The power succession in
North Korea has reached its culmination. Kim
Jong-il, who died seven months ago, left his
youngest son, Kim Jong-eun, as the successor but
appointed a number of high-ranking officials to
mentor him and help ensure a smooth transition.
Now the training wheels are being removed and the
young Kim is about to show the world who he really
is and what he is capable of.
After six
months of training in the driver's seat, Kim
Jong-eun has decided that he is mature enough to
rule the country single-handedly. The sudden
ousting of his military mentor, Vice Marshall Ri
Yong-ho, is puzzling and can only be explained by
a serious conflict which happened between the
regal student and the soldierly supervisor. The
hastiness with which the 69-year-old
veteran was relieved of
his duties in the army and deposed from the Party
was comparable only to the grand purges of the
1960s conducted by Kim's grandfather, North
Korea's founder and Eternal President Kim Il-sung.
There are rumors that Ri Yong-ho defied the
dismissal and ordered his men to open fire,
leaving some 20 or 30 people dead.
As for
the reason why the young dictator would sack his
mentor in such a dishonorable way, one may only
guess and assume that Kim Jong-eun simply decided
to get rid of the last element of guardianship
imposed by his late father. In addition to Kim's
numerous positions within the party and military:
the First Secretary of the Korean Worker's Party,
the Chairman of the Central Military Commission of
the KWP, the First Chairman of the National
Defense Commission, and the Supreme Commander of
Korean People's Army; Kim Jong-eun has recently
been coronated with the highest military rank of
Marshal. Prior to Kim Jong-eun this rank in North
Korea was held by his father and grandfather and,
therefore, is an indication of his peerless
status.
Another dimension of the power
succession process can be traced to the cultural
performance, which Kim Jong-eun attended a week
prior to Ri Hong-ho's fall from grace. The newly
established light music band 'Moranbong' gave its
first concert which was broadcast nationwide.
Rumor has it that Kim Jong-eun personally came up
with the idea for the concert and selected its
performing members. The unusual nature of the show
raised the eyebrows of everyone who saw it. Short
skirts, revealing tops, and the trendy haircuts of
the all-female music band were just the beginning.
Walt Disney characters Mickey and Minnie Mouse,
Winnie the Pooh, Tigger and other symbols of
Western animation culture were warmly welcomed by
the Mao-suited dictator and his uniform-clad
military milieu. (See Kim Jong-eun's Mickey Mouse world, Asia Times Online, Aug 3, 2012)
The mysterious lady, who
has recently accompanied Kim Jong-eun on most
cultural functions, including visits to the elite
kindergarten and 'Moranbong' concert, turned out
to be his wife, Ri Sol-ju (also known under the
name Hyon Song-wol, a former singer from the
Pocheonbo Electronic Music Ensemble). Conspicuous
by her gymnastic posture, short hairdo and trendy
Western clothes, she looks more sophisticated than
her rotund apparatchik-like husband. Nevertheless,
it is a new step in promoting Kim Jong-eun's
public image. He is now being seen by North
Koreans as a mature man and head of the family,
rather than the youngest child of Kim Jong-il. As
a person who has achieved prominent social and
political status he now also enjoys the top spot
in the military.
These are coded signals
designed to reassure the North Korean population
that they are being ruled by a powerful, shrewd
and caring leader. Kim Jong-eun looks young but
prominent; he is conservative in style but modern
in heart; he might be ruthless to subordinates but
is always benevolent to the common people.
The purpose of the recent cosmetic changes
and scandalous reshuffles is to diffuse the issue
of legitimacy, which Kim dynasty inherently faces
with each succession.
Many important
questions (such as: 'Who is this clumsy young man
parading in his granddad's costume?', 'Can he feed
the nation of 23 million people?, and 'Will he
bring about peace or war?') are superseded by the
bizarre mix of pseudo K-Pop shows, fake Disney
parades, and the bloody shoot-outs between vice
marshals.
Can Kim Jong-eun deliver the
many promises which his father and grandfather
bequeathed to the population of the Democratic
People's Republic? Relations with South Korea will
stay strained until the conservative government in
South Korea is replaced by the moderates, who may
opt to once again take up the imperfect "Sunshine
policy". Pyongyang's dialogue with the United
States will remain indefinitely mute or at least
until Kim Jong-eun gives up the nuclear program of
which he is so proud. Russia is too pragmatic to
lend more money to the bankrupt regime. China
expects the young leader to embrace economic
reform, something that Kim cannot permit due to
potentially catastrophic consequences for North
Korea's political system.
In other words,
Kim Jong-eun is left with few choices, none of
which seem suitable. Any attempt to liberalize
economic life in North Korea would leave Kim's
clan vulnerable to the turmoil of a legitimacy
crisis. Moreover, in the process of
market-oriented reform, some of the elite groups
which are associated with non-productive sector of
the economy (the party, the army and state
security) will find their role obsolete and their
socio-economic status will be predictably worse.
Disillusioned masses and angry elites are the best
recipe for popular uprising and a collapse of the
Kim dynasty. This scenario is the worst nightmare
for Kim Jong-eun and his close circle of trusted
advisors.
Despite some temporary
disagreements and purges, the North Korean
leadership will continue supporting superficial
change but will resist any attempts at a
full-fledged reform. Mickey and Minnie Mouse will
continue dancing on Korean Central TV, but the
military-first policy will remain the cornerstone
of domestic politics and the main impediment for
economic and political liberalization. The
dynastic system, however outmoded and ineffective,
permits the young Marshal to keep his subjects
loyal and competing for favors.
North
Korea as we know it cannot be reformed. The
problem is that the state is a hostage of its own
history. So many lies and horrible crimes have
been perpetrated during the 65 years of tyranny
that the youngest of the Kims cannot open up the
country without betraying his predecessors or
jeopardizing the foundations of his own rule. Any
attempt to reform the system will lead to a
legitimacy crisis, public unrest, the fall of the
dynasty, and uncontrolled unification. Attempts to
avoid this scenario will only protract the agony,
permitting North Korea to slowly change in form
but not in content.
Leonid A Petrov
PhD is a lecturer in Korean studies at the
School of Languages and Cultures, Faculty of Arts
and Social Sciences, University of Sydney.
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