| |
Israel ready for
war with Iraq
By Marc Erikson
By Pentagon counts, Iraq lobbed 42 Scud missiles
at Israel during the Gulf War. Two Israelis were killed,
many more injured. As the warheads were conventional
ones and contained no chemical or biological agents,
damage was limited and the US prevailed upon Israel not
to enter the conflict, to prevent a bust-up of the
anti-Saddam Hussein coalition which included a large
number of Arab states. Israel complied and sat out the
war.
 This is only one of the things that
will be different this time around as the ongoing US and
allied forces' military encirclement and pressure on
Iraq continues and gives way to more overt and
higher-intensity action. Israel believes that a
beleaguered and trapped Saddam would use weapons of mass
destruction - possibly including radiological devices or
"dirty bombs" - against its territory and citizens,
and, indeed, might do so preemptively in early phases of
open combat. "My working assumption as defense minister
is that the Iraqis will not give us a moment of rest
from the very first minute," Israeli Defense Minister
Binyamin Ben-Eliezer recently told the mass circulation
daily Yedioth Ahronoth. "If Saddam understands that this
time he won't be able to escape an American strike, he
will take out everything he has and we will be one of
his first targets."
In that event, Israel will
strike back and with commensurate force and weapons
selection. "If they hit us, we reserve the right of
response," says Ben-Eliezer. And according to top
military analyst Zeev Schiff, writing in the Haaretz
daily, retaliation might well include a nuclear strike.
Such commentary by an analyst with high-level military
connections is, of course, in part penned for propaganda
purposes and designed to reinforce deterrence. But,
though Pentagon analysts assign it a very low
probability, an Israeli nuclear counterstrike cannot be
ruled out.
Israeli intelligence has formed the
opinion that Saddam has been speeding up chemical and
biological weapons production since late last year. It
also confirms a January German foreign intelligence
(BND) report saying that Iraq is within at most three
years of acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. The BND
estimate is based on human intelligence sources (humint)
as well as close monitoring of deliveries to Iraq of
machine tools and other equipment required in nuclear
weapons production. Under these circumstances, the
Israeli government believes that the US should strike
Iraq sooner rather than later. "Postponing the action to
a later date would only enable Saddam to accelerate his
weapons program and then he would pose a more formidable
threat," said Ra'anan Gissin, a top aide to Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon. Foreign Minister Shimon Peres
also supports an early attack, telling CNN on August 16
that while the operation would be "quite dangerous ...
postponing it would be more dangerous".
Is
Israel ready? Yes. It would be reckless and absurd for
the country's leaders to ask Washington to get on with
it otherwise, even if the expected longer-term political
and security payoff, depriving radical Palestinians of a
key ally, is large.
Israel has two immediate
military concerns: The remaining longer-range Scud
missiles still in Iraqi possession and the possibility
that Iraqi agents or Iraq-trained Palestinians
infiltrated into Israeli territory could set off
explosive devices containing (or in some other manner
releasing) chemical and biological agents or radioactive
materials.
Of these threats, only the first is
quantifiable with any precision. Iraq still has between
at least six and at most 36 Scud-B "Al-Husayn" missiles
with a range of 600-650km, a payload of 500kg, and fired
from reloadable mobile launchers. To reach Israel -
let's say Tel Aviv, the preferred Gulf War target - they
must be launched from points in western Iraq west of Ar
Rutbah (approximately 33 degrees N, 40 degrees E) north
and south of the Baghdad-Amman highway (the "Scud box").
The box is not a huge area, but certainly large enough
to hide a dozen or so launchers when interspersed with
decoys. During the Gulf War, the "Great Scud Hunt" by
allied air forces killed plenty of dummies but few of
the real things.
To kill Scuds in flight proved
nearly as difficult, ironically precisely because of
their well-known technical defects which make them
useless against hardened military targets. (They are
"lousy weapons" said Lt-Gen Charles Horner, commander of
the air component of the US Central Command in 1991.) In
the boost phase (powered flight) which lasts about 80
seconds, the Scuds have stable flight characteristics.
But once the engines are shut down, they tend to get
unstable, tumble, and veer off course, and many break
up. Such tumbling or multiple objects presenting no firm
single target are difficult to destroy with terminal
missile defense systems. Post-Gulf War analysis showed
that only about 10-20 percent of 88 Scuds launched by
Iraq were actually killed by Patriot (PAC-2) defenses.
Since 2000, Israel has begun deploying its own
(co-developed with and co-financed by the US) Arrow-2
terminal defense system ("Homa" or "Barrier") in
locations south and north of Tel Aviv. The Arrow
interceptor and its supporting radar and fire-control
systems are significant improvements over the PAC-2 and
may substantially improve interception ratios. Israel
now also possess its own highly capable military
reconnaissance satellites of the Ofeq series, the latest
one (Ofeq-5) launched on May 28, which can detect Scuds
immediately upon launch.
But the problem
remains: some Scuds will get through. A new US
boost-phase defense system, the Airborne Laser (ABL)
(megawatt-class chemical lasers fired from a modified
Boeing 747-400F flying at 40,000 feet), has been
successfully tested and could readily deal with Scuds in
the 40 seconds between the time they break through the
cloud ceiling and engine shut-down. But alas, like the
PAC-3 Patriot, which is equipped with a direct-hit kill
vehicle (PAC-2 and Arrow carry proximity-fuzed
warheads), the ABL is not ready for operations.
What to do? If only a handful of Scuds loaded
with chemical (CW) or biological-warfare (BW) warheads
get through, areas of up to 1,600 square kilometers
could be lethally contaminated with VX nerve gas,
anthrax or small pox. Radioactive contamination from a
"dirty bomb" would be less extensive, but still force
evacuation of sizable urban areas. Most Israelis have
gas masks; a large-scale small-pox vaccination program,
starting with security and rescue personnel is underway.
But ultimately, missile defenses and civilian protection
measures aside, every effort will have to be made to
prevent Scuds from being launched in the first place.
The Scud box, bordering on Jordan, is thus a
prime early military target - not just for less
effective aerial bombardment, but for ground invasion.
Former Israeli defense minister Moshe Arens has recently
revealed that in 1991 the Israeli Defense Forces had
prepared specialized commandos to go after Scud
launchers. Such a contingent has been reactivated, and
it can be assumed that it will be deployed side-by-side
with US forces (6,400 are now in Jordan) for a quick-hit
invasion of western Iraq. Another, more daunting, option
is the use of tactical nuclear weapons against the
sparsely populated areas where Scud launchers are
suspected. The Israeli air force has greatly stepped up
its training for such a mission in recent months.
To many Israeli analysts, the threat of
pre-positioned chemical and biological agents, to be set
off inside Israel by Iraqi or Palestinian teams upon the
commencement of full-scale war, is as great or greater
than the Scud threat. The search for potential suicide
bombers in Palestinian and Israeli areas for some time
now has simultaneously focused on detection of such
munitions and teams. As with the Scuds, some will get
through and hit; most probably won't.
For
Israel, support for early US military action against
Iraq (and participation in such action) is a calculated
risk. Military preparations can (and have) substantially
reduced the risk, but cannot eliminate it. But the
strategic calculation is obvious: eliminate the Saddam
regime and the chances for lasting peace in the region
and security for Israel on its borders are massively
enhanced.
(©2002 Asia Times Online Co Ltd. All
rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com
for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
|
| |
|
|
 |
|
