Dealing with "North Korea
3.0" By Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi
A year has passed since Kim Jong-eun
became the leader of North Korea. While there are
some underlying changes, the current leadership
looks and has acted a lot like its predecessors.
The satellite launch on December 12 was
essentially a message from Pyongyang - "Merry
Christmas, we're still here and we'll be back
again next year".
"North Korea 3.0" will
stay the course to bolster domestic legitimacy
while surveying regional reactions and influencing
security dynamics. Yet despite the new
leadership's consistency and continuity, the US,
South Korea, and Japan as a coalition must revise
their strategy vis-a-vis North Korea.
North Korea's ultimate goal remains the
unification of the Korean Peninsula under its
terms. Reality forces the leadership to focus on
regime survival through three strategies -
"politicization", "centralization", and
"inheritance". These concepts, established
and strengthened by Kim
Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, remain the bedrock of
North Korea's political, economic, and military
policies. This triple strategy relies heavily
on symbolism. The cold-weather satellite launch
allows Pyongyang to claim victory in the
inter-Korean space race, even though
Kwangmyongsong-3 is reportedly "tumbling" in a
low-altitude orbit. Frantic reporting to the
contrary, this does not give North Korea an
intercontinental ballistic missile capability.
Pyongyang faces myriad technological barriers such
as target precision and miniaturization of
warheads before it can claim to have strategic
weapons capabilities. Further technological
advances will pose challenges.
Symbolism
is also vital as the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK)
tries to politicize the entire state. The same
framework applies to its military capabilities,
where North Korea believes that military
modernization is not so much about technological
innovation as it is about the innovative
application of existing technology for asymmetric
capabilities. This raises expectations of the
party and military cadres toward the leadership,
further fixing the regime on its current path.
This could lead to a nuclear test or even more
deadly military provocations like the
Cheonan or Yeongpyeong Island incidents.
North Korea will continue to exploit China
without being overly reliant on Beijing. China's
political leverage is not that great, given the
difficulties and distrust between Beijing and
Pyongyang. Despite China's strong economic
influence and unflinching support from elders in
the Communist Party of China (CCP) leadership
along with the new Xi Jinping regime, North Korea
views its ally as an asset to be exploited. Yet
both countries want the North Korean regime to
survive, which compels them to maintain their
alliance. North Korea will engage heavily with the
Xi Jinping leadership to keep the Chinese
"shield".
Extortion remains North Korea's
primary policy vis-a-vis South Korea. The new
South Korean President Park Geun-hye will be more
flexible than Lee Myung-bak (at least until North
Korea conducts a deadly military provocation like
those in 2010). Expect Pyongyang to test the new
administration and then decide whether to deal
with Seoul via dialogue or pressure. North Korea
will also attempt to manipulate South Korea's
politics by taking advantage of the cleavage
between conservatives and progressives, which is
the most effective way to blunt Seoul's leverage
against Pyongyang.
With the return of the
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to power in Tokyo,
North Korea will continue to isolate Japan. For
Pyongyang, the LDP's pursuit of stronger defense
capabilities and Shinzo Abe's strong stance on the
abduction issue are a threat and an irritant,
respectively. North Korea is aware of Japan's
efforts to expand military relations with third
parties such as South Korea, Australia, and some
members of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations. This will further drive Pyongyang to
adopt diplomatic and militarily hostile attitudes
toward Tokyo.
As always, North Korea will
pursue dialogue with the US under its terms.
Pyongyang will utilize military provocations and
the secretive nature of its regime to force
Washington into engagement. For Pyongyang, a peace
treaty with the US is ideal. In the short term,
North Korea will seek any agreement that offers
political and material benefits.
Despite
the continuity in Pyongyang's strategy, it is a
mistake to assume that regional powers can pursue
business as usual. North Korea's military
provocations have revealed weaknesses of the US
and its alliance partners' Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
capabilities and their military readiness. A more
expansive and flexible strategy is needed to deter
North Korea. In truth, China has the most
diplomatic leverage when it comes to North Korea.
But for the US, Japan, and South Korea,
strengthening trilateral coordination and
coherence in ISR, as well as amphibious and air
power projection capabilities to penetrate Korean
People's Army's weaknesses are priorities.
Key to successful trilateral efforts is
greater cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo. While
animosities remain, Japan and South Korea must
acknowledge shared concerns on the Korean
Peninsula and formulate the means to synergize
their capabilities. Increasing military-level
dialogues and finalizing the previously negotiated
Acquisition Crossing Supporting Agreement and
General Security of Military Information Agreement
between Seoul and Tokyo is an essential starting
point. Then, more advanced items such as
inter-operability and contingency plans should be
discussed.
While the exact fate of the
regime is hard to predict, expect more of the same
from Pyongyang in 2013. The US, Japan, and South
Korea must work together to show the North Koreans
that playtime is over.
Dr Ryo
Hinata-Yamaguchi (ryo@pacforum.org), a Vasey
Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS, focuses on the
North Korean military. PacNet commentaries and
responses represent the views of the respective
authors.
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