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Kurds vow: '10,000 men in
Baghdad'
By Ian Urbina
This
weekend saw the close of an important conference in
London of more than 300 delegates from the various
groups of the Iraqi opposition forces. The point of the
meeting was to present a new image of unity for the
fractious and ever-bickering collection of anti-Saddam
Hussein organizations. But ironically one of the few
things that everyone at the US-sponsored meeting could
agree on was that they did not want the US running
Baghdad after Saddam. Far less clear was what sort of
government they did want.
It was an
accomplishment in and of itself that a wide array of
organizations attended the two-day meeting. The main
Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) - who fought
each other for years - sat alongside the Iranian-backed
Shi'ite group Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution
in Iraq (SAIRI). Also in attendance were the
Constitutional Monarchy Movement and the National Accord
Movement. One of the main organizers of the event was
the Iraqi National Congress (INC), headed by Ahmad
Chalabi, who draws strong backing from Washington.
But the event, which had been postponed several
times due to party disagreements, was not without its
glitches. The Iraqi Communist Party, the Socialist Party
and the pro-Syrian branch of Iraq's ruling Baath Party
all decided to boycott the function, claiming that they
had been marginalized from the conference’s organization
and agenda. The Shi'ite Muslim al-Daawa Party also did
not attend, stating that it could not condone a
potential US attack on Iraq.
On occasion,
tensions flared. One amused Iraqi observer said that he
overheard one lifelong opponent of Saddam shout at
another, "Just you wait until we have democracy in Iraq,
and I'll throw you in jail!" Though all parties
supported the notion of a federal Iraq, they tabled the
decision over the type of federalism. While the Kurdish
parties argued that a federation should be based on a
bi-national model with an Arab and Kurdish state, others
preferred a decentralization based not on ethnic but
geographic lines.
There was, however, one
important and contentious matter resolved, officially at
least. The conference organizers ruled against forming a
government-in-waiting. Despite the lobbying of the INC,
which contended that forming a transitional government
ahead of time would help limit US control of Baghdad
post-Saddam, most other parties were skeptical, instead
arguing that Chalabi intended to have the US parachute
him into leadership. Some groups believe that Chalabi is
still plotting behind the scenes, and while the INC
strongly denies such accusations, it is also quick to
point out the need for a "political authority" to be in
place to avoid a "sovereignty vacuum" in Iraq.
The US strongly opposes the formation of a
government-in-exile, arguing that it will alienate
serving Iraqi generals who might mutiny once a war
starts. Surely, the US also does not want to tie its own
hands in advance concerning Iraq’s political fate, and
more importantly the economic status of its oil
reserves.
Nevertheless, there are reasons other
than the potential US occupation of Iraq for Chalabi and
the INC to favor an early settling of the terms of any
post-Saddam government. For all of his stated concern
over the possibility of a power vacuum, Chalabi is more
specifically worried that the Kurds will be the ones to
fill it.
For the most part, Kurdish leadership
has remained tight-lipped about their ultimate
ambitions. But occasionally, they have gone on record
with candor, and the vision they disclose predicts a
potentially chaotic scramble for power once an invasion
gets under way. While touring Iraqi Kurdistan, Chris
Kutschera of Middle East Report magazine interviewed a
number of high-level Kurdish military personnel and most
admitted that it is not just the oil-rich city of Kirkuk
- the so-called Kurdish Jerusalem - that the Kurds seek.
The US will likely send in the Kurdish
peshmergas as the first wave of fighters, and
these men do not intend to go half way. "We have an
agenda for all possibilities," Kosrat Rasul, former PUK
prime minister in Suleimaniya, remarked. "We want a
share in Baghdad. If we have air cover, and artillery
support, we can even take control of Baghdad. Geography
is in our favor: Kalar and Kifri [two towns controlled
by the PUK] are only an hour and a half to two hours
from Baghdad."
Rasul has more in mind than
merely ensuring that Kurdish diplomats are present
during post-Saddam negotiations. "We must have a force
of at least 10,000 men in Baghdad. Garrisoned in one of
Baghdad's three big military bases, this Kurdish
division will be a guarantee, protecting the government
and democracy against an eventual putsch by some Iraqi
general, as has happened so often in Iraqi history."
Without muscle behind it, Kurdish ambitions will
go nowhere. "If we want federalism, we must be strong in
the central government in Baghdad. If we do not go to
Baghdad, the Shi'ites will come, or the military will
take over."
This scenario strikes not only at
the heart of Chalabi's fears, but also at the essence of
his Achilles' heel. With the Pentagon as his primary
backer, Chalabi - who is said to have more support on
the Potomac than the Euphrates - lacks the strength
inside Iraq to militarily exert his aspirations. Not
having set foot in the country for over 20 years,
Chalabi depends on a handful of wealthy exiles to stand
by him. The Americans are the only ones with guns who
might push his interests once war breaks out.
The London conference was Chalabi's main chance
to establish political terms that he cannot possibly
enforce on the ground in Iraq, and since the Kurds will
likely be the primary US proxies on the front lines,
they may be best positioned to get to Baghdad first.
Unless the US decides to keep the Kurds on a short
leash, Chalabi could conceivably find others already
there to greet him when he and his transitional
government parachute into Baghdad. In all likelihood, he
is cutting deals at present to make sure that does not
happen.
(©2002 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All
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