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Turkey: The ugly duckling
By K
Gajendra Singh
"It's all right to be
born into a duck family if you aren't a
swan."
- Turkish journalist Ferai Tinc,
recalling Hans Christian Andersen's "The Ugly
Duckling"
Turkey's November parliamentary
elections, which gave a two-thirds majority to the
Islamic-based Justice and Development Party (AKP), might
yet prove to be a blessing in disguise after all. And
for all - Turkey, Europe and the West.
If two
secular parties had succeeded in crossing the 10 percent
threshold needed to have representation in parliament,
which they narrowly missed, with 34 percent of the total
votes, the AKP would have been forced to form a
coalition government, like its parent Welfare Party in
1996, leaving room for maneuver and confusion both at
home and abroad. The Welfare-led government was forced
to resign by the armed forces in 1997.
But as it
turned out, Christian Europe was forced to decide on
Turkey's possible entry into the European Union against
a backdrop of the massive AKP majority government in
Ankara, and in the face of a full frontal and vigorous
charge led by the AKP's undisputed leader, Recip Tayyip
Erdogan, and new Prime Minister Abdullah Gul, assisted
by Turkish President Ahmet Sezer, a former head of
Turkey's Constitutional Court.
They left no
stone unturned, for everyone to see, in seeking an early
date for talks on Turkey's accession to the EU,
preferably by the end of 2003, or early 2004, and well
before the 10 new countries, now admitted, were
scheduled to become members formally.
But a firm
EU leadership, while trying to humor the Turkish leaders
at last week's Copenhagen summit and at their capitals
earlier, agreed only to discuss a date for accession at
the end of 2004. In announcing the decision on December
12, Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the
current EU president, said that only if the EU
leadership decided in December 2004 that Turkey had
fulfilled formal criteria for all candidate states as
set out in a 1993 document, "then we will open accession
negotiations with Turkey".
When asked when the
negotiations would begin, Rasmussen appeared to grope
for the right words. "Well, it's a very clear message,"
he said. "The answer to that, well, you ask me, when. It
is a good question and the answer is very clear. As soon
as possible. Because we stick to principle. We stick to
principle that Turkey can get a date for the start of
accession negotiations when Turkey fulfills the
political criteria."
Gul reacted angrily,
accusing the EU of discrimination. "This means our
efforts are not appreciated and there is a prejudice
against us," he said. Erdogan, for his part, accused the
EU of double standards and behaving like a "Christian
club".
Yet there was no disguising the rebuff to
the efforts by the Turks, as well as those of the
British and the energetic US lobbying, which served
largely to infuriate many Europeans. Jacques Chirac, the
French president, was singled out for furious criticism
by the Turks. He had been angered by Ankara's aggressive
lobbying, described by a senior EU figure as
"blackmail". "It's not enough to respect European law,"
Chirac was quoted as saying, "You also have to be polite
and civilized." Gul retorted that it was the French
president who was doing "the real blackmailing".
"What the Americans fail to understand is the
difference between a military alliance like Nato and the
EU," a senior EU official said. "What we have to do is
to persuade European consumers that they should be happy
to have a Turkish head of the food standards agency. The
EU is not about foreign policy but domestic issues."
Nicole Fontaine, the French industry minister,
said, "It's certainly not up to the president of the
United States to interfere in something so important and
which mainly concerns Europe." British Prime Minister
Tony Blair warned that French and German resistance to
delay the start of negotiations would prove a strategic
error in Europe's dealings with Islam. Later, putting a
spin on the agreement, he said that it was a "huge step
forward". He admitted that Turkey would have liked an
earlier date, but added, "For 40 years, Turkey has been
waiting for a firm date, and this is a firm date."
Foreign Minister Jack Straw added that the UK government
"wanted to see a democratic market economy Muslim
country coming into the European Union".
But the
Turkish attitude had irritated even friendly diplomats.
"They have snatched defeat from the jaws of victory,"
said one diplomatic source. "This kind of thing does not
make it any easier to argue their case." Italian Prime
Minister Silvio Berlusconi confirmed that Ankara's
pre-summit lobbying may have worked against it. "There
has been strong pressure from Turkey, which many didn't
like." German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer took
exception to Gul's strong language at the summit. But he
added that the December 2004 date on which Turkey's
membership chances would be judged "was a real
breakthrough".
European parliament president Pat
Cox said, "Turkey has won a political victory at the
Copenhagen summit. You should celebrate this instead of
considering it a defeat." Swedish Prime Minister Goran
Persson said, "The 2004 decision we took for Turkey
proves that Turks will be a EU member, because you
deserve it." While EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana
said, "We have made Turkey feel relieved. This decision
showed that there can't be a Europe without Turkey."
Sources said that the Netherlands, Austria,
Denmark, Sweden and Finland were least keen on an early
membership date. Against considerable lobbying from the
US, with Britain, Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain
favoring Turkey, France and Germany took a firm line,
dashing Turkish hopes.
Any date before June 2004
was out of the question as it would have affected
elections to the European parliament. The German
Christian Democrat opposition leader, Edmund Stoiber, is
an outspoken critic of Turkish membership and the ruling
Social Democrats feared serious losses in those
elections if Turkey was already a candidate. Chirac was
also opposed, fearing that the next European elections
could be hijacked by the French far right.
Once
the verdict was delivered, the French and German duo did
not even shake hands with Erdogan, not even for the
cameras. Western leaders will in time make their own
assessments about the AKP and its leadership to
formulate their policies, but the haste, style and
clumsy diplomacy shown by the AKP over admission did not
go down well, never mind that it was for consumption in
Turkey to show that the AKP was as keen as any other
party to fight for Turkey's entry into the EU.
The Turkish media expressed deep dismay at the
outcome. "Once again, a broken dream," read a headline
in the Cumhuriyet. Later, Gul said, "We did our best but
the negotiation date appeared a little bit delayed. Our
road is clear. We will make reforms for our people, even
if there will be EU membership or not."
Meanwhile, Erdogan added that he was not pleased
with the political decision, but the road map was in
favor of Turkey and the journey would continue. He even
denied that he was angry and vowed that Turkey would
continue its reform efforts, with the goal of passing
the 2004 review. "We're not upset, but it could have
been a better decision," he said.
But the
speaker of the Turkish parliament, Bulent Arinc, one of
the most influential men in the AKP, condemned the
decision, while deputy prime minister Abdullatif Sener
said, "The decision was a step forward for Turkey, and
we assess it as a closer approach to the EU. The glass
is not half empty. We need to look at the full half."
Such differing views must have horrified the Turkish
Foreign Office and its sedate Euro-leaning mandarins.
President Sezer, who did some canvassing at the
NATO summit in Prague earlier, had concluded that the
European leadership was not serious and did not even
attend the Copenhagen summit. His office expressed
disappointment at the decision.
It was a bit of
theater of the absurd played around the world; in
Turkey, the US, European capitals and Girne, the capital
of Turkish-controlled Cyprus. Even President George W
Bush took time from his war on terror and plans for a
regime change in Iraq to meet with Erdogan and support
Turkey's entry into the EU.
If one looks through
the smoke screens, though, the final result was crystal
clear from the very beginning. But it was an education
and even amusing to see the charade unfold, bringing out
into the open the attitudes and positions of the various
governments and their compulsions.
Here is a
quick summary of Turkey's journey so far to join the EU.
Turkey, a member of NATO since 1952, applied in 1959 and
became an associate member of the European Economic
Community, as the EU was then known. In 1970, Turkey
signed an agreement foreseeing Turkey's eventual full
membership of the now renamed European Community (EC).
In 1978-79, the EC asked Turkey to apply for membership
along with Greece. Turkey declined, and perhaps missed
the best chance it had ever had. After the military
takeover in Ankara in September 1980, relations with the
EC were frozen, but after the parliamentary elections in
1983 relations resumed.
In 1984, members of the
Turkish parliament participated in the Council of
Europe. Under prime minister Turgut Ozal, Turkey applied
for full membership and was registered in 1987. In 1989,
the EC accepted eligibility but deferred assessment of
the application. On January 1, 1996, a customs union
with the EU came into force. In December 1997, the EC
refused candidate status. Ankara was angry. In the 1999
elections, leftists and fascist parties won by big
margins. So in December 1999, Ankara was granted
candidate status. In October 2001, Turkey streamlined
the constitution drafted in 1982 under the military
regime to fulfill the EU's political criteria.
To strengthen its case for the vital 2002
Copenhagen summit, the Turkish parliament passed
sweeping constitutional reforms, including the abolition
of the death penalty and the easing of bans on the use
of the Kurdish language, to meet some of the EU's human
rights criteria. On December 11, the Turkish parliament
overwhelmingly approved a package of human rights
reforms, including sanctions against torture, but it
stopped short of full ratification pending technical
procedures.
Before September 11, 2001, Erdogan
would not have even dreamt of visiting the White House.
Prior to the November elections he would have been given
a polite no, but now he is being dined but not wined in
Washington. He addressed think tanks and press
conferences in the US capital, capped by a good meeting
with Bush. Later, he met with UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan. His whirlwind tour covered 15 European countries.
To an uneasy Christian world, with terrorist
attacks spreading, it must have been a relief and a
reassuring sight to see Erdogan in a Western suit,
albeit somewhat crumpled and old fashioned, wanting to
join the Christian club. More so after the October
elections in Pakistan, a front line ally of the US
against terrorism, in which Islamic parties led by the
fierce-looking traditionally clad Fazlur Rehman and his
ilk made the best ever showing in Pakistan's history of
religious parties. Their pro-Taliban coalition, the
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, won on an anti-US manifesto. It
has already formed a government in North West Frontier
Province and is in a coalition in Balochistan. It will
play an important role in Pakistan's politics.
Thus, in an era of growing confrontation between
Islam and Christianity, led on one side by the elusive
Osama bin Laden, his al-Qaeda and its clones in the
Islamic world and Bush on the other, the efforts of
Erdogan to exchange views with Western leaders should
lead to a better understanding.
In 1994, when
Gul was spokesman for foreign affairs for the Welfare
Party, he had said, "Turkey should not join the European
Union, we have said this from the beginning. Look at a
European city, and then look at Istanbul. It's not a
Christian city."
A few years ago, Erdogan
recited a poem that included the verses, "Minarets are
our bayonets, domes are our helmets, mosques are our
barracks, believers are our soldiers." For this, he was
jailed and subsequently debarred from contesting the
November elections for having a criminal record. Should
the constitution be amended, though, he would be able to
stand for elections, at the earliest in February.
The AKP, by embracing the EU cause, is working
to further undermine the secular parties, which have
traditionally worked for Europe and NATO. Most Turkish
businessmen want Turkey in the EU. The majority of the
electorate in general identifies Europe with more jobs,
prosperity, and the freedom to travel and work in the
continent.
The US, with Turkey's critical
importance in its strategic algebra in general and
immediate support for plans for a regime change in Iraq,
gave its maximum support to Turkey. From the isolated
comforts of plush media or think tank premises, Muslim
American writers recommend to the Christian EU that it
should let in Muslim secular Turkey in a grand gesture
of Christian Muslim synthesis. This did not fool the
Europeans, nor does it fool Muslims who remain opposed
to US policy.
For the UK, apart from toeing the
US line, Turkey's admission would be more in line with
its perception of how the EU should evolve into a
federation of states and not what France and Germany
want - a more unitary body. Also, the English, whose
empire was built from the East India Company, would not
miss a chance for a commercial deal.
Hoping for
a contract for Istanbul's third bridge across the
Bosporus, which was never built, then-premier Margaret
Thatcher even claimed to Turkey's prime minister Turgut
Ozal in the 1980s that "I am an Ozalist". In India,
whenever an air force jet trainer deal or some other
purchase is under consideration, the British leaders
sing a more favorable tune on Kashmir, but soon revert
to the old song of neutrality or favoring Pakistan. So
Tony Blair's efforts and the spin that Turkey after 40
years has a deal is aimed to win some brownie points
with the Turks.
The unitary political systems in
France and Turkey are quite similar, but the French give
more importance to culture. It was elder statesman and
former president Giscard D'Estaing, now working on a
conceptual framework for the EU, who stated the French
view earlier (and perhaps that of many others), that
Turkey is not in Europe, its culture is different and
Turkey's entry would end the EU. At a media conference
in Copenhagen, when a Turkish journalist rather rudely
enquired if he was sorry for his stand, Giscard replied
that he had nothing more to add to his earlier view. It
must be remembered that France has 3 million Muslim
Arabs from its former colonies in Maghreb. But their
borders end in the sands of the Sahara, unlike Turkey's,
which lead to states like Syria, Iraq and Iran.
Germany's relationship with Turkey is much more
historical and complex, beginning from the time when
Ottoman janissaries twice reached the gates of
Vienna in the 16th century. Turks and Germans fought for
control of East Europe and the Balkans and both ruled
over it. When the Ottoman Empire started declining, to
counter superior European arms and military training,
the Ottomans relied on German assistance, which
influence still abides in the mental make up of the
Turkish armed forces. The Turkish and German
disciplinary view of life also converges. So it was
natural that Turks allied with the Germans in World War
I, after which the Ottoman empire was finally unraveled.
There was great internal pressure on Turkish president
Ismet Inonu to join Hitler in World War II, but before
dying in 1938, Kemal Ataturk had warned Inonu not to go
against the strongest Western power, ie England.
Under Ottoman Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent,
the Turks could not get west of the gates of Vienna, but
under his namesake Suleiman Demiral (seven times prime
minister of Turkey from the early 1960s until he retired
as president in 2000), a new relationship developed with
Turks emigrating to meet the needs of Germany's fast
expanding economy in the 1960s. They now number over 3
million, out of which nearly a quarter are Kurds. Most
of them came from poor and backward east and south
Turkey. They now face the hostility of pro-Christian
parties following the end of the economic boom, but most
of the hybrid Turks, ill at ease in Germany and in
Turkey, have preferred to stay on in Germany.
The Kurdish organizations are very active in
Germany and the AKP and its parents, like the Welfare
Party, easily collect huge funds and recruit supporters
as Turkish politics are echoed in Germany, especially
Turkish Kurdish rivalries.
For instance, Kurdish
rebel leader Abdullah Ocalan, after being expelled from
Syria, was looking for asylum and was arrested in Rome
on a warrant issued at Germany's behest. But Germany,
afraid of repercussions at home, dared not extradite
Ocalan. So for left of center politicians like
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, Turkish support and votes
are very important. But they would be happier if the
problem did not become bigger, which it would with
Turkey inside the EU. With free travel, many millions of
Turkey's 70 million population could seek new pastures.
In the EU, only a now united Germany has a larger
population.
But in spite of Turkish
recriminations against Germany, skilled Turks returning
home helped Ozal carry out the industrialization of
Turkey. On the other hand, there are nearly 15,000 Turks
in German universities, according to a recent report.
And there are 40,000 Turkish-owned businesses, mostly
shops and restaurants, in which billions of dollars are
invested and which employ over 125,000 people, including
many Germans.
Erdogan's time as a mayor of
Istanbul gave him only limited exposure to the world of
diplomacy and negotiations. As part of prime minister
Necmettin Erbakan's cabinet in 1996-97, Gul had more
exposure, but the sensitive ministries of foreign
affairs, defense and interior were held by the coalition
partner, the True Path Party. Western leaders and their
diplomats shied away from meeting Welfare ministers. But
even at home, the AKP leadership has to learn how to
deal with the Pashas, as the top military brass is
called in Turkey. The Pashas have already instructed Gul
at their first briefing about the dangers of Islamic
fundamentalism.
The Turkish Chief of General
Staff is next in state protocol after the president and
the prime minister, but has perhaps more real power. The
armed forces exercise their influence through regular
monthly meetings of the highest policy-making National
Security Council, dominated by them (it was the model
for President General Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan).
Every year, military officers who are suspected of any
Islamic tendencies or connections are expelled from the
armed forces. Islamist leader Erbakan, when he was prime
minister in 1996-97, had to swallow and sign such a
decree. According to EU political norms, the armed
forces have no role in political decision making, except
in an advisory capacity.
While the self-styled
custodians of secularism in Turkey guard the
constitution, such a role itself will remain a great
hindrance for Turkey in gaining entry into the EU. But
without the armed forces, one can guess the state and
health of democracy and secularism, with such examples
as Pakistan and Algeria.
Lacking experience and
young, carried away by a massive unexpected victory and
warm diplomatic receptions abroad, Erdogan and his
colleagues are already making mistakes, such as the wife
of the AKP's parliament speaker covering her head in a
scarf.
Erdogan claims that his daughter studies
in US because there is freedom to wear scarves. AKP
leaders are unwisely raising such matters in public too
early. Erdogan made a faux pas by linking Turkey's entry
into the EU with a solution to the Cyprus problem and
the use of NATO assets by the EU's rapid defense force
without clearing it with the Foreign Ministry and the
armed forces.
He also had to backpedal on his
embracing a Belgium-like solution for the intractable
Cyprus problem, which was also shot down by the Foreign
Ministry and the armed forces. As expected, a solution
to the Cyprus problem, necessary for its entry into the
EU, could not be found before the end of the summit in
Copenhagen. The Greek and Turkish sides signed a letter
of intent to continue negotiating under UN auspices and
to undertake to reach an accord by March 2003.
It may be true that Erdogan had a successful
tenure as mayor of Istanbul, partly because of corrupt
and inefficient predecessors or their parties. But many
a time the celebrations of his achievement smacked of an
election campaign. But running a big country going
through a crippling economic crisis and with a decimated
political opposition waiting to trip the new regime will
need the utmost care, caution and finesse.
In
1994, US-educated prime minister Tansu Ciller, with a
PhD in economics, attempted real and serious economic
reforms. She had become prime minister in spite of
opposition from her godfather, party chief Demirel, who
had moved over to the presidency. So, led by Demirel and
assisted by others, her bold reform measures were
thwarted. So was her attempt to even look at a solution
to the Kurdish problem by the armed forces. The Kurdish
conflict must have cost Turkey over $100 billion since
1984, and is perhaps a major cause of the current
economic malaise. The bureaucracy appointed by other
political parties will be sullen, if not hostile. The
West will wait and watch, but it is doubtful whether it
will really promote a resurgent AKP.
The
Copenhagen summit statement said, "Turkey is a candidate
state destined to join the union." This writer had
argued that full membership will remain a dream and that
at the Copenhagen summit "EU politicians will go through
many contortions and make soothing noises, but visa-free
entry to Turks and freedom to work in EU countries is
out of question, and the AKP might attempt to drive a
hard bargain and consolidate its position".
And
now this writer would wager that whatever a secular
Turkey, but with its 99 percent Muslim population, might
do, accession to Christian fortress EU is unlikely to
happen for a long time. Even when Turkey deserves it.
While wishing success to Turkey, this writer would
happily lose the bet.
K Gajendra
Singh, Indian ambassador (retired), served as
ambassador to Turkey from August 1992 to April 1996.
Prior to that, he served terms as ambassador to Jordan,
Romania and Senegal.
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