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Iraq: Thinking through the
aftermath
By David Isenberg
WASHINGTON - While the world focuses on whether
the United States will invade Iraq, others are assuming
it is a done deal and looking to the aftermath - namely,
what happens in Iraq after Saddam.
To that end,
the US National Defense University's Institute for
National Strategic Studies, in collaboration with the
Naval Postgraduate School, held a workshop titled "Iraq:
Looking Beyond Saddam's Role" on November 20-21. The
workshop, the existence of which was first reported by
the defense trade newsletter Inside the Army on January
6, brought together more than 70 functional and regional
scholars and experts to discuss post-intervention
challenges.
An executive summary of the workshop
was made available by Department of Defense sources. The
findings and recommendations of the three working groups
- military and security; political and humanitarian;
infrastructure and economic stabilization - indicate
that in some respects fighting a war against Iraq may be
the easy part.
For example, even assuming only
light to moderate damage as a result of a war, one of
the assumptions the workshop participants were given (as
noted by the first working group) was: "Given the
potential for internal disorder and conflict, the
primary post-intervention focus of US military
operations must be on establishing and maintaining a
secure environment in which all other post-intervention
activities can operate."
There is a certain
tension between the demands of operating multilaterally
and unilaterally. On the one hand, the working group
found that "a UN Security Council mandate authorizing a
multinational force in Iraq is highly desirable in
building an international presence that enjoys broad
legitimacy and possesses a robust security capability."
At the same time, the working group sees US forces
maintaining a central role: "The United States should
provide initial internal security as part of its Fourth
Geneva Convention obligations as an occupying power.
Over time, the US can work to broaden multinational
contributions, so as to reduce its own military
presence, but a full US hand-off of lead responsibility
is not advisable for as long as international forces
remain in Iraq."
Also, the working group found
that to some degree the new Iraqi military will have to
rely on units other than regular army units, which are
thought to be relatively apolitical and poorly prepared
for war or peace. They noted, "Realistically, building a
new high-quality Iraqi force on the foundations of the
regular army will be difficult. It may ultimately be
feasible to incorporate selected elements of the former
Republican Guard into a reconstituted Iraqi army
depending on the outcome of a careful evaluation of the
personnel involved. (The Special Republican Guard is too
closely identified with the present regime and should
not be considered salvageable.)"
Economic
considerations also weigh against a quick reduction of
Iraqi military forces. As a Department of Defense (DoD)
official said to Asia Times Online, "If you demobilize
the regular military, you put 400,000 people out of
work."
Interestingly, one of the main jobs in
any post-Saddam era will be the same job going on today:
searching for weapons of mass destruction: "Given the
overriding importance of weapons of mass destruction
[WMD], a well-planned and resourced effort must be made
to locate, seize, secure and dispose of WMD munitions,
materials and weapons employment systems and to detain
key Iraqi personnel who might otherwise try to sell or
smuggle these weapons systems to terrorists or
interested third parties," the working group stated.
This may be easier said than done. The DoD
official interviewed for this article said Iraq would
never give up its nuclear, biological or chemical
programs "because they see it as an ace in the hole to
keep Iran from coming across the border".
Also,
in a rather astonishing acknowledgment f what might
happen (albeit one that is buried in page three of the
summary), they note, "The US also should be prepared to
conduct consequence management operations, mobilizing
available Iraqi and international resources for this
task, in the event of WMD release."
The
political stabilization group also seeks a key role for
the United States, regardless of whatever nations play a
role. It recommends that "[a] senior American civilian
should be appointed as civil governor responsible for
administering post-intervention Iraq; the governor
should report directly to the commander of the US forces
until a stable security environment is established; at a
later stage, a non-US civilian (perhaps an Iraqi) should
be appointed, and the international administration could
operate in close coordination with US-led international
forces."
Concerns over Iraq's territorial
integrity are also evident. The political working group
notes flatly, "The US and its partners should make it
clear - both in planning and execution - that there are
no hidden agendas regarding a Kurdish state or control
of Iraqi oil. Specifically, a separate Kurdish state
will not be established." That this is a source of
concern is shown by their statement that the "US and its
partners must head off any independent action to
establish a de facto Kurdish state by immediately
placing US forces in Kirkuk and its surrounding oil
fields".
Doing these and others tasks is going
to be costly; thus, restoration of the Iraqi oil
industry is a priority. In that regard, the political
working group found that "as the oil industry is a key
element in the country's economy and in binding Iraq's
various factions together, the civil transition
authority must be ready to assume control of the oil
industry to assure a continuation of its operations
necessary for funding the humanitarian relief of the
Iraqi people. International monitoring is essential to
give transparency to the oil sector and to prevent any
perception that the US is running the sector for its own
benefit."
But even if people are ready to step
in, increasing oil production will be challenging. The
DoD official said that it "will take years to get Iraqi
oil up to pre-Desert Storm levels. The fields are in
such disrepair that the fields are constantly shut down
and restarted in round robin fashion."
Finally,
humanitarian issues will be a significant challenge. The
final working group noted that "to address the
anticipated needs created by an upsurge of Iraqi
refugees and IDPs [Internally Displaced Persons], the US
should identify military and non-military assets that
would be required to provide necessary relief operations
(including consequence management assets) and coordinate
its plans with those of the NGO community."
Right now the situation is precarious for people
in Iraq, and war would likely make things worse. The DoD
official noted, "Fresh water in southern Iraq has to be
trucked in. Hundreds of 5,000-gallon tankers have to go
in every day."
Military forces are seen as
having a role here, according to the working group: "The
uncertainty of the security environment will require
that the humanitarian relief actors coordinate their
activities with military forces in their sector, via
well-established procedures for civil-military
operations coordination."
None of this will be
easy. The DoD official said, "It's going to be a
significant challenge for American ground forces. It
will require MPs, medical forces, transportation and
logistics assets that you don't have in active forces."
The majority of those assets are in the reserves, which
would imply an extended call-up for those units.
(©2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights
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