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COMMENTARY
The lessons of
Afghanistan
October 7, 2002, marked the first anniversary of
the first shots fired in America’s global war on
terrorism. It was under this general rubric that
Washington carried out a military campaign to dismantle
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Now, the United
States is gearing up to conduct another war. This time
around, the objective is to dismantle the brutal regime
of Saddam Hussein. A retrospective look at Afghanistan
is in order, because military action against Iraq -
America’s "preemptive war" - will create problems.
Though similar to the ones in Afghanistan, they may
prove to be of considerably greater magnitude.
The military campaign in Afghanistan was a
shining success in the sense that the Taliban/al-Qaeda
terror nexus was dismantled. But many other related
objectives have still not yet been met, most notably the
capture or elimination of Mullah Omar, the Supreme
Leader of the former Taliban regime, and Osama bin
Laden, the spiritual guru of the al-Qaeda terrorist
organization.
Opportunities to capture the
latter were lost because US commanders did not want to
risk absorbing casualties. The notion of "force
protection" continues to drive the thinking of America’s
top military and civilian leadership, denials to the
contrary by the Pentagon’s top officials
notwithstanding. The present modalities of America's
involvement in Afghanistan are focused entirely on the
eradication of remnants of the terrorist forces
scattered in the areas bordering Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
As acceptable as that goal is, US
officials have been oblivious to the "opportunity cost"
related to such emphasis. A continued heavy reliance on
Afghan warlords to eliminate the remnants of the Taliban
and al-Qaeda has resulted in the resurgence of
warlordism. Thus, the dilemma before US officials in
Afghanistan is how to eradicate the terrorist groups and
still disallow that resurgence. Ultimately, the choice
between these alternatives must be determined in
Washington. That is also problematic because the
hierarchies of objectives in Washington and in the
military headquarters in Afghanistan are entirely
different.
The contemporary realities of
America's involvement in Afghanistan necessitate that it
involve itself in nation-building with focus and zeal -
and therein lies the rub. It is not in the strategic
culture of the United States to remain involved in
nation-building. On this issue, it shows sporadic and
episodic interests, and is most willing to pass the buck
to other actors - European and Asian countries,
international organizations, etc - who are not likely to
assign high priority to that task.
Like the war
in Afghanistan, the prospective military campaign that
the United States is likely to wage to dismantle
Saddam's regime will also succeed, if the US wants it
to. There is no comparison between America’s military
power and the fighting capabilities of the Iraqi armed
forces that have been highly contained under
international sanctions since the end of the Gulf war of
1991. Under the best of circumstances - as was
demonstrated in 1991 - the Iraqi military was not in the
same league as the US military. Under its present
substandard version of readiness, it may be able to
suppress domestic uprising or brutalize the Kurds in the
north and the Shi'ite dissidents in the south, but a
fighting force the Iraqi military is not.
Once
the military campaign is over in Iraq, the United States
will face problems of considerably larger magnitude than
it did in Afghanistan. Iraq is a major Arab state, the
maintenance of whose territorial integrity is in the
interest of all regional powers, perhaps with plausible
exception of Turkey. Thus, the United States will face
the constant scrutiny of Arab countries about ensuring
that the post-Saddam Iraq remains intact. There is no
threat that Iran would want any part of Iraqi territory.
But Turkey might be tempted, as it was in the aftermath
of the World War I.
The second problem will be
ensuring that the United States is not accused of
presiding over the international pilfering of Iraqi oil.
The temptation to force the successors of Saddam to pay
the entire cost of carrying out America's war against
Iraq will be immense. After all, a major portion of the
cost of Desert Storm was absorbed by Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Systematic measures
have to be adopted to immediately put the oil-producing
facilities of Iraq under some sort of transparent
international management system, with the visible
presence and participation of the new Iraqi leaders'
representatives in the Arab League.
The issue of
nation-building in Iraq will be of a lesser magnitude
compared to Afghanistan, especially if the United States
military were to take special precautions not to conduct
unending "target practice" in dismantling critical
infrastructures during the military campaign. Given the
military superiority of American forces, and considering
the potential heavy use of unmanned aerial vehicles - as
was done in Afghanistan - Iraq’s command and control
systems are likely to be targeted first. After taking
away the "eyes and ears" of the Iraqi armed forces, the
remainder of US military campaign is likely to be
downhill.
If the psychological operations
["psyops"] are conducted with the expected effectiveness
of the Desert Storm campaign, even the frequently
mentioned Republican Guards of Iraq are likely to
surrender without much fight when they see the physical
presence of American forces within their borders. Thus,
assuming minimal destruction of the Iraqi
infrastructure, the rebuilding of post-Saddam Iraq
should not pose enormous problems. Iraqi oil revenues
will bankroll the reconstruction projects.
Finally, the potential use of the "Samson
option" by Saddam Hussein must be considered. Depending
upon its scope, that issue remains the biggest unknown.
As determined as President George W Bush is to take down
Saddam, one can only hope that the US military has
elaborate "consequence management plans" - ie, plans
that may be implemented in the aftermath of a disaster
or the use of weapons of mass destruction.
If
America's war on Afghanistan teaches one lesson, it is
that the post-Saddam Iraq will not become another
Scandinavian democracy any time in the foreseeable
future. The rebuilding of Iraq will require an enormous
amount of commitment and patience - commodities sorely
lacking in America's strategic culture. Getting rid of
terrorists and tyrants may be cathartic, but the process
of ridding them also carries bloody consequences for
innumerable innocents. The enormous task of America's
military power is to minimize the scope of those
consequences for millions of innocent Iraqis. In that
regard, America's past wars provide reasons for hope
regarding the prospective war against Iraq.
(©2002 Asia Times Online Co Ltd. All rights
reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com
for information on our sales and syndication
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