SPEAKING
FREELY North Korea puts China in harm's
way By Thapa Pradip
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North Korea has put
China in a difficult position. The engagement
approach China has pushed forward through
multilateral initiative, namely Six Party Talks
and through its own bilateral efforts vis-เ-vis
North Korea has not helped.
China has been
one of the firm believers in resolving North
Korean nuclear issue through peaceful solution.
The six-party talks framework hosted by China
since 2003 is a multilateral effort through which
China has tried to put its diplomatic prowess at
work by assuming what Samuel S Kim (2005) calls a "multiple
and multitasking role of
host, facilitator, mediator, and arbiter" to
address the nuclear issue.
But North Korea
has proved a defiant ally who not only routinely
breaks international law but also the commitments
it makes by itself. For instant, almost three
years of patient diplomacy by China and other
countries to convince North Korea to forgo nuclear
ambition in exchange of economic and political
inducement was rendered invaluable when in 2006
North Korea test-fired a long-range missile
followed by nuclear test.
Despite North
Korea's provocation, China took balanced approach
in the UN Security Council on issues related to
economic sanctions. When by the end of 2006, China
again convinced North Korea to take part in the
talks, there was some welcome progress with regard
to North Korea's deactivating of nuclear
facilities.
However, just when the
denuclearization process was about to enter the
serious round of devising standards for
verification, North Korea backtracked from the
commitments it had made. In April 2009, North
Korea tested an alleged long-range missile
violating the 2006 UN resolution and in May 2009
it carried out fresh nuclear test. It renounced
the six-party talks as a framework that had
'turned into a platform' for forcing the North to
disarm and for bringing down its system of
governance.
Despite China's call for North
Korea to return to the six-party talks, North
Korea took the Korean Peninsula to the brink of
war when in March 2010 it allegedly torpedoed
South Korean warship followed by the November 2010
shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. In the wake of the
growing tension, despite the lack of interest on
the part of other stakeholders, China again
emphasized the urgent need for resumption of
six-party talks.
Indeed, even before Kim
Jong-il died in December 2011, China readily
backed his son Kim Jong-un as the future leader of
the country, facilitating stable transition. With
China's prodding, North Korea agreed in a February
29, 2012 deal with the US in Beijing to halt
nuclear weapons tests, uranium enrichment, and
long-range missile launch and allow International
Atomic Energy Agency to inspect its nuclear
facilities in exchange for food aid. A mere 16
days after this agreement, North Korea repeated
its erstwhile tactics, allegedly launching a
missile in the guise of a satellite, and in the
wake of that failure, preparing for the third
nuclear test.
Role
questioned Justifiably or unjustifiably,
the years of unyielding talks and periodic display
of defiance by North Korea has led the critics of
engagement to point their fingers at China for its
alleged inability to use its leverage to cajole or
coax North Korea to implement the agreements or to
not to carry out provocative activities. Writing
after North Korea's second nuclear test, Gordon G
Chang (2009) argued that reliance on Beijing to
contain Pyongyang and disarm Kim was a mistake on
the part of the US because Chinese gave North
Korea "time" to develop nuclear weapons and the
missiles.
Robert Kagan and Dan Bluemanthal
(2009) criticized China as a middleman having no
interest in closing the deal. Some saw China's
unwillingness to use economic pressure as a factor
that has emboldened North Korea to defy
international concerns. Indeed, North Korea's
provocations have time and again rendered
engagement as an inapplicable approach to deal
with it.
The US disinterest in appeasing
North Korea after second nuclear test was
reflected in a metaphor then Secretary of Defense
Robert Bill used: "I am not interested to buy the
same horse twice".
In the aftermath of
2010 attacks on South Korean interests during
which China showed reluctance to support South
Korea's position, China was criticized viciously
by South Korea and the US, with South Korea
President Lee Myung-bak urging the visiting
Chinese envoy to take "a more objective,
responsible" stance in handling inter-Korean
affairs, and US President Barack Obama chiding
China for what he called "willful blindness". Even
when China joined other UN Security Council
members in condemning the recent North Korean
missile launch, there are murmurs that China
supplied the missile launch transporter to North
Korea violating the weapon sanctions.
The Cost of escalation In the
game of engagement, China as a country hosting the
talks can play influential role to shape the
geopolitics of the Korean Peninsula. But when
tensions spiral in the region because of North
Korean provocations, strategic environment in the
region becomes a challenge for China. In fact,
when China cannot even rein its ally, the prospect
of China influencing the strategic choices of the
US-Japan-South Korea triangle is minimal.
Risk of war North Korea's
provocations put a question mark on the peace and
stability in the Korean Peninsula as laid bare by
the military tension throughout 2010 and 2011 when
war rhetoric were flying in the region. The danger
of war is again rising
Furious of the
criticisms of its failed rocket launch, North
Korea is again ratcheting up the war rhetoric.
Evoking the fear of the 2010 attacks on South
Korean interests, North Korea has warned South
Korea of unspecified "special action". Whether it
is going to make good of its threat - and ignore
the possibility of US and South Korea retaliation
in kind - is a big question which some may think
render the North Korean warning as a hollow
threat. But, given the level of tensions, and the
chances of adventurism and miscalculation, there
is serious risk for conflict to flare up.
North Korea is continuing with the
provocations, the alleged preparation for third
nuclear test being a case in point. These
continuous provocations put pressure on the US and
allies to make it sure that the punitive measures
they have applied constrain North Korea quickly
and effectively. If North Korea keeps on advancing
its capabilities - say it is close to develop
nuclear warhead-fitted missile that can target the
US, then the US might consider military option as
a means for preventive war, even if it has a big
price tag. If they do not choose this extreme
option, they might very well sabotage North Korean
test by shooting down North Korean missile, as
they threatened during recent launch, or even
making pre-emptive strike on launch sites. In any
case, the risk of war increases.
The war,
if happen, would put China in a difficult
position. Firstly, war in the Korean Peninsula
would mean significant economic fallout, affecting
China's interests. Secondly, there is a question
of what China will do if war breaks out. During
the Korean War, China fought from the North Korean
side with the rationale to preserve North Korea as
a buffer zone between itself and US forces based
in South Korea. The 1961 treaty between China and
North Korea, which still exists, calls for mutual
military assistance in the case of aggression by a
third party against either one of them. In the
current context however, China has great stake in
maintaining its political and economic
relationships with South Korea, Japan and the US.
At the same time analysts point out that
China wants North Korea to not to be overrun by
the US and south Korea as that would mean the loss
of so called "buffer zone". This would put China
in a dilemma if war were to break out in the
Korean Peninsula.
The militarized
region While China's interests in seeing
peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula
converges with the interests of the US, Japan and
South Korea, it is not so when one looks at
broader strategic picture. There are security
related sensitivities between China and the US
block. North Korea's provocative moves do not help
China's interest, especially when they provoke
regional militarization.
Responding to
North Korean provocations, South Korea, Japan and
the US have been building capabilities,
individually and collectively, for years now. In
the case of the US-Japan security alliance, as
Thomas J Christensen (1999) writes, concern about
North Korean nuclear activities as early as the
1990s played a large role in solidifying the
US-Japan alliance through agreements such as 1996
Joint communiqu้ and 1997 Revised Defence
Guidelines, which envisioned an increased role for
Japan in what was termed as "situations in the
area surrounding Japan". Similarly, the North
Korean 1998 missile test across Japanese sky is
thought to have triggered Japan's decision to
jointly develop an Anti-Ballistic-Missile system
(ABM) with the US, making it the only country to
have joined hands with the US in this project. To
quote Richard J Samuels (2007): "North Korea has
been a useful surrogate, allowing military
planners to reconfigure Japan's defense posture in
a way that deals with both neighbors", ie North
Korea as well as China.
The response to
North Korea's nuclear and missile threats after
2006 have been robust. ABM systems have been
operationalized both on land and at sea. China
cannot question the use of this system as loudly
as Russia does in Eastern Europe because North
Korea, its provocative ally, gives a perfect
reason for concerned countries to develop and
operationalize these systems. The US-South Korea
joint military drills are routine now as South
Korea, which had earlier been viewed as drifting
towards China, is now firmly in the US embrace.
Military activities around China's periphery are
increasing because of North Korea, but there is
not much China can do even if these same
capabilities could hurt China. Indeed, a third
nuclear test by North Korea would give further
momentum to the latest US push to focus its
military might in Asia, and more reason for China
to worry.
Conclusion Successful
six-party talks could have earned China a windfall
of global praise as a responsible rising power,
enhancing its geopolitical profile regionally and
globally. North Korea's international
politico-economic engagement could also have
strengthened its domestic stability (a concern for
China), while enhancing the broader socio-economic
welfare of the population. However, by acting
recklessly, North Korea is turning out to be a
strategic burden for China. While in the 1950s and
1960s, a militarily strong North Korea could have
been the preferred option for China, the
post-reform interests of China are focused more on
stability and hence it advocates engagement to
solve North Korean nuclear issue. In the context
of the Korean Peninsula, China's strategic
interest in seeing North Korea as a buffer zone
could be strengthened by economically vibrant
North Korea rather than impoverished yet dangerous
North Korea which invites security and stability
concerns.
Thapa Pradip is a
master's candidate at the Institute of
Sustainability and Peace, United Nations
University, Tokyo, Japan, and can be reached
at praedip@gmail.com
Speaking
Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows
guest writers to have their say.Please
click hereif you are interested in
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