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Iraqi opposition forges ties in
Tehran
By Hooman Peimani
On
December 9 and 10, four major leaders of the Iraqi
opposition held talks between and among themselves in
Tehran. The talks involved Ayatollah Seyed Mohammad
Bager Hakim, the leader of the pro-Iranian Shi'ite armed
group Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq
(SCIRI); Jalal Talebani and Masoud Barezani, the leaders
of the two main armed Kurdish parties, respectively, the
Patriotic Front of the Iraqi Kurdistan (PF) and the
Democratic Party of Kurdistan of Iraq (DPK); and Ahmad
Chalabi, a leader of the London-based secular Iraqi
National Congress (INC).
While such talks among
Iraqi opposition groups are not a new phenomenon, the
place and the timing of the recent ones give them a
special significance for their impact on the formation
of any future Iraqi regime, and also serve as an
indicator of Iran's efforts to play a role in such
process.
In a serious manner, efforts to create
a united front of the Iraqi opposition groups began
following the 1990 Iraqi invasion and annexation of
Kuwait and the subsequent 1991 Persian Gulf war. At that
time, the expression of interest and the direct
encouragement of the American government for a regime
change in Iraq increased contacts among the Iraqi
opposition groups, which, excluding the Kurdish and
Shi'ite ones, were mainly small, foreign-based, unarmed
and devoid of any significant popular support.
In the wake of the 1991 war, the Iraqi regime's
brutal suppression of anti-government uprisings in the
Shi'ite and Kurdish regions of Iraq paralleled, with
equally brutality, its suppression of Iraqi opposition
groups and individuals operating in the country. As a
result, in about a year, the PF, the DPK and the SCIRI
were the only major Iraqi opposition groups still
operating in their country.
In the
post-September 11 era, the American government's seeming
determination to attack Iraq and change its regime has
created a realistic ground for a regime change in that
country, an unachievable goal for the Iraqi opposition
groups individually or collectively without direct
American military support. Thus, as the expanding
American military build-up in Iraq increases the
possibility of an American attack in the near future,
the American preparations for a post-Saddam regime have
coincided with the interest of the Iraqi opposition to
arrange for an acceptable political system for all its
influential groups.
This is a very difficult
objective given the subscription of those groups to a
wide range of political orientations and ideological
persuasions and their representation of different ethnic
groups and religions. Based on this reality, the
scheduled London conference of some 50 Iraqi opposition
groups (December 13-15) will aim at creating a consensus
among all the groups of relevance to the future of Iraq.
Against this background, the Tehran talks of the
four major Iraqi opposition leaders were of special
importance for at least four major reasons: First, they
were held in Iran, whose government has officially
opposed the American plan for a regime change in Iraq
with the assistance of the Iraqi opposition groups.
Undoubtedly, the Iranians, who tolerated heavy
casualties (about 1.5 million dead and wounded), during
their war with Iraq (1980-88) have no sympathy for the
Iraqi regime and Saddam Hussein, the instigator of the
devastating war. However, they are concerned about a
pro-American Iraq, which would almost complete their
encirclement by unfriendly, unreliable and/or
pro-American neighbors of which most host American
troops.
Second, the talks involved the only
three Iraqi opposition groups with significant popular
support and military forces. Apart from the PF, the DPK
and the SVIRI, other Iraqi opposition groups are mainly
unarmed small intellectual groups with self-claimed ties
with the dissatisfied elements of the Iraqi military,
the security forces, or the ruling elite, having
insignificant, if any at all, popularity or influence
among the Iraqis, while operating outside Iraq in
countries such as Syria and the United Kingdom. For this
reason, the three mentioned Iraqi groups are the only
ones with the capability to facilitate any future regime
change in Iraq with the direct American assistance
and/or to help the restoration of law and order in the
aftermath of such change.
Third, the talks were
conducted a few days prior to the London conference
tasked with coordinating the Iraqi opposition efforts
towards establishing a new regime in Iraq. Given the PF,
the DPK and the SVIRI popular and military significance
and the political importance of the INC as the main
coalition of Iraqi opposition figures, their talks, if
fruitful, could have helped them achieve a common ground
by which they could have a major impact on the outcome
of the London conference, ie, through securing large
shares of future Iraqi regime to preserve their vital
interests.
Finally, the Tehran talks indicated
Iran's potential influence in shaping post-Saddam Iraq.
Added to the talks between and among the four Iraqi
opposition leaders in Tehran, their individual private
meetings with the Iranian influential figures, eg,
parliamentary speaker Mehdi Karroubi and head of the
expediency assembly Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, revealed a
recognition of Iran's importance for any future
political development in their country. As well, those
meetings and talks demonstrated that the major Iraqi
opposition groups do not support nor consider feasible
the American policy of isolating Iran in the Persian
Gulf region and of its exclusion from any arrangement
for the future of Iraq. Among other factors, this is a
consequence of its long borders with Iraq, its strong
ethnic and religious ties with that country and its
certain influence with the Iraqi opposition caused by
hosting and backing the SVIRI and providing assistance
to the Kurdish groups.
The Tehran talks
signified both Iran's importance for a regime change in
its neighboring Iraq and also its government's efforts
to avoid being sidelined in shaping that country's
future. The latter has also been reflected in certain
recent change of policy by Ayatollah Hakim, while
revealing his appreciation of the political realities
demanding a compromise. Hence, despite his group's clear
religious orientation and its being backed for over two
decades by Iran (where it is based), Ayatollah Hakim has
recently declared his acceptance of a secular future
regime in Iraq by supporting a proposed secular
constitution for that country. Unimaginable without
Tehran's consent, such a sudden development suggests
that the Iranian government has decided to use its
assets to play a significant role in influencing the
future of Iraq by seeking to secure the positive
attitude of the entire Iraqi opposition favoring a
secular regime.
Dr Hooman Peimani
works as an independent consultant with international
organizations in Geneva and does research in
international relations.
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