Page 2 of
2 COMMENT Korea: The case for
withdrawal By Geoffrey
Fattig
For a regime which prides itself on
a doctrine of juche self-reliance, the
near-total dependency on its powerful neighbor has
to be incredibly distressing. Some of this
frustration was on display in October, when the
government heavily criticized a Chinese company,
Xiyang, over a failed mining deal, and Kim
Jong-eun voiced a rare complaint that his
country's mineral resources were being sold off
too cheaply. Indeed, awareness of this
over-dependency may have been one of the
motivators behind new leader's somewhat surprising
call for inter-Korean reconciliation during his
2013 New Year's Day address.
Testing
the waters in the West Sea If North Korea
is truly serious about a change in its antagonistic
relationship with the South,
there are few better places to test this
proposition than in the disputed West Sea area.
Since 1999, this volatile area has witnessed no
less than five deadly incidents, including two in
2010 that were among the worst military
engagements between the two sides since the end of
the Korean War: the Cheonan sinking and the
artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong Island.
The source of this dispute is the
so-called Northern Limit Line (NLL), which has
emerged as the thorniest issue between North and
South in recent years. While historians can argue
about the origins and validity of the line (those
wishing for a more detailed discussion would do
well to read Terence Roehrig's excellent
background paper), in the practical sense, this is
one area that will test the resolve of both North
and South to make the kinds of concessions needed
for peace.
The inter-Korean summit of 2007
attempted to address this problem with the
creation of a joint fishing and maritime peace
area in the West Sea, a multi-billion dollar port
expansion in the northern city of Haeju, and joint
development of the Han River estuary.
Unfortunately, this summit took place with just a
few months left in President Roh's term, and these
projects were never implemented under the Lee
administration. As noted previously, this decision
poisoned inter-Korean relations almost from the
day that Lee came into office.
With
President-elect Park's stance backing
implementation of previous inter-Korean
agreements, the pieces of a deal are still there
if she decides to pick them up. Given the North's
chronic need for injections of foreign capital,
she would likely encounter a receptive audience,
especially if she sweetened the pot by offering
additional economic incentives, such as increased
humanitarian aid or the lifting of the May 24
sanctions. Despite her campaign rhetoric vowing
not to give ground on the NLL issue, she might
find herself more willing to make concessions if
shifting security conditions made the South Korean
president solely responsible for ROK military
policy.
In return, the North would have to
apologize for the Yeonpyeong Island attack and
renounce further aggression in the area. From
there, the two sides could work toward creating
the kind of cooperatively administered area
envisioned in the previous summit accord. Another
idea would be to create a mechanism for joint
patrols in the West Sea in order to prevent the
illegal intrusion of Chinese fishermen into the
area, which have been on the rise in recent years.
Forging a comprehensive solution to the
West Sea dispute would be a major accomplishment,
turning a flashpoint of conflict into the
foundation for a new era of peaceful coexistence.
The sight of naval vessels from North and South
patrolling side by side as Korean fishermen hauled
their catch out of calm, tranquil waters would be
a tremendous boost for mutual trust. It would also
provide the momentum needed to address larger
concerns, such as the nuclear issue and an
eventual peace treaty to replace the armistice
ending the Korean War. By demonstrating its
intention to peacefully resolve what has been such
a difficult issue, the North would send an
important signal that it is ready for serious
negotiations regarding other major sources of
dispute.
Making diplomatic
overtures Disengaging militarily from the
Korean Peninsula does not mean that the United
States should sit passively on the sidelines.
Especially if progress on the West Sea issue and
enhanced economic cooperation were made between
North and South, it would be important for the
Obama administration to follow up with its own
diplomatic efforts. Rather than premise this
discussion on the demand for complete
denuclearization, however, it would be better to
adhere to what Selig Harrison has referred to as
the "three nos": no new weapons, no further tests,
and no sales of weapons or military technologies
to other nations.
The United States should
approach these negotiations with an eye toward
improving both the political climate between the
two countries and the North's economic situation.
The former would lessen the need for further
nuclear tests and missile development, while an
improving North Korean economy would mean that the
regime would have less incentive to sell its
weapons and technology to other countries or to
terrorist groups, especially if doing so
jeopardized the economic gains that would result
from upholding their agreements.
The
long-term objective is the creation an environment
where the losses to North Korea if it chooses to
revert back to weapons development outweigh the
gains they get from playing by the rules. This
environment has yet to be established, which is a
primary reason that talks with Pyongyang
continually lead nowhere. To get there, both
political and economic concerns have to be
addressed.
On the political side,
diplomatic normalization with the United States
has long been a goal of the North Korean regime.
As a first step, Washington could take a page out
of France's playbook and offer to establish a
cultural office in Pyongyang as a precursor to
eventual full diplomatic recognition. France is
one of only two European Nations that does not
have diplomatic relations with the DPRK - the
other being Estonia - but opened a cultural office
in 2011 as a kind of intermediary measure to
improve relations. Such a step would go beyond
anything that the United States has offered
before, signaling that it is in fact a serious
about making progress in this area, while also
allowing an out to hedge against North Korea
failing to honor its side of the deal.
Transforming the role of the Six-Party
talks In order to improve the North's
economic situation there should be a two-track
effort consisting of both bilateral North-South
engagement and a resumption of the Six-Party
Talks. While the goal of the Six-Party forum
should remain denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula, it should also not let this long-run
goal preclude progress from being made in the
short term. One way to do this is by establishing
funding mechanisms in order to show North Korea
the benefits that can be gained through
cooperation with the international community.
An interesting idea proposed by Suk Hee
Kim and Bernhard Seliger would be the creation of
a Bank of North Korean Development, funded by the
Six-Party members and administered by a China, the
United States, and a third party, possibly
Switzerland. This idea has several merits, not
least of which is institutionalizing a mechanism
for economic assistance and dividing the burden of
financing projects among all six member states.
Institutionalizing funding is particularly
important in order to avoid a repeat of the
problems that plagued implementation of the 1994
Agreed Framework, which was the first attempt by
the United States to address the problem posed by
North Korea's nuclear program. In the words of
Kenneth Quinones, a State Department official who
helped verify the removal of spent plutonium rods
at Yongbyon in the 1990s, "North Korea did in fact
comply with all their stipulations under the
Agreed Framework," while the American record of
compliance was "quite spotty."
The
mistrust generated by Washington's inability to
live up to its end of the deal - largely a result
of congressional foot-dragging in allocating
funding to construct two light water reactors as a
condition for the North ending its nuclear program
- was undoubtedly one of the biggest motivators in
North Korea's decision to undertake a clandestine
uranium enrichment program, the discovery of which
would spell the end of the accord in 2002. By
collectivizing the financing mechanism among
countries which all have a stake in a peaceful
Korean Peninsula, such a breakdown would be much
easier to avoid in any future agreements.
The most important role for the Bank would
be to fund projects within North Korea that would
allow it to improve its economy without having to
resort to its old habits of selling weapons,
narcotics smuggling, or counterfeiting American
currency. Given the dilapidated state of North
Korean transport and energy infrastructure, there
are no shortage of proposals that could serve as
pilot projects for this endeavor. If successful,
this could lead to the type of conditional
exchange envisioned under earlier agreements,
whereby the North would agree to comply with
certain demands, such as inspection of nuclear
facilities and ending its missile program, in
return for project funding. Verification measures
could then be coordinated by the Six Party members
in conjunction with international organizations,
such as the IAEA.
A pragmatic approach
in an age of limits With its much
publicized foreign policy "pivot," the Obama
administration has rightly identified Northeast
Asia as the new center of economic power in a
rapidly changing world. The danger is that the
president and his team will continue to cling to
the 20th-century notion that American military
might is the basis by which it can manage that
change. As seen in the case of North Korea, this
worldview can be quite problematic when practical
considerations - in this case, the devastation
that would result in the event of a new Korean War
- force that card to remain in the deck.
To its credit, the Obama administration
has recognized the need for cooperative action in
dealing with the problems posed by North Korea.
However, it hasn't yet been able to reach the
conclusion that this help would be much more
forthcoming if the American military were removed
from the equation on the Korean Peninsula. Doing
so would give China an incentive to take a firm
stance when North Korea refuses to honor its
commitments, and provide South Korea with the
opportunity to better influence a change in the
North's course of action.
The hope, of
course, is that as they begin to see the benefits
of cooperation with the international community,
the North Korean government would become amenable
to discussing giving up its nuclear weapons. As
both the United States and South Korea have made
repeatedly clear, denuclearization is a
prerequisite to any peace treaty that can replace
the now 60-year-old armistice that ended the
Korean War. An improved security situation on the
peninsula through the withdrawal of American
military forces, a normalizing of its
dysfunctional relationship with the United States,
and coordinated economic assistance from its
neighbors might finally convince the North to take
this step.
Geoffrey Fattig is a
graduate student at UC San Diego's School of
International Relations and Pacific Studies. He
currently lives in Seoul, Korea.
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