SPEAKING
FREELY Europe offers path for a nuclear
Asia By Sangsoo Lee
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Kim Jong-eun's leadership
transition in North Korea has been more-or-less
without incident. Yet many observers remain
concerned about the country's nuclear program,
which could inevitably bring dangerous uncertainty
to the Peninsula and the entire region.
Moreover, it risks opening the way for
continued proliferation of nuclear weapons in the
world, as North Korea is the only country to have
left the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The North
claims the uranium enrichment program is for
peaceful energy
development, but outside
experts believe that it will give the country a
new source of plutonium to make more deadly atomic
bombs.
To quell North Korea's nuclear
program, the international community has attempted
many different approaches. There have, however,
been no positive changes to North Korea's position
as a result of international aid or sanctions. For
example, the past multilateral discussion process,
the Six Party Talks, failed to stop the nuclear
crisis that North Korea's nuclear weapons program
has explicitly developed.
It seems that
Pyongyang's final goal is to force other members
to admit that North Korea is a nuclear nation.
Thus, an obvious question will ensue challenging
the "usefulness" of the negotiation regime, the
Six-Party Talks. It might be necessary for the
member countries to call for a reassessment of
their past negotiation framework as there has been
an increasing request for, and discussion about,
alternative security mechanisms to deal with North
Korea's nuclear issue.
As an alternative
approach, future negotiation could include a wider
range of regional nuclear security matters as
areas of common interest for all countries in
Northeast Asia since the North Korean nuclear
issue is not the only source of instability in the
region. Therefore in order to build mutual trust
and confidence between parties, the purpose of
this nuclear energy-based multilateral framework
is to integrate North Korea into regional
cooperation in Northeast Asia.
Post-Fukushima nuclear
issues Northeast Asia is heavily dependent
on nuclear power. It is the only region in the
world where steady expansion of nuclear power is
expected. According to the World Nuclear
Association, Japan has two reactors under
construction but another three which were likely
to start building by mid-2011 have been deferred.
South Korea plans to bring a further four reactors
into operation by 2017, and another five by 2021.
Meanwhile, in China, some 26 reactors are under
construction and many more are likely to enter
planning stages.
However, the expansion of
the region's nuclear reactors raises central
issues regarding regional nuclear safety and
environmental protection as seen by the nuclear
disaster at the Fukushima nuclear plant in Japan
in March, 2011. In fact, nuclear disasters, which
could spread radioactive materials across national
frontiers, pose a significant threat to the
region.
It is estimated that Japan
discharged 11,000 tonnes of contaminated water
into the ocean during the Fukushima nuclear
disaster. Nevertheless, Japan appears bent on
maintaining the troubled Monju prototype
fast-breeder reactor in Fukui Prefecture despite
growing public reservations about the safety of
nuclear energy.
Furthermore, Japan has
recently revised the Atomic Energy Basic Act that
some observers fear could be adapted for military
use. There has been a growing opinion that Japan
has to possess nuclear weapons against North Korea
which threatens Japan with nuclear capabilities
and long-range missiles. As nuclear development
continues in North Korea, an increasing number of
South Koreans support the creation of a nuclear
weapon development program, which is seen as the
only option to deal with North Korea.
In
2004, it was revealed that a government-funded
research institute in South Korea had enriched
uranium to a level just below the requirement for
weapons production. Despite the destruction of the
test and enrichment facility, a US government
report from 2008 described South Korea as a
"threshold nuclear state", defined as a state that
has the capacity to develop and field nuclear
weapons in just a couple of years.
China
is already a nuclear weapon state, as it tested
its first nuclear device in 1964. Official US
Defense Department sources put the size of the
Chinese strategic arsenal at approximately 80
operationally deployed nuclear warheads. In this
regard, it is highly likely that in the near
future a nuclear arms race between Japan, China
and the two Koreas will become the biggest threat
to peace and security in Northeast Asia.
The European experience A
security mechanism in Northeast Asia could
possibly take its inspiration from post-war
Europe. Similar conditions existed in Europe
during the 1950s with a history of conflict and
one that features both nuclear weapons states and
non-nuclear weapons states when the European
Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) was created.
EURATOM created in 1957, was the European
Community's effort to regionalize the management
of civil nuclear power.
Its mandate
includes a common market to insure free movement
of nuclear commerce, nuclear safety standards,
safeguards (beyond those of the International
Atomic Energy Agency), ownership of fissile
materials, non-proliferation policy, research, and
negotiations with other countries on the import
and export of nuclear materials.
Although
both Europe and Northeast Asia display a history
of war and competition of nuclear power among
regional powers, the recent experiences of the two
regions stand in sharp contrast to each other. In
a sense, there is a clear and increasing need for
confidence building in Northeast Asia, which
itself can justify the efforts to establish a
regional scheme to deal with nuclear issues as was
the case for the EURATOM.
In particular,
how might the experience of EURATOM benefit either
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy or regional
security in Northeast Asia? Accordingly, measures
to solve nuclear issues in Northeast Asia should
focus beyond the details of the current nuclear
crisis on the Korean Peninsula and try to shed
some light on the question whether a regional
approach could be applied for Northeast Asia to
resolve other various problems.
Nuclear
cooperation in Northeast Asia There is the
reality of the strong effect of the domestic
situation in each country in Northeast Asia to
promote regional cooperation in the area of
nuclear energy sector. Realistically, not much can
be done until the completion of the 2012 elections
in South Korea, the US and Japan, as well as the
Chinese leadership transition. However, a positive
atmosphere could reemerge after the elections.
Under the new leaderships, possible
cooperation in the nuclear energy sector will be
expected to be on the table in discussions among
Northeast Asian countries. There is a wide
spectrum of options for nuclear cooperation in
Northeast Asia, including areas of nuclear safety,
joint management of spent fuel and plutonium, and
collectively administered regional institutions.
However, cooperation should be a gradual
approach from modest collaboration, to promote the
safe use of nuclear energy, to more ambitious
regional security issues, such as the peaceful use
of nuclear energy focusing on North Korea's
nuclear program.
Sangsoo Lee is a
Research Fellow with the Institute for Security
and Development Policy (ISDP), Stockholm, Sweden.
This piece is a revised version of a Policy Brief
for ISDP. The opinions expressed are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of
ISDP or its sponsors. www.isdp.eu
(Copyright 2012 Institute for Security and
Development Policy)
Speaking Freely is
an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest
writers to have their say. Please click here
if you are interested in contributing. Articles
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