| |
Flawed assumptions on war
By
David Isenberg
The view that there simply is no
alternative to invading Iraq and overthrowing Saddam
Hussein is one that is largely accepted by the US media
and public. Over and over the administration points out
certain, inarguable points: that Saddam is a brutal,
despicable dictator responsible for horrific human
rights abuses; that he has repeatedly threatened and
attacked his neighbors; that he has violated
international law and treaty commitments; that he
continues to seek nuclear, biological and chemical
weapons and the missiles to deliver them.
So,
the thinking goes, it may be unpleasant, but there
really is no other choice. Or is there?
In fact,
the assumptions underlying that thinking are highly
debatable. The most recent prominent critique of those
assumptions is a study released last month by the
Committee of International Security Studies of the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences: "War with Iraq:
Costs, Consequences, and Alternatives."
The
review received some mention when a shortened version of
one of its chapters, by Yale economics professor William
Nordhaus, was run in the New York Review of Books. But
it is the second chapter, by Professor Steven Miller of
Harvard University, that offers some of the most
detailed critiques to date of Bush administration
thinking.
Miller finds that "when the potential
costs, risks and consequences are fully assessed, the
war looks very much like a dangerous gamble that could
well be damaging to American (and Western) interests and
the cause of a safe and congenial international order."
He points out many assumptions in the
administration's thinking that are not supported by
evidence. For example, the Bush administration’s "theory
of victory" is built around the notion that Saddam is a
brutal dictator, despised by many of his own people,
whose rule is based on fear, rather than loyalty.
But as Miller points out, we have heard this all
before. That view echoes the one held during the 1991
Gulf War that Saddam would be overthrown during or
immediately after the war by internal forces seeking to
spare the country further suffering. Of course, with the
advantage of hindsight, such a view was wildly off the
mark. Similarly, he asks, "Why is Saddam regarded as
undeterrable when other, much powerful tyrants (such as
Stalin and Mao) were in fact deterred?"
There
are other points worth considering. If Saddam is as
great a brute as he is made out to be, and there is
really no reason to say that he isn't, then doesn't it
follow that he will have no compunction about seeking
ways of inflicting the maximum amount of harm in
response to an invasion, including the biological and
chemical weapons that are most feared?
Currently, US intelligence believes that the
probability of use against the US of whatever chemical
and biological weapons Iraq actually has is low. Thus,
ironically, as Miller puts it "the Bush policy of
preventive war maximizes the likelihood of WMD use in
the short run in order to eliminate longer-run fears of
Saddam’s WMD capability. That is, Saddam’s WMD are most
likely to be used if he is attacked." Such a reaction
stands in contrast to the benefits of carrying out a
preemptive strike, as was publicized on September 30
when the Bush administration released its National
Security Strategy report.
A related issue is
Iraq's capability for initiating terrorist attacks.
Although the administration has unsuccessfully tried to
make the case for links between Saddam Hussein and
al-Qaeda, it is a fact of life that Iraq has both
harbored terrorist groups and has undertaken its own
terrorist actions overseas.
As Miller notes,
"This implies that Saddam has another strategic
retaliatory option to utilize in response to an
America-led attack; he can fund, fuel and facilitate a
campaign of terrorism against his attackers. Given the
amount of warning that the Bush administration has
provided him, Saddam has had plenty of time to
pre-deploy his own terrorists in the US or elsewhere."
There are also consequences to be concerned
about, such as the shifting focus from the war on
terrorism. While the Taliban has been overthrown in
Afghanistan, al-Qaeda is far from beaten, as shown from
past attacks in Indonesia and Kenya. And, as virtually
every analysis of homeland security efforts shows, the
United States is still tremendously vulnerable. Much
remains to be done and nothing should divert the US
government from that task.
Yet a war with Iraq
would inevitably divert attention and resources away
from the fight. Miller writes, "An attack on Iraq will
without question preoccupy the president, his
administration, the Congress, the media and even the
public. The war against al-Qaeda may continue
simultaneously, but it will no longer be the central
focus."
Then there is what one might politely
call the hypocrisy factor. The Bush administration’s
willingness, and, in some cases, eagerness, to get its
own way, in contravention of international law and
global order, is not exactly news. But still, many
foreign observers are dismayed and disturbed by its
unilateralist impulses. On that point, Miller cites
historian Paul Schroeder: "A more dangerous,
illegitimate norm and example can hardly be imagined ...
It completely subverts previous standards for judging
the legitimacy of resorting to war, justifying any
number of wars hitherto considered unjust and aggressive
... It would in fact justify almost any attack by any
state on any front for almost any reason."
In a
less strident passage, Miller asks, "Can one promote a
rules-based order while appearing to ignore, bend or
reshape the rules oneself? Can one punish the
non-compliant by engaging in behavior that many others
will view as non-compliant? To believe so is to have
moved a long way from the "humble" foreign policy
promised by candidate Bush. To many in the international
community, this appears to be a clear and power-based
exercise of a double standard."
(©2002 Asia
Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact content@atimes.com
for information on our sales and syndication policies,
or to submit a letter to the editor.)
|
| |
|
|
 |
|
