| |
How to beat Iraq without a
fight
By David Isenberg
The
media generally agree that the United States government
has exhausted all the non-military means available to
force Iraq to comply with its obligation to destroy its
nuclear, chemical, biological and missile programs. But
the conventional wisdom is wrong, according to a new
report.
In its view, the "disdain for the work
of UN weapons inspections expressed by Bush
administration officials is not based on fact. Claims
that 'the issue is disarmament, not inspections' distort
reality and ignore the fact that intrusive inspections
equal disarmament."
The available non-military
options, which include renewed weapons monitoring,
enhanced containment and strengthened deterrence, are
decidedly less costly than the use of military force and
are fully capable of providing effective security
against the potential threat from Iraqi nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons, according to the
report, titled "Winning Without War: Sensible Security
Options for Dealing With Iraq." The report was produced
jointly by the Fourth Freedom Foundation and the Joan B
Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the
University of Notre Dame.
This conclusion is
potentially quite significant, given that Section 3 of
the resolution passed by the US Congress last month
authorizing the use of US military force against Iraq
stipulates that if the president decides to use force,
he must certify why "diplomatic or other peaceful means"
will not adequately protect the national security of the
United States.
The report's authors, David
Cortright and Alistair Millar, of the Fourth Freedom
Foundation, and George A Lopez of the Joan B Kroc
Institute, note many points that are usually overlooked
or ignored by those who advocate invading Iraq.
For example, with regard to Iraq's biological
and chemical weapons program, they note that these
materials degrade over time and lose their lethality. In
the absence of production facilities to create new
toxins, Iraq's biological agents will gradually
deteriorate. And despite Iraq’s obstruction and
deception, the United Nations Special Commission has
supervised the destruction of Iraq’s main biological
weapons and production facility and destroyed equipment
and growth media at four other major facilities.
Similarly, with regard to chemical weapons, all
production facilities and thousands of tonnes of
chemical agents have been destroyed. In any remaining
agents, including VX nerve agent, precursors would
degrade without new supplies from a functioning
production facility.
The report finds that the
return of inspectors would provide an immediate security
benefit. Even if the inspectors encountered renewed
Iraqi obstruction and concealment, their very presence
in the country would disrupt potential weapons
development efforts.
Contrary to popular
opinion, the report finds that military containment is
working; in large part due to UN sanctions and, in
particular, the arms embargo and the review of dual-use
goods. Despite Iraqi smuggling and kickback schemes, the
vast majority, estimated at 85 percent, of Iraqi oil
revenues remain under UN control. And Iraq’s estimated
illegal earnings of US$1.5-3 billion annually could be
reduced if the UN took steps to bring under its control
the Iraq-Syria oil pipeline, which opened in 2001.
While no sanctions are 100 percent leak-proof,
the report found that in Iraq’s case sanctions were
unusually successful because the United States had made
a major investment in sanctions enforcement, and the
world community remained united in its resolve to deny
Iraq the means to rebuild its weapons programs. As the
scope of sanctions narrowed to focus on preventing
weapons imports rather than civilian trade,
international compliance improved.
In order to
improve and strengthen containment, the report details
10 policy recommendations:
Creation of an externally based system of border
monitoring and cargo inspection. This would require
strengthening of border monitoring in Jordan, Syria,
Turkey and other neighboring states. Surprisingly, there
is currently no international monitoring of commercial
crossings into Iraq. Development of such a system would
require the deployment of an adequately funded,
well-equipped and professionally trained international
inspection force to detect and prevent shipments of
prohibited goods.
The use of advanced monitoring and scanning
technology. With the right equipment and resources,
trained monitors should be able to detect the shipment
of prohibited items without major disruption to
commercial traffic. The model for such a system could be
the "smart border" program now being established as part
of the post-September 11 homeland security measures in
the United States, Canada and Mexico.
Creation of sanctions-assistance missions - modeled
after those developed for UN sanctions in Yugoslavia in
the early 1990s - that can be combined with customs
support stations in which monitoring experts work
alongside officials from host nations to maintain and
operate detection equipment. While such missions would
be challenging, it would be less difficult than
inspecting the traffic that daily crosses the US-Mexican
border.
Improvement of cargo monitoring at the Jordanian Red
Sea port of Aqaba. Ships used to be subject to
inspection by the UN-sponsored Maritime Interception
Force, but that ended in 1994 due to concerns about
disruption and costs to commercial shipping.
Installation of X-ray scanning equipment would allow UN
officials to conduct quick inspections of cargo
containers without disrupting commercial traffic.
Some remaining steps include the provision of
substantial financial support and technical assistance
to frontline states to help offset the costs of
monitoring equipment and customs staffing; the
publicizing and penalizing of arms embargo violations;
the elimination of kickbacks by tighter controls on the
sale of Iraqi oil; the requiring of audited financial
reports from oil purchasers; the control or shutdown of
the Iraq-Syria oil pipeline; and the strengthening of
deterrence by maintaining a capability to threaten
military attack.
The report concludes, "If
deterrence could succeed against a superpower like the
Soviet Union, which had tens of thousands of nuclear
weapons and huge quantities of chemical weapons, it can
surely work against an isolated and weakened country
like Iraq. In combination with renewed UN weapons
inspections and enhanced containment, strengthened
deterrence would provide further protections against the
potential Iraqi weapons threat. By acting forcefully to
enhance containment and strengthen deterrence, the
United States can achieve its security objectives
without a costly and risky military invasion of Iraq."
(©2002 Asia Times Online Co Ltd. All rights
reserved. Please contact ads@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication
policies.)
|
| |
|
|
 |
|
