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COMMENTARY
Iran: A blueprint for
change
By Suri Dalir
Almost
everybody knows - as do the reformists themselves, maybe
better than anyone else - that their reforms were dead
even before they were born.
And President
Mohammad Khatami's recent show didn't, and should not
have, deceived anyone. In an unusual public outbust at a
news conference in Tehran, Khatami boldly challenged the
religious hardliners for blocking his efforts to make
Iran more democratic, vowing to present a bill to
parliament that would give him more power.
"My
repeated warnings on violations of the constitution have
been ignored. The president should be empowered to
fulfill his constitutional responsibilities. Therefore,
I will present a bill to the parliament soon that would
allow me to fulfill my responsibilities with greater
powers absolutely within the constitution," Khatami
said.
That Khatami's wailing and moaning, laced
with anemic threats, was only a show is evidenced by the
fact that, while conservatives hailed him for his
so-called speech - even though he implicitly attributed
his failure to their machinations - many reformists were
not one bit impressed by his threadbare gambit. It is
clear by now that even if Khatami were what he claimed
and still claims to be, that is, a reformist, he is and
will remain as impotent as an emasculated deity.
He, as well as the religious hardliners, know
that the majority of Iranians want a separation of
politics and religion. But Khatami and his peers,
instead of yielding to the demands of the people, are
passing off an oxymoronic term, "Islamic democracy" for
the real thing, democracy.
The truth is, while
Khatami promises to bring civil freedoms to Iran, his
efforts are sabotaged by the hardliners who control
unelected institutions such as the judiciary and who are
supported by supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the
appointed religious figure who outranks the elected
president.
And while any reforms that Khatami
might propose will most likely be passed by the
reformist-dominated parliament, the bills have to be
approved by the hardline religious supervisory body, the
unelected Guardian Council, which has in the past
rejected reforms proposed by parliament.
Democracy, being secular by nature and
definition, is as incompatible with religion as mating
and reproduction between two different species.
Believing that "religious democracy" is a contradiction
in terms, as is freedom in shackles, and that the
majority of Iranians are asking for real democracy, the
question arises how secular democracy can be attained,
especially when the religious hardliners have their
claws dug as deeply as possible into each and every
organ of power. Before attempting to answer this
question, a brief review of the political context of the
issue might prove helpful.
Iran is an isolated
country in the real sense of the word. It is surrounded
by Arabs and Turks, and it has a long history of
on-and-off animosity with both. (A few Persian-speaking
Afghans or Tajiks don't change this fact.) To make
matters worse, Ayatollah Khomeini, leader of the Islamic
Revolution in 1979, and company, at the onset of the
uprising drew a clear line between Sunni and Shi'ite
Muslims (Iran is almost 90 percent Shi'ite) to cement
the latter's indisputable power and authority.
This led to a deepening conflict not only
between the Sunnis and Shi'ites in Iran, but between
Iran and the rest of the Muslim world, the overwhelming
majority of which espouse the Sunni branch of Islam and
resented Iranian attempts to spread their Islamic
revolution. Khomeini, with his misguided political
views, generated from his utmost naivete and lack of
political insight, turned every one of these Muslim
countries into Iran's potential or actual enemy.
Saudis, besides being designated as "worse than
America", were spurned and despised for being Wahhabi, a
strict Sunni sect. The Palestine Liberation Organization
was sidelined for not following Khomeini's version of
Islam and his policies in its conflict with Israel.
Khomeini then supported the Shi'ite Ayatollah Hakim as
the bona fide leader of Iraq, thus providing Saddam
Hussein with an excuse to invade Iran in 1980, the start
of the crippling eight-year war.
Libya was given
a cold shoulder from the beginning. The regime's
representatives were sent to Turkey, India, and later to
the newly-founded Muslim republics of former Soviet
Union, carrying vast amounts of chador (black
veils that the regime enforces on women), which were
doled out, ostensibly as gifts, among the unveiled
schoolgirls of those countries. In short, Khomeini's
words and deeds became the exact opposite and a mockery
of the slogan inscribed on a newly-minted coin: "Oh,
Muslims of the world unite."
Among non-Muslim
countries, America, of course, was the arch-fiend (often
translated as "Great Satan".) In one speech, Khomeini
declared that "America is worse than England, England is
worse than America and the USSR worse than both". This
statement made the Americans very happy, for it gave
them assurance that the leftists in Iran wouldn't be
given a voice or a chance. That would have made the
process of disintegration of the USSR a little easier
and faster.
Slogans such as "Israel should be
annihilated," and "The road to Jerusalem passes through
Karbala," (where the shrine of the third Imam in Iraq is
located) covered the walls in every city, town and even
village. As a result, Iran didn't have a single friend
in the region and beyond, except Syria, which was bribed
with millions of barrels of free oil for its nominal
support of Iran. And after almost two decades, when
Khatami tried to break this enormous barrier of
isolation, the hardliners constantly sabotaged his
meager detente efforts in any way they could. It should
be noted that the hardline conservatives are more than
eager to have a relationship with the West, especially
America, but they want to be the initiator and the
beneficiaries of any such relationship with the outside
world.
The second point to be taken into
consideration in the quest for democracy is the place of
religion in Iran. It can hardly be denied that the
majority of Iranians are essentially religious. However,
there has always been a profound difference in religious
outlook between Iranians and the majority of other
Muslims.
While in Saudi Arabia, for instance,
the canonical laws and their observance according to the
Koran are of central importance, the nature of Iranians'
adherence to religion is more of a mystical attachment
rather than rigid piety. The appearance of mystic or
mystically-oriented poets and thinkers shortly after the
Iranians' conversion into Islam after the 7th century
Arab Muslim conquest of Iran and the Iranians' endless
fascination with mysticism and mystical poetry attests
to the fact that it was the spiritual, rather than the
practical aspect of Islam that led to their near
voluntary conversion into Islam.
This is not the
place to discuss too deeply the roots of these
tendencies in the religious outlook of Iranians. Suffice
to say that Iranians believe that the patriarch, whether
in heaven or on the earth, is and has always been loved,
feared and worshipped with a lover's fervent - and a
lover's informality. Thirteenth century Persian poet
Jalaluddin Rumi's famous parable of a shepherd and Moses
is an excellent example of this religious outlook. As
the story goes, at first, Moses is horrified at the
informal manner in which the shepherd addresses God, but
after a revelation he learns that "there are no rules
for worship. Say whatever and however your loving [of
God] tells you to. Your sweet blasphemy is the truest
devotion. Through you a whole world is freed. Loosen
your tongue and don't worry what comes out. It's all the
light of the spirit."
Hence, the place of
intrinsic and spontaneous religious attachment in
Iranian mystic-religious beliefs rather than
rigidly-imposed religion and strict adherence to what
Rumi calls the superficial aspects of religion, or "the
skin of the Koran which we throw to dogs".
The
strict attitude towards religion is manifested nowhere
better than in the fundamentalists' constant efforts to
implement such laws as Islamic dress code or the ban on
alcohol, and the people's obstinate defiance of those
laws, while pilgrimage to holy cities or visiting this
or that saint's tomb goes on as enthusiastically as
ever. No doubt, the atrocities committed by
fundamentalists have, to a great extent, dampened
religious zeal and fervor, and disaffected large masses
of people. Yet it will be naive to believe that Iranians
have abandoned their Islamic beliefs. To be sure,
political views, social class or rank, and where a
person lives, have almost no bearing on those feelings.
The emigre Iranians of monarchist tendencies
(who lost most of their wealth and all of their power to
Islamic rule) hold, every Thursday, parties consecrated
to the third Imam's stepbrother. Interesting enough, 90
percent of these people don't fast, don't perform daily
prayers, don't wear veils - unlike Arab, Pakistani and
Afghan women abroad - and freely associate with members
of the opposite sex. Yet they love, fear and venerate
this semi-saintly figure fanatically as the epitome of
religious ideals. This may illustrate the love and
adulation of the patriarch as the basis of Iranians'
religious devotion.
Viewed from this angle, it
wouldn't be too far from the truth if one said that Iran
was trapped into being the first Islamic state, as
Russia was forced to be the first communist country,
contrary to Karl Marx's prediction. And now they want
the separation of state and religion, and are striving
to force out those who come between them and their god.
No doubt, there are and have always been
fanatics and fundamentalist Islamists who long for a
strictly Islamic state. But with the testimony of
history, they have always been in the minority.
Otherwise, the poetry of Omar Khayyam, Hafez Shirazi,
Shaykh Sa'di, and yes, Rumi, wouldn't have existed. One
can hardly find similar poetry in other Muslim
countries.
Therefore, while the majority of
Iranians, despite their adherence to Islam, want an end
to theocratic rule, there is the fundamentalist minority
who want to hold on to the ideal of an all-powerful
Islamic state with tooth and nail.
The
terrorists who attacked the Twin Towers and the Pentagon
by destroying themselves epitomize the mentality of
Islamic fundamentalists everywhere, including Iran.
Moreover, they will definitely be encouraged and
assisted by mysterious figures, inside and outside Iran,
should there be a change towards democracy. Considering
the circumstances, one wonders whether the establishment
of a secular government is possible. And there is even a
bigger question, who should take the lead towards such a
government?
Reza Pahlavi, the son of the deposed
shah, might seem a likely candidate, and, indeed, he has
started a campaign for secular democracy recently. But
those familiar with Iran's internal conditions and
international position hardly take him seriously. His
opponents have discussed, in detail, the reasons that
disqualify him for the leadership, the most damning
being that he is the son of a tyrant and his association
with those who served his father.
However, what
is more important than his capability to lead a movement
is the question of his ability, if he succeeds to the
"throne", to deliver what he is promising Iranians.
First of all, his addressees, besides some aged
monarchist, are very young people who imagine that as
soon as Pahlavi sets foot in Iran he will lift all the
restrictions that stand between them and fulfilling
their youthful desires (which have been sharpened by
watching Western television through satellite.)
However, his audiences are mostly from northern
Tehran, the affluent part of the capital, and a few big
cities. Besides, the fanatic Islamists, at least for a
while, might very well turn their dreams into a
nightmare. I even doubt if Pahlavi will dare to propose
the lifting of hijab, the strict code of dress
for Muslim women. Second, his opponents rightly predict
that he won't be able to solve the gigantic economic
problems that the country faces or reduce or eliminate
unemployment.
It should be added here that no
one possesses a magic wand to make the near arid field
of Iranian economy flourish overnight. But those who
have been patient to the limit won't hear the request or
command for more patience from someone who has promised
them the horn of plenty. Certainly, there will be other
difficulties and failures, too. So, either he will have
to give up or, most probably, start ruling the country
with an iron fist.
Nothing, though, could be
more difficult than containing a people who have had the
experience of overthrowing a monarchy, as happened in
January 1979, when the shah left for exile from Iran.
Although America, Europe and the rest of the world
didn't offer asylum to his father during the last days
of his life, the West might want to assist Pahlavi now
on his way home, or when he ascends the desecrated seat
of power. But the harmful consequences might well
outweigh the doubtful benefits of supporting a ruler who
is not trusted or accepted by the majority of his own
people. The result is not difficult to predict: the
widespread growth of fundamentalism and intensification
of hatred of the West, especially America, in Iran and
the region.
Other opposition groups wishing the
overthrow of the current regime in Iran are almost as
ineffectual as to be non-existent. There are tiny
communist groups which, enjoying the freedom of
democratic societies in the West, oppose democracy as
fiercely as Josef Stalin himself. There are the
nationalistic groups, which, lacking any coherent
strategy or plan, are still bogged down in the debate on
whether or not prime minister Mohammad Mosaddeq was a
constitutional monarchist, and who betrayed him when he
was overthrown in 1953.
No doubt, the relentless
crushing of opposition groups by the Islamic republic
has left no room for any meaningful activists in Iran.
Nevertheless, these political parties have neither been
able to establish themselves as a well-organized and
effective force abroad, nor project their voices to
Iranians inside - something that Ayatollah Khomeini did
so effectively.
The Mujahedin-e Khalq
Organization (MKO) is the only organized group outside
Iran. Yet, being sheltered and supported by the enemy
Saddam Hussein, the group has lost the trust of the vast
majority of Iranians, and is despised at least as much
as the ruling clergy, for "treason". Moreover, all of
these groups suffer from a common ailment: worshipping
past heroic or not-so-heroic figures has left no room
for independent thinking or planning a viable strategy.
Some of these groups, such as the MKO,
monarchists and communists, dream of forcing Iranians
into another bloody revolution. However, this is hardly
more than wishful thinking. Iranians have witnessed, to
their dismay and horror, that "revolution does kill its
own children", and that today's revolutionaries can
easily turn out to be tomorrows's tyrants. Besides, they
have lost thousands on thousands of their sons,
brothers, husbands and fathers to the eight-year war
with Iraq that ended in 1988, which fattened the mullahs
and helped them to tighten their grip on power and
wealth. Iran won't again lose even one of her children
to anyone, if she can.
In the face of such
formidable obstacles, then, and in the absence of a
qualified person or group to organize and lead a
movement, what can be done? Should Iranians give up the
hope for a secular democracy? Certainly not. Actually,
some reformists, intellectuals (both inside and abroad),
many disillusioned revolutionaries, some former
fundamentalists and a few clergy have already denounced
theocracy in favor of a secular democracy.
But,
paradoxically, it is the last group that seems to be the
one capable of untying this Gordian knot. Some members
of this group are loved and venerated by the majority of
Iranians, to the point of being accepted as leaders. And
they have the power of fatwa (religious ruling),
which could sanction secular democracy (fiercely
resisted by fanatics as un-Islamic) as well as ending
Iran's self-imposed and destructive isolation.
Further, some younger clergy, such as Kadivar,
Eshkavari (now in jail), Abdollah Nouri (also in jail),
and senior religious figures, such Ayatollah Sane'i,
advocate separation of politics and religion. And of
course there is Ayatollah Montazeri, who is loved and
venerated to such an extent that even monarchists and
anti-democratic communists couldn't dare to oppose him
or question his legitimacy. (Ayatollah Montazeri is a
senior cleric of Iran who was first chosen by Ayatollah
Khomeini to be his successor. But his liberal views
angered Khomeini and he was ousted. In recent years
Ayatollah Khamenei, Khomeini's successor, has placed
Ayatollah Montazeri under house arrest.)
True,
some non-clergy intellectuals, such as Abdol Sorush,
advocate a secular democracy. But no matter how many
interpretations of the Koranic lines they present to
justify a non-religious government, and no matter how
fitting a religious context they provide for their
political views, they can't even come close to Ayatollah
Montazeri, with his immaculate past and his brave
defiance of Khomeini when others either carried out
Khomeini's murderous orders or just stood by.
These intellectuals can't claim the love and
trust of Iranians as Ayatollah Montazeri does. Ayatollah
Montazeri's objection to Khomeini on the brutal massacre
of thousands of people (some as young as 13 years old,
some even pregnant) cost him the leadership and
subjected him to house arrest up to this date.
However, he hasn't been silent, even under
pressure to do so. He has criticized the ruling clergy
for their un-Islamic policies. He has condemned the
brutal treatment of the youth. He has declared terrorism
as haram (canonically unlawful.) Besides, his
charismatic personality places him far above the
ordinary politicians and the so-called sophisticated
intellectuals.
Anyone who has read his memoirs
(which are banned in Iran) knows that he expresses his
views with such a fascinating lucidity that instantly
inspires trust and respect. He has the capability to
reach the public with the same simplicity, and without
needing intellectual acrobatics. He could, for instance,
ask the guards and leg-breaker volunteers not to take
orders from those whose words and deeds are un-Islamic,
and not to shed the blood of their brothers (believe me,
the majority of them will listen to him.)
Or he
could point out that chanting "death" to an entire
nation, even if some of their politicians are hostile to
Iran, is cursing God's creation. And more importantly,
he could, by a fatwa, sanction civil disobedience
- the most effective tool to break the back of the
Islamic Republic without jeopardizing lives, as well as
shielding the democratic movement and democratic
enterprises against the aggression of hardliners, their
mercenaries or fanciful followers.
This sounds
like a long haul, considering the internal and external
obstacles to the realization of the wishes of Iranians.
And no doubt the brunt of carrying out this extremely
difficult task will fall on the Iranian people. Yet this
seems to be the only way out. However, there is not much
time left. Ayatollah Montazeri is old, he is 79, and
ailing. And no one else could replace him, the Grand
Ayatollah.
Thus, the time is ripe for the
so-called opposition groups, such as the National Front,
the National-Religious and the Nation of Iran parties to
redeem themselves by declaring their support of
Ayatollah Montazeri and his views, and help Iranians in
any way that they can. The students in the Office for
Reinforcement of Solidarity, instead of writing
ineffectual letters and futile criticism of Khamenei and
his organs of power, should announce that they support
and follow Ayatollah Montazeri as the spiritual leader,
and invite all students and others to join them.
And of course, the reformists could come out of
the closet and make good the promises that they have
made whenever they have needed votes, but then forgot
them once they were in office. However, it would be
absolute naivete to believe that the Iranian people
could achieve their goals in isolation.
They
need all the help that they can get from around the
world. President George W Bush, just recently, declared
that the US would help the people of Iran. And he could.
To begin with, America should stop humiliating Iranians
by finger-printing them or denying them visas.
Washington could also stop implicit and explicit threats
of Iran, such as labeling the country a part of an axis
of evil along with Iraq and North Korea, and let
Iranians find a way to end their miseries.
Harassing or humiliating Iranians won't force
them into a bloody confrontation with the theocrats. On
the contrary, it will provide the ruling clergy with an
excuse to tighten their grip over the country. Unlike
what some Iranians argue, it would not be expedient at
this stage for America to release Iranian assets, for
they would be "mullah-devoured", as Iranians put it.
However, America could and should lift sanctions against
the country. Presently, Iranians are paralyzed with
poverty. Many put all of their time and energy into just
feeding themselves and their families. And everyone
knows very well that poverty is not a suitable soil for
democracy to grow.
Similarly, the European Union
could refrain from setting preconditions for trade with
Iran, if not for supporting the Iranians' quest for
democracy - as they sometimes claim - at least for the
sake of very profitable deals with Iran. Those
conditions could be met when Iran is freed from
theocracy.
But the Europeans are following and
will follow America's footsteps. Whatever British poet
William Wordsworth meant by "The child is father of
man", in a poetic expression of his romantic outlook, it
has become a reality in a very peculiar way: the child
America has become the father of man Europe, and among
the most obedient of yesterday's fathers and today's
children is Great Britain.
This particular
child, because of its long-standing experience with
imperialistic rule, is still "closer to the source of
knowledge", and has willingly put that knowledge at the
service of the child-com-father, as in the 1953 coup in
Iran. Even today, BP building the Baku-Ceyhan-Tbilisi
oil route rather than a more cost-effective and safer
route through Iran, is an indication that Britain is
more than willing to ignore Iran's infrastructure,
according to the wishes of father.
But it is not
that important. What Iran needs more than anything else
is the lifting of sanctions by America and a meaningful
relationship between the two countries. If and when that
happens, the children will follow the father. And it
will be for everybody's benefit.
Suri
Dalir has a PhD from UCLA in Middle Eastern
Literatures and Cultures
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