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Biological terror: A bucket of
hogwash
By Todd W John
BANGKOK - After the attacks of September 11,
2001, then with the war that followed in Afghanistan,
and now with the ensuing weapons inspections in Iraq, we
have wondered about the ability of terrorists or rogue
nations to strike out with weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). These could include biological, chemical and
nuclear threats. Indeed, during the war in Afghanistan,
the press and military alike frantically waved remnants
of terrorist cookbooks for WMD as evidence of an
imminent threat. However, they often failed to
understand that the documents themselves were
rudimentary and often uninformed, incorrect, and reliant
on technology and skills that were difficult to procure.
Still, the media in the West caught a whiff of
terror from limited anthrax attacks in the United States
and fragments of documents in Afghanistan, and set about
exhaustive, and unfortunately often incorrect, reporting
on weapons of mass destruction. Regarding biological
weapons and agents, one news agency went so far as to
have an expert claim that a biological weapon of mass
destruction could be produced in a "five-gallon bucket
in your back yard".
While this writer
doubts that any al-Qaeda members rushed out to buy buckets,
he still blames the media for irresponsible and
ultimately inaccurate reporting that results in nothing more
than spreading fear without basis and a temporary boost
in ratings. What always seemed to be at the root of
the reporting was the possibility of a
large-scale biological attack, with "anthrax" being the
leading bio-buzzword. Even though limited infections of
anthrax occurred and resulted in only five deaths, the
looming danger was most certain to be cataclysmic from
the media's viewpoint.
Crop dusters, fogging
machines and agricultural misting equipment were all put
on display as possible methods of delivering the deadly
biological toxin. In truth though, none of these devices
or delivery methods would be effective for spreading
anthrax.
First we must understand that
weapons-grade anthrax is not easily developed. In fact
the only nations that have successfully developed
weapons-grade anthrax are the United States and the
former Soviet Union. It is a process that requires
knowledge, facilities and equipment - beyond the scope
of your garden-variety bucket.
Converting
anthrax to dry spores is essential to its usability as a
weapons-grade biological agent and is technically
difficult to achieve. Anthrax is a naturally occurring
livestock pathogen common in rural farming areas. Since
it is not concentrated and occurs primarily at the
ground level, it is seldom harmful to humans. Even wool
sorters who are believed to come in contact with trace
amounts of anthrax through their daily work rarely see
it affect their health. To make it a viable weapon for
mass destruction, it must be concentrated, dried to
powder form and delivered optimally through an aerosol
application.
This process that initially calls
for highly trained biologists to identify, segregate and
develop appropriate anthrax spores then still requires
equipment and knowledge beyond that of even the savviest
terrorist organizations. Anthrax is a cellular pathogen
that is naturally moist because of its composition. In
its wet form anthrax is not at all effective as a
weapon, certainly not of mass destruction. Sprayers clog
and mechanical stress on the microbes can kill up to 95
percent of the pathogen. To be delivered effectively,
the "anthrax slurry" used to cultivate the spores must
be dried in a centrifuge, a large and expensive piece of
equipment. Moreover, simply opening your centrifuge to
retrieve your bio-weapon is not recommended, but
requires a host of pressure chambers and steam
sanitizing equipment before properly trained and
protected technicians can safely retrieve the biological
agent.
If this cultivation and purification
process were successful you would now have a heap of
very deadly powder that would still be hard to deliver
to the mass populace. Aerosol is a preferred method of
delivery for the US government, but is still considered
a limited deployment option. Consider that even when
aerosols are sprayed, a powder, like all objects, will
obey gravity and drop to the ground, much of it not
being inhaled. Delivering anthrax as a weapon of mass
destruction, then, to a large population is considered
ineffective, costly and having only limited impact.
There are similar hurdles against
developing other bacterial pathogens into weapons-grade quality
and delivering them to the masses. Years ago the
technically savvy, well trained and funded Japanese Aum
Shinrikyo cult attempted to develop biological weapons,
reportedly including anthrax and botulism, but finally turned
to the chemical weapon sarin or nerve gas that
it used in its 1995 attack on a Tokyo subway.
The complexity of developing and delivering the delicate
bacterial agents thus often precludes their application
and use as a WMD, especially for terrorist groups.
Another classification of biological agents that
can be used as weapons is that of viral agents. Examples
include smallpox, yellow fever and influenza, which can
be modified to increase their effectiveness. As we have
seen with bacterial agents, technical skill and training
in biology are essential to handling and developing
these agents and preparing them for use as a weapon.
Unlike bacterial agents, viral agents are often
contagious and this in itself can act as a delivery
method. A single person purposely infected with smallpox
could infect dozens of people quickly. This bio-suicide
bomber of sorts in a mobile population such as the
United States' could cause outbreaks across the country
in a matter of days. A 1999 report in the Journal of the
American Medical Association states that more than 30
percent of such a population could be infected in
matter of weeks. Considering that smallpox vaccinations
ceased more than 25 years ago and the United States
holds only 15.4 million doses of vaccine for a
population of more than 260 million, the effects of an
outbreak could be massive.
Control of
such outbreaks would center on quick recognition,
immediate treatment and strict isolation of infected
individuals. This could prove difficult in a mobile modern
society, especially since most medical doctors of the day
have never had to diagnose smallpox. Some cases could be
sent home misdiagnosed only to spread the contagion
further. This type of attack would be truly suicidal, as
in today's increasingly internationally mobile society
it would likely spread to Third World nations where
the poor and even terrorists themselves would be
least prepared to deal with such an outbreak. It may be
that because of these apocalyptic ramifications for their own
world, smallpox would not be a viable tool for terrorists.
Toxins or naturally occurring poisons derived
from plants and animals need less time to take deadly
effect than bacterial and viral agents that require
incubation periods ranging from days to weeks. However,
much like their counterparts, these biological agents
are hard to store, develop and deliver to a large
population. Like bacterial agents, toxins are
susceptible to environmental factors in delivery and
storage that could ultimately render them ineffective.
One of the primary considerations in biological
weapons is effectiveness in delivery. For this reason,
when coupled with the hardships of weapons-grade
development and subsequent storage and transport, we may
see more clearly why biological weapons, while they may
seem tempting to terrorists, are not in most cases
conducive to the contemporary urban battlefield where
terrorists tend to wage their battles. Instead, in the
more conventional warfare we have seen in Iraq in years
past, and could see again, the battlefield is defined,
and missile-based delivery of biological agents becomes
more viable. In such situations the usually less
effective and less widely used liquid-form agents
would at least wreak havoc on enemy troops on the
battlefield, complicating military movement and
operations.
So while the terrorist
may stand ready - bucket in hand - he will likely soon
find that biological agents are not the answer to his
weapons needs. Terrorists remain far more likely to
choose weapons that can be easily developed, safely stored
and transported, and that effectively destroy their
enemy while instilling terror in the masses.
(©2002
Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
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