Hard
truths from Pyongyang's prodigal
son By Andrei Lankov
SEOUL - It seems that every royal family
is bound to have a maverick prince - and Kim
Jong-nam, the eldest son of Kim Jong-il, fills the
role for North Korea's ruling family.
Kim
Jong-nam was born in 1970. Soon afterwards, his
mother Song Hye Rim, a beautiful actress, broke up
with his father. Nonetheless, the boy spent his
childhood in the palaces of the Kim family and
then in expensive overseas schools. For a brief
time, he was even considered the most likely
successor to his father.
For various
reasons, things went awry and for the past 15
years or so, Kim Jong-nam has lived in China and
the Chinese territory of Macau, visiting North
Korea only occasionally.
From 2002 or
2003, Kim Jong-nam began to behave strangely (at
least in one important regard) - he became the
only member of
the Kim family who was
not completely and unconditionally media shy. If
intercepted by foreign journalists, he usually was
happy to engage in conversation.
In most
cases, what transpired was merely a little small
talk, but it showed in and of itself the fact that
North Korea's black prince was nonetheless witty
and charismatic. With the passage of time, his
occasional interviews have become more substantive
in content and more politically frank. In 2010, he
even went so far as to openly voice his
disapproval of the hereditary power transfer at
that point developing in Pyongyang, with Kim
Jong-eun being prepared to take over from his
father, which happened after Kim Jong-il died in
December last year.
However, the real
bombshell was dropped earlier this year when Yoji
Gomi, a journalist for Japan's Tokyo Shimbun,
published a book that described his interactions
with Kim Jong-nam. In most cases, these were
limited to the exchange of e-mails, but there were
a few meetings as well and at one point, Yoji Gomi
was granted a long interview with Kim Jong-nam.
This interview was published in the Tokyo
Shimbunin early 2011, but the book itself adds
much to what was initially published.
Interestingly, it was Kim Jong-nam that
sought out Yoji Gomi. In 2004, at Beijing Airport,
Kim Jong-nam ran into a group of foreign
journalists, most of whom handed to the North
Korean prince - then still widely seen as the most
likely successor - their business cards. Somewhat
surprisingly, Kim Jong-nam sent e-mails to some of
them, but as far as we know now, Yoji Gomi was the
only journalist to successfully establish a
long-term connection with Kim Jong-nam.
For the subsequent years, they exchanged
e-mails and occasionally met in person as well.
In these exchanges, Kim Jong-nam was
seemingly quite careful. He did not divulge
information related to the personal lives or
factional struggles of the leadership in
Pyongyang. He also made it clear that he has no
political power in the North (he is a half brother
to current leader Kim Jong-eun). He has studiously
avoided explaining how he was able to enjoy the
highly agreeable lifestyle he does in Macau and
refused to talk about the origins of his
considerable personal wealth.
In other
words, it is clear that Kim Jong-nam said only a
fraction of what he knows. Nonetheless, the book
is the most frank testimony to have emerged from
the ruling elite in Pyongyang, of whom Kim
Jong-nam was once a very important part.
The single-most important topic in the
Japanese-language book, titled My Father, Kim
Jong-il, and Me, is the (im)possibility of
Chinese-style reforms in North Korea (the book is
also published in Korean). Indeed, for nearly two
decades, many outside observers have expected that
North Korea would eventually emulate the stunning
success of China and embark on similar
market-orientated reforms which are apparently all
but certain to revive the country's moribund
economy.
Some other observers, including
the present author, have been less optimistic;
they have indicated that in the peculiar case of
North Korea, which faces a "dirty rich" and free
South, attempts at reform and relaxation are
highly dangerous politically. In the unique case
of North Korea, attempts at reform are likely to
produce a collapse followed by absorption by the
South, rather than a Chinese-style boom.
It seems that Kim Jong-nam's statements
have confirmed that the pessimists were correct in
their assessments of North Korea's reasoning on
the issue (being one of the pessimists himself,
the ego of present author feelings well massaged
by Kim Jong-nam's remarks).
In a number of
his letters and interviews, Kim Jong-nam has
clearly stated his belief that market-orientated
reforms would probably revive the North Korean
economy. In one case, addressing his half-brother
Kim Jong-eun (by that time already the successor
to Kim Jong-il), he implored him to have pity on
the common people and follow the Chinese example.
However, in many other cases, Kim Jong-nam
is far less certain about the potential positive
impact of reforms. In his interview in January
2011, he said, "I personally believe that economic
reforms and openness are the best ways to make
life better for the North Korean people. However,
taking North Korea's unique position into account,
there is a fear that economic reforms and openness
will lead to the collapse of the present system."
At other points, Kim Jong-nam repeated the
same point: "The North Korean leadership is stuck
in a bind. Without reforms the country's economy
will go bankrupt, but reforms are fraught with the
danger of systemic collapse."
In one of
his letters discussing with Yoji Gomi the
then-recent Fukushima nuclear disaster and
resultant electricity shortages in Japan, Kim
Jong-nam emphasized that apparent similarities
with North Korea were superficial. He said, "North
Korea's electricity problems result from North
Korea's systemic economic problems."
One
cannot be more certain on this issue. Kim Jong-nam
confirms that North Korea's leaders are aware of
the potential economic benefits of reforms. They
are, however, concurrently aware of the huge
associated political risks and hence they remain
indecisive.
Kim Jong-nam mentions that
around 2006, the North Korean leadership created a
special group whose task was to study the Chinese
experience and suggest ways in which North Korea
could emulate China's success.
The head of
the group was Chang Song Taek, the brother-in-law
of Kim Jong-il, and at present seemingly regent
(either as advisor or maybe as actual ruler) to
Kim Jong-eun. According to Kim Jong-nam, the
"Chang Song Taek committee" could not come up with
any recommendations. Thus North Korea has
continued its politically safe and economically
disastrous course.
Kim Jong-nam touched on
another sensitive issue - the hereditary
succession. He is known to have voiced his
disapproval of hereditary transfer of power in
other interviews, but in his exchanges with Yoji
Gomi he sounded more ambivalent.
On one
hand, Kim Jong-nam admits that the idea of
hereditary succession is clearly anachronistic. He
said, "[The world] having left behind the era of
feudal monarchies, so we are an unusual laughing
stock."
Kim Jong-nam has even claimed that
his father was initially unsupportive of further
hereditary succession. On the other hand, Kim
Jong-nam is less critical, he emphasizes the fact
that the hereditary power transfer makes a lot of
sense domestically since the people of North Korea
have grown used to the idea of being run by
members of the "Paektusan family".
Kim
Jong-nam does not explicitly use the word
"legitimacy", but this is clearly what he means.
He goes on to claim that hereditary succession
might not be such a bad idea after all, since it
will lead to continued stability in the North,
which he claims is in everyone's interests.
Another important issue that is raised in
the book is the growing level of North Korea's
economic dependency on China. These remarks are
important because Kim Jong-nam is often seen as a
"Beijing man", a person who lives under Chinese
control and might be even become a head of a
pro-Chinese regime if such a regime was ever to
emerge in Pyongyang.
Actually, Kim
Jong-nam admitted that the Chinese had much
interest in him, so he lived under a mixture of
protection and surveillance by the Chinese
authorities.
Kim Jong-nam is not
particularly hostile to China, but he is hardly
sycophantic when it comes to describing Chinese
policies. On the one hand, Kim Jong-nam admits
that China's major goal is to maintain the status
quo in the region. At the same time, however, he
also states that China hopes to establish control
over the North Korean economy - a development that
"cannot be welcomed from North Korea's point of
view".
Therefore, we have an interesting
piece of important evidence coming from a source
very close to Pyongyang's decision-makers. Kim
Jong-nam's revelations confirm that these people
are smart, rational and know perfectly well what
they are doing. Unfortunately, their overriding
goal is regime survival and this goal is not
necessarily compatible with the interests of their
own people, let alone outside players.
But
this leaves us with an important question: why did
Kim Jong-nam reveal all of this? After all, Kim
Jong-nam initiated contacts with Yoji Gomi and did
not mind discussing many sensitive issues (and he
also talked to a number of other foreign
journalists with comparable level of openness).
Does this mean that he has decided to
partake in the high politics, so he wants to
position himself as the voice of moderate
opposition and win some domestic (or foreign)
political support? Or does it mean the opposite -
that Kim Jong-nam wants to distance himself from
North Korean politics, whose moral shortcomings he
obviously knows only too well?
Or is it a
non-political gesture, an attempt to voice some
opinions and concerns that Kim Jong-nam believes
should be voiced?
We do not know the
answers to these questions. Nonetheless, the
surprisingly frank comments of this charming,
smiling and overweight North Korean princeling
provide us with a rare insider's view into
Pyongyang's way of thinking.
Unfortunately, these insights do not
create much ground for optimism about North
Korea's future.
Andrei Lankov is
an associate professor at Kookmin University in
Seoul, and adjunct research fellow at the Research
School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian
National University. He graduated from Leningrad
State University with a PhD in Far Eastern history
and China, with emphasis on Korea. He has
published books and articles on Korea and North
Asia.
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