Reeling from North Korea's provocative
rocket launch, the international community is
shining the obligatory spotlight of shame on
Pyongyang. As always the rhetoric of condemnation
came from around the world and the United Nations
even gained China's consent in the joint statement
chastising North Korea. However, the monochrome
analyses of the situation by policymakers and
"experts" reflects how the world will continue to
be ineffective in dealing with the North Korean
problem.
In a recent article on Foreign
Affairs, Jennifer Lind identified some of the
reasons why the US has been rendered immobile on
the Korean Peninsula: Pyongyang's
unpredictability, the catastrophic consequences of
North Korea's collapse, and the regime's nuclear
capabilities. [1] Professor Lind's conclusions are
not out of the ordinary, but her contextualization
of the launch within a "long
history of unpunished
provocations" provides an interesting insight on a
common shortfall in popular analysis of North
Korean foreign policy.
Lind presumes a
single linear narrative from the 1968 hijacking of
the USS Pueblo to the 2010 shelling of the
Yeonpyeong Island. While all these events share
the common theme of North Korean instigation and
Washington's inaction, without attempting to
assess the various factors that motivate
Pyongyang's provocative behavior, the broad
interpretation of events implicitly reinforces the
presupposition that North Korea's leaders act
irrationally or without calculating risk.
Deprived of context, the provocations
appear to be a mere application of brute force
seeking immediate gratification (US hostages,
death of South Korean politicians, etc) without
long-term strategic gains. Yet evidence suggests
that North Korea, like other states, practices
doctrines, assumes legacies, and responds to
international conditions. This is not to insinuate
that Pyongyang's every move falls within some
grand strategy, but there is no need to encourage
an oversimplified interpretation, especially when
there is empirical evidence that reveals the
complexity of Pyongyang's foreign policymaking
rationality.
The 1968 Pueblo crisis
highlights this fact. Since Pyongyang did not
share its intentions to hijack the US navy
intelligence ship with other communist states,
North Korea's true rationale behind the
provocation remains unknown. Nonetheless, new
documents uncovered in the archives of former
communist states by the Woodrow Wilson Center
underscore several key factors that were present
in North Korea's decision-making process. Most
recently, documents from the archive of the
Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs note how
Pyongyang may have sought closer ties with Beijing
in 1968 by aggressively engaging Seoul and
Washington. [2]
If cooperation with China
was what incentivized North Korea's provocations
during the Pueblo crisis, then Pyongyang
would have been forced to reassess its behavior
when China's relations with the United States
shifted in the 1970s. This is consistent with the
dramatic decrease in violence on the peninsula
during the US-China detente despite Pyongyang
maintaining hostile intentions towards Seoul. [3]
Furthermore, this also explains why scholars have
been unable to identify a singular motive running
through North Korea's maritime provocations
against South Korea in the Yellow Sea; Pyongyang
is relentless responding to changes in the
international environment. [4]
In short,
there is little value in looking at the different
North Korean provocations without assessing their
causes and circumstances because each event
developed from strategies responding to realities
of that period of conflict. The manifestations of
these strategies often appear violent and
provocative because they are built upon
pre-existing military tensions on the peninsula.
Failure to see all these variables at play
results in a redundant assessment that yields no
useful recommendation to break the tragedy and
suffering in Korea. Likewise, while Lind is
correct to criticize the ineffectiveness of
current US policy that merely revolves around
sanctions, she too does not present anything new.
Going forward, analysts and policymakers
of the international community must keep in mind
the current realities that will affect North
Korea's strategic thinking. Pyongyang's
willingness to forfeit the nutritional aid
promised in the "Leap-day Deal" highlights the
regime's readiness to combat the international
order. Many see the rocket launch as a precursor
to a nuclear test; in particular, now that the
satellite has failed to enter orbit, experts
suggest that the North Korean state may feel
compelled to prove its destructive capacities to
its citizens. [5]
Meanwhile, Moscow and
Beijing's quiet responses to the rocket launch
indicate that even in the event of a nuclear test,
neither of Pyongyang's major supporters is likely
to do anything substantial to reprimand the
regime. On the contrary, growing Chinese
investments and Russia's vision of a trans-Korean
pipeline protect North Korea from rebuke that
would jeopardize continued cooperation in these
key projects. Pyongyang is undoubtedly aware of
this and acts accordingly.
Despite solid
support from China and Russia, North Korea is
still dominated by extreme insecurities. In order
to maintain parity with Seoul, Pyongyang has to
project its greatest asset: the regime's apparent
willingness to go to war. (See Calculus
of an existential war Asia Times Online, April
21, 2011.)
However, since the sinking of
the South Korean frigate Cheonan and the
shelling of the Yeonpyeong Island, the North
Korean military cannot attack physical assets in
South Korea without provoking a serious response.
Therefore, Pyongyang must choose other means to
project deterrence. Rocket launches and nuclear
weapons tests accommodate the needs of the state
perfectly.
Recognizing that Pyongyang is
motivated by insecurity, Washington's best chance
of bringing stability to the region is to play a
high stakes game where the US offers North Korea
recognition, security, etc, in exchange for the
nuclear program, ballistic missiles, and more.
Former ambassador Morton Abramowitz
suggests exactly this approach and recommends
sending a senior level official such as the vice
president to negotiate. [6] While Abramowitz
recognizes the inherent political challenges
associated with dispatching such a senior
politician to a rogue state, it is hard to see an
alternative method of dealing with this crisis
without broaching the subject of what the North
Korean state most desires.
Washington
bears the burden of dealing with Pyongyang.
Allowing instability to overtake the region will
be costly and unsafe for both North Korea's
neighbors and North Koreans themselves. The
fastest way for this to occur is if the US elects
not to negotiate at all.
Unfortunately,
this is most likely to happen in a sensitive time
like an election year. Nonetheless, US
policymakers must dispel the long-held assessment
that North Korea will not alter its behavior under
any circumstances and move forward towards
engagement. Pyongyang will respond to changes, but
Washington must initiate these changes.
The alternative is for the whole world to
carry another security and humanitarian crisis
into the decades to come. The time for change is
now.
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
