Kim
points to a gentler North
Korea By Evans J R Revere
A New Year's Day speech by North Korean
leader Kim Jong-eun on improving the nation's
economy and calling for better relations with
South Korea has sparked a flurry of speculation
that Pyongyang is planning a shift in direction in
2013. Is economic reform coming to North Korea?
Are relations between North and South about to
undergo a major turnabout? Is the North preparing
to change its spots?
Prepare to be
disappointed. Experience tells us that a healthy
dose of skepticism is in order when we see hints
of possible change in the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea). We have
been down this road many times before and we are
best served by taking such pronouncements from
Pyongyang with a large grain
of salt.
Nevertheless, several aspects of
Kim Jong-eun's remarks are noteworthy and give us
some insight into the unfolding dynamics of Kim's
rule, as well as a sense of how the North may deal
with Seoul - and Washington - in the coming
months.
To begin with, Kim Jong-eun's
high-profile speech to the nation was the latest
manifestation of his artful "channeling" of his
grandfather. To date, we have seen the youthful
leader adopt many of the late Kim Il-sung's
mannerisms, his style of dress, his gregarious way
of dealing with subordinates, and even his
haircut. On January 1, the young Kim took this
talent to a new level as he revived Kim Il-sung's
one-time practice of addressing the nation on New
Year's Day to praise the country's
accomplishments, inspire the masses, and chart the
course forward. In following in his grandfather's
footsteps, Kim Jong-eun again distinguished
himself from his late father, Kim Jong-il, who was
famously averse to public appearances. A shy and
uncomfortable speaker, Kim Jong-il opted instead
to inspire the nation to achieve new heights by
approving the annual New Year's joint editorial.
Kim Jong-eun's choice of venue for the New
Year's speech was important. He delivered his
remarks at the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) Central
Committee building, a site selected to reinforce
another theme of his year-old leadership: the
primacy of the party over other institutions and
the role of the KWP as the main vehicle for his
rule. It was no accident that the party flag was
displayed prominently next to Kim as he spoke.
Having sought to convey that he is a
leader in his grandfather's mold, and having
reminded the nation (particularly the military)
that the party under his leadership is in the
driver's seat, Kim spent much of the speech
holding forth on another central theme of his
reign: economic growth. Looking through this
section of the speech, one is hard pressed to find
details about future economic plans or concrete
new ideas aimed at boosting the DPRK's anemic
economy. In fact, its hortatory calls for making
new "advances," "building an economic giant," and
"breaking through the cutting edge" resemble the
timeworn, empty exhortations of past New Year's
editorials. Thin gruel indeed.
Rumors have
been circulating for some time that the regime
intends to introduce "Chinese-style" reforms to
rationalize the backward agricultural production
process and to provide incentives to farmers. If
this is the plan, Kim did a good job of obscuring
it in a speech that was strikingly weak and
uninspiring when it comes to something as
important as producing food.
Perhaps we
can draw some solace from the fact that Kim's
speech was an unusually prominent call by the
leader for the North to improve its economy. But
if reform is the hope for North Korea, there was
nothing in the speech to inspire it.
Kim's
extension of an olive branch to the South was
interesting, but hardly surprising. North-South
relations have been in tatters due to the North's
unwillingness to work with outgoing ROK President
Lee. Perhaps driven by a desire not to waste
another five years, Kim Jong-eun used the speech
to signal South Korean President-elect Park
Geun-hye that he may be receptive to her stated
intention to reach out to the North. And doing so
may be in Pyongyang's interest. Re-engagement with
the South would help bolster the North's economy,
which has gone without significant economic,
agricultural, and food aid from the ROK for most
of the past five years.
Seen in this
light, Kim's outreach to the South may be his way
of putting Seoul on notice that re-engagement will
have a price tag denominated in aid. And his
reference to past North-South agreements concluded
under progressive ROK governments is a reminder to
the incoming ROK leadership that assistance was
the sweetener that made those agreements possible.
If the new South Korean president does
intend to re-start aid to the North, she is likely
to have her own asking price. The scars from the
North's sinking of the warship the Cheonan,
its artillery attack on the South's Yeonpyeong
Island, and the killing of a South Korean tourist
at the Kumgang Mountain resort by a North Korean
soldier have not yet healed. Many South Koreans
will demand that Madame Park raise these unsettled
issues with the North, and this is a message
Pyongyang will not want to hear.
The
United States went unmentioned in Kim's speech. No
surprise here. There will be plenty of time to
mention the US (and the rest of the international
community) when the North sees what action the US
and the UN Security Council take in response to
the DPRK's recent rocket launch.
For now,
the young Kim may actually see himself in an
advantageous position with respect to the US. He
has achieved a central goal of the regime by
successfully carrying out a long-range rocket
launch. Thus far, nothing has been done to punish
the DPRK. The success of the launch has taken the
North a step further toward developing a credible
ICBM threat to the US. Meanwhile, reports suggest
the North may be mulling a nuclear test, a step
that would both enhance the DPRK's "deterrent" and
get Washington's attention.
And lest
anyone think the DPRK's core priorities have
changed, Kim reminds us that "only when it builds
up its military might in every way" can North
Korea become a "thriving country" and "defend the
security and happiness" of its people. Indeed,
while Kim's speech makes clear that the Party is
in charge, he makes it no less clear that the
regime's "military first" policy remains firm. For
a speech that is widely interpreted as being about
butter, guns are hardly in a distant second place.
Kim's self-confidence may also be due to
the fact that China is already hinting at its
unwillingness to support tough UN security council
measures against the DPRK over the launch. And if
past practice is any guide, we will soon hear the
PRC praise Kim Jong-eun's New Year's speech for
its "moderation," as some in the US and the South
Korea already have. The North Koreans are masters
at neutralizing Beijing.
The young Kim
could also believe that the US, eager not to be
out of step with its ally, will defer to Seoul's
desire to re-engage with Pyongyang. And the US
might even be eager to make overtures of its own,
if it hasn't already. Pyongyang has developed a
knack for "reading" Washington over the years -
with some success. Today, North Korea's young
leader may believe that a new foreign policy team
in Washington is a ripe target of opportunity for
a "kindler, gentler" approach by Pyongyang.
Finally, for a DPRK that wants the aid
that often flows from dialogue with the US, the
South, and others, re-engagement in talks is a
low-risk option. Pyongyang has made eminently
clear in recent years that denuclearization and
the dismantlement of its missile program are no
longer on the table. So what's to lose?
Evans J R Revere
(erevere@albrightstonebridge.com) is senior
director with the Albright Stonebridge Group and a
non-resident Senior Fellow at the Center for
Northeast Asian Policy Studies. This article
originally appeared in Brookings on January 3,
2013.
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