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COMMENTARY
Inside
information
By Ehsan Ahrari
The United States carried out effective
information warfare against Iraq during the Gulf War of
1991. That fact then greatly facilitated its military
campaign and is still considered a textbook example of
conducting information war. As debates in the American
domestic arena are being carried out on toppling Saddam
Hussein from power in Iraq, the Bush administration is
sending confusing signals.
These seemingly mixed
signs may be purposeful, to confound Iraq, and they may
provide the United States the much-needed element of
surprise against the Iraqi dictator. Information warfare
is an umbrella phrase that describe a whole slew of
activities - including electronic warfare as well as
psychological operations - whose collective purpose is
"perception management". That phrase, in turn, describes
a variety of activities aimed at demoralizing the enemy
forces prior to and during the outbreak of hostilities.
The United States was the master of those activities
during the Gulf War, especially in the technological
realm, but also in the realm of controlling the thought
process of the opposing forces. However, Saddam now has
a significant advantage, which, if deftly used, might be
problematic to Washington.
As the public
brouhaha over whether or when to attack Iraq intensifies
inside the US domestic arena, a number of influential
public officials are staking out their positions
opposing it. Most recently, Brent Scowcroft - who served
as Bush Senior's national security adviser, coauthored a
book with the former president, and is considered a
family friend of the Bush clan - publicly opposed it. A
number of major Republican and Democratic congressional
leaders are also volubly questioning the wisdom of a
potential military action.
At the same time,
President George W Bush's National Security Adviser,
Condoleezza Rice, couched the debate in a moral
framework: that it is the moral responsibility of the
United States to oust Saddam. However, even some
important European allies of the United States do not
share that purported moral obligation. Chancellor
Gerhard Schroeder of Germany has even made this
opposition one of his election campaign planks.
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Jordan, Egypt and even
Iraq's bitter enemy Iran are in public opposition to any
military actions against Iraq. Saudi Arabia has made
clear that its military facilities will not be available
to the United States.
By the same token, Bahrain
was equally unequivocal about its opposition to a
military attack on Iraq. Bahrain signed a Defense
Cooperation Agreement with the United States in 1991,
whereby it agreed to grant to US forces access to its
facilities and to pre-positioned material for future
military crises. Last October, Bush designated Bahrain
as a "major non-NATO ally". Considering that the US
Central Command's naval component, NAVCENT, is based in
Bahrain, its opposition to a US military action against
Iraq was a major blow to Washington. To top it all, the
Emir of Bahrain declared that opposition in a joint
statement with Iran while he was visiting that country
last week. Even though Iran will not shed any tears if
or when Saddam is ousted, it certainly does not wish
"the Great Satan" to have another permanent place in its
neighborhood to station its troops.
Lest one
think that Iraq's Arab neighbors have developed an
instantaneous likeness to Saddam Hussein, it should be
pointed out that they are only reflecting the public
mood prevailing in their respective streets. Viewing the
Middle East from within is much different than viewing
it from without, especially from Washington, where
moralism regarding the PLO, Iraq and Iran is running
rampant. In the year 2002, the United States does not
have the clear-cut political advantage over Saddam that
it had in 1990, when that dictator invaded and occupied
Kuwait.
In the meantime, Saddam Hussein,
watching the growing bellicose rhetoric from Washington,
has intensified his own information warfare, even during
the Arab League meeting in Beirut in March when the
Iraqi officials were seen hugging and kissing Crown
Prince Abdullah Ben Abdel Aziz of Saudi Arabia and even
Kuwaiti officials. Iraq and Kuwait reached a "brotherly
accord" during that meeting. In addition, Saddam is
deftly conducting his "charm offensive", which is a
highly calculated attempt to find a common purpose with
the Arab masses. For instance, in a rare interview that
was published in several Arab newspapers in July, the
Iraqi dictator made the following significant points:
Arabs have faced many invaders in the
past - Moghuls, Tartars, Crusaders, etc - and now they
are being victimized by "the US-Zionist invasion of the
Arab world represented by Palestine and Iraq". This was
aimed at refreshing the idea of the "neocolonial" nature
of the potential American attack on Iraq.
The "foreigner" aims to divide the
"Arab nation" and "seeks to drive a wedge between them
and deepen their differences". This was an obvious
reference to the recent abortive diplomatic campaign
carried out by Vice President Dick Cheney to seek Arab
support for military actions against Iraq.
The whole Arab nation is a target.
"This is not the battle of Iraq, but of the entire Arab
nation ..." This was a shrewd line to characterize an
attack on Iraq as an attack on all Arabs.
Saddam Hussein presents no danger to
other Arab countries. "We have announced [to our
brethren in the Gulf] more than once and stated in
official work committees and Arab summit conferences ...
that we want to turn a new leaf in the history of
inter-Arab relations." This was an unambiguous plea to
Arab states and Iran that there is now a "kinder and
gentler" Saddam.
The Palestinian cause is synonymous
with the Iraqi cause. "The heroic [suicide] operation in
Palestine shall be recorded in the history of our nation
with letters of light. I consider these martyrdom acts
and the steadfastness of the heroic Palestinian people
as steadfastness by the Iraqi people ... every Arab must
view these acts from this viewpoint; that is, he has
carried out his work fully and this is the true Arab
spirit." This was an unabashed championing of the
Palestinian cause, which is presently so popular in the
wider Muslim as well as the Arab world.
To
underline the significance Iraq attaches to the
Palestinian suicide bombers, Saddam has fully publicized
his awarding of large sums of money to the survivors of
those acts. Within the Arab world, his action has
created ample goodwill for Iraq.
Iraq is equally
attentive to the West. It has announced its willingness
to allow in United Nations inspectors, and has invited a
US congressional delegation to visit and conduct its own
inspection. Saddam is fully aware that a number of
congressional leaders are opposed to military action.
Iraq is also watching with equal care the fact that
public opinion in the United Kingdom is not in favor of
participation in a military campaign to topple Saddam.
Considering that the UK might be the only Western
country that would back Washington's military
operations, Iraq knows how important it is to intensify
doubts or opposition related to that potential action.
Even the Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, has
publicly opposed attacking Iraq. Iraq has recently
announced that it is willing to send its official to
talk to "any British official".
Saddam Hussein
knows that his most potent weapon is conducting an
information war before the onslaught of a US military
campaign. The longer the Bush administration keeps on
talking about toppling Saddam, the more opportunities it
creates for him to undermine that probable action. The
best thing Iraq has going for it is that almost no one
in its immediate neighborhood wants to see the region
plunge into another turbulent war, the consequences of
which none can foresee. Iraq knows that the only thing
it should do well is to persuade its neighbors that they
have the right idea. To that end, Saddam's information
warfare serves a great purpose.
Ehsan
Ahrari, PhD, is a Norfolk, Virginia, US-based
strategic analyst.
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