpetual Great Game
battleground called East Asia. This last trait is
the most intriguing as Myanmar begins to open up,
playing into the intensifying China-US
Asia-Pacific rivalry.
Both Myanmar and
North Korea have been called, rightly or wrongly,
pearls in China's strategic plan to develop a
string of outposts along its southern and eastern
border facilitating a more distinct hegemonic
posture in the region. China has invested heavily
in both countries, which is one reason that it is
sour over Myanmar's opening and rapidly developing
ties with the US, which threatens to limit or
reduce China's claim over Myanmar's resources and
hamper China's plans to use Burmese ports for
military and economic purposes.
Some
suggest that China is also concerned about the
degree to which Kim Jong-eun is viewing the
situation in Myanmar in decisions on whether to
introduce his own reforms. Thus far, there does
not appear to be any real reason to believe Kim
Jong-eun really cares one way or another.
When the US visited Myanmar to praise its
release of political prisoners among other
laudable reforms, North Korea conveniently
announced it had made big progress on its light
water reactor and uranium enrichment program.
North Korea's plans to move ahead with its
satellite launch are further evidence that it is
not about to follow in Myanmar's footsteps. To be
clear, Pyongyang's satellite launch shouldn't be
viewed as a gross violation of international norms
and law; but it is quite clear that this is
exactly the effect it will bring. With this in
mind, Pyongyang is making a conscious choice to
continue its brinksmanship policies.
Being
the target of Chinese influence is not the only
tie that bound Pyongyang and Naypyidaw. The
regimes developed a mutually beneficial trade in
military arms and who knows what other illicit
goods which may also include nuclear technology
and secrets. The emerging reforms in Myanmar and
its quest to have sanctions lifted seriously
threaten this trade.
As Libya and other
former North Korean arms buyers start to fall off
the map, the potential for this trade to end must
be disconcerting to Pyongyang. It is hard to know
how much of a dent this would put in Pyongyang's
revenue stream, but even the slightest reduction
could have significant consequences.
Adding to these concerns is surely the
result of the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Summit at which
Chinese President Hu joined the chorus of
international condemnation of North Korea's
planned satellite launch. Reaction appears mixed
but many believe Beijing is simply growing weary
of Pyongyang's antics.
But Chinese
pressure in this case is not that surprising. US
food aid for North Korea can be seen in two ways
in China's eyes: aid helps to maintain stability
therefore reducing the likelihood of a coup,
internal dissent, revolution, rogue or aggressive
military actions, and streams of North Koreans
charging the North Korea-Chinese border.
On the other hand, if Pyongyang is denied
the aid because of the rocket launch or any other
reason, North Korea becomes even more dependent on
Chinese support, giving Beijing more leverage in
its dealings with Pyongyang. Both are positive
outcomes for China so it makes perfect sense for
China to join the chorus. Besides, no matter what
it does, North Korea will do as it pleases because
of the importance of the satellite launch on
various levels, including the celebration of Kim
Il-sung's centenary.
Guaranteeing North
Korean acquiescence to China's broader goals of
stability on its doorstep and limiting US
influence in the region is surely a major goal.
For this reason Beijing must tread carefully in
order to discourage in North Korea what appears to
be happening in Myanmar. Although North Korea has
historically relied on China a great deal, if this
reliance is eroded stability in the region will be
eroded as well. An isolated Pyongyang for China
can be good, so long as Pyongyang doesn't follow
Myanmar's trajectory into US favor. Since North
Korea holds much more geostrategic importance,
this is all the more important for China.
To China's advantage is that North Korea
simply isn't Myanmar. One big difference between
the two is that there are no nascent democracy
movements or rebel groups to speak of in North
Korea. So far Myanmar's reforms seem real, even if
protracted.
However, the April 1
by-election, which is a follow up to the 2010
elections which many considered a sham producing
mostly military and former military
representatives, and the outcome of the struggle
to amend Myanmar's constitutional provision which
requires 25% of parliamentary seats to go to
members of the state military, are true litmus
tests.
If, in fact, there is smooth
transition to democracy, it will be very
interesting to see if the former junta rulers are
held accountable for their brutal actions of the
past. How they are treated could have a strong
impact on the rulers in North Korea and their
choice to make North Korea a more open society.
The problem is that this is unlikely to
happen anytime soon. The Western assumption is
that the running of Aung San Suu Kyi and her
National League for Democracy (NLD) Party's
candidates in the election will produce a
landslide in favor of democracy.
However,
with only 45 seats contested, and if insider
accounts are accurate, Myanmar's political
landscape is actually quite split, with a large
portion of the population who do not support the
NLD for various reasons. At the very least this is
positive because it suggests that open political
dialogue and freedom of choice is becoming more
prominent in Myanmar.
As such, there will
naturally be the tendency to chalk up Burma's
reforms to pressure from within, but outside
pressure in the form of sanctions and the politics
of removing them has played a large role in this
process. The implications of this for North Korea
are unclear. There is, of course, optimism that
North Korea is on the brink of change.
But
minimal pressure from below, as of yet, and the
apparent futility of influencing North Korea from
the outside suggests that any change will only
occur dramatically, as in war because of military
provocations from either party, or rapid regime
collapse from within. The alternative is that the
North Korean regime's power will be eroded through
gradual changes in North Korea's class, economic
and socio-political structure. The outside
preference must be for the latter path, though it
can be an excruciating thing to monitor and
anticipate.
The other major difference is
that Myanmar doesn't possess nuclear weapons. Many
arguments have been formed on the basis that the
US and its allies have targeted states for
political, military and/or economic motivations,
and that the willingness to attack these states
was made easier because these states did not
possess nuclear weapons. The North Korean case
seems to verify this thesis.
The Myanmar
case does not. There has been no shortage of
excuses to intervene in Myanmar. And while there
may have been hints that it has pursued nuclear
weapons and technology in the past it was never
close enough to make potential invaders think
twice. The presence of nuclear weapons is thus not
the only deterrent to potential foreign
aggression; regional rivalries and the threat of
big power conflict are still a deterrent for
imperial conquest and conflict between states.
What is more, the motivation to intervene must
also carry substantial perceived benefits.
Despite these fundamental differences, it
is important to question whether Myanmar's push
for reform is for real. Could it be taking a page
out of Pyongyang's books and looking to hold out
reform as a carrot for US support, only to rip it
away? Could it also be stealing a page from
Pyongyang's playbook on masterfully playing allies
and enemies off one another? Or will it simply
side with the US and expose secrets of its illegal
dealings with North Korea?
As Sebastian
Strangio points out in his recent article in The
Diplomat, it is worth noting that Bertil Lintner,
an expert on Burmese affairs, argues that freeing
Aung San Suu Kyi was part of the former junta's
master plan in a bid to wean itself from Chinese
influence and satisfy minimal expectations from
the US in order to end sanctions and garner
valuable foreign aid and investment. (See The
master plan for Myanmar, Asia Times Online,
Feb 10, 2012.)
And as long as the
opposition is handcuffed by the current
constitution, the views of the military rulers are
likely to prevail. Under this scenario Myanmar's
reforms look a lot more tentative, with the
potential to retain its status as the second most
repressive regime in the region.
It is not
a foregone conclusion that the policies of the
regimes in North Korea and Myanmar outlined above
are going to continue but the two do seem to be on
different trajectories. Policy paths will depend
to a large degree on who is really in power in
both Pyongyang and Naypyidaw.
Therefore,
it is questionable whether the ways in which the
international community handles Myanmar in this
delicate transition period has great potential to
send signals to Pyongyang. Despite the importance
of both North Korea and Myanmar to both China and
the US, North Korea's situation suggests that it
is likely to continue its successful hold on
domestic power and resistance to significant
manipulation by interested actors in the region.
Regardless of whether or not there is true
democratic progress in Myanmar, ongoing political
and economic instability is likely to put Myanmar
at risk of becoming another battleground in the
quest to adorn their crowns with the jewels of the
Asia-Pacific as China and the US manipulate
holders of political and economic power in a bid
to suck dry its resources and territory for all it
is worth, leaving it politically impotent. If this
is the case, North Korea is likely to feel more
confident that its brinkmanship policy is more
valuable and important to national independence
and regime survival than ever.
Ben
Kolisnyk holds two degrees in political
science and is an avid North Korea watcher. His
articles have appeared in this publication as well
as The Korea Times and Joong Ang Daily in South
Korea.
(Copyright 2012 Ben Kolisnyk.)
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please
click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
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