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THE KURDISH EQUATION
A blueprint for
Iraqi federalism
By Carole A O'Leary
This article recounts the developing
situation of Iraqi Kurds over the past decade and
discusses what the future of this group might be in a
post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. It explores the option of a
federal system in which a division of powers between the
central government and north would provide a way for
effective regional government while ensuring the state's
unity. A workable, acceptable solution to the Kurdish
problem would be absolutely necessary for the future
stability of Iraq. The article also looks at how the
decade-long experience of Kurdish self-rule in a
democratic framework affects the debate over Iraq's
future. The article concludes with a chronology of
modern Kurdish history.
The Kurds, an
Iranian ethno-linguistic group - like Persians, Lurs,
Baluch and Bakhtiari - inhabit the mostly mountainous
area where the borders of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria
converge. Following World War I and the breakup of the
Ottoman Empire, the Kurds were promised their own
country under the terms of the 1920 Treaty of Sevres,
only to find the offer rescinded under the 1923 Treaty
of Lausanne. Numbering at least 25 million people, Kurds
are mostly divided among Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria.
The main area they inhabit is about 230,000 square
miles, equal to German and Britain combined. The Kurds
are the largest ethnic group in the world without a
state. The term "Kurdistan" is widely used in Iraq to
refer to the Kurdish area of northern Iraq and in Iran
to refer to the Kurdish area of northwest Iran. Turkey
and Syria, however, avoid this term for political
reasons, although under the Ottomans it was widely used.
The area of northern Iraq where Kurds
predominate is a region of about 83,000 square
kilometers. This is roughly the same size as Austria.
Smaller ethno-linguistic communities of
Assyrian-Chaldeans, Turkomans, Arabs and Armenians are
also found in Iraqi Kurdistan. In Iraq there are
approximately 3.7 million Kurds in the predominantly
Kurdish northern safe haven area, and between 1 and 2
million in the rest of Iraq, particularly Baghdad, Mosul
and that part of Iraqi Kurdistan still under the control
of the Baghdad regime.(1)
The majority of Kurds
are Sunni Muslims. There are also Shi'ite and Yezidi
Kurds, as well as Christians who identify themselves as
Kurds. Yezidis are Kurds who follow a religion that
combines indigenous pre-Islamic and Islamic traditions.
The once thriving Jewish Kurdish community in Iraq now
consists of a few families in the Kurdish safe haven.
Since the creation of the modern state of Iraq,
the history of Iraqi Kurdistan has been one of
underdevelopment, political and cultural repression,
destruction, ethnic cleansing and genocide.(2) Al-Anfal
(The Spoils) was the codename given to an aggressive,
planned, military operation against Iraqi Kurds. It was
part of an ongoing, larger campaign against Kurds
because of their struggle to gain autonomy within the
Republic of Iraq. Anfal took place during 1988 under the
direction of Ali Hasan al-Majid, Saddam Hussein's
cousin. He became known as "Chemical Ali" because of his
use of chemical and biological weapons on Kurdish towns
and villages.
The broad purpose of the campaign
was to eliminate resistance by the Kurds by any means
necessary. Its specific aim was to cleanse the region of
"saboteurs" - who included all males between the ages of
15 and 70. Mass executions were carried out in the
targeted villages and surrounding areas. The operation
was carefully planned and included identifying villages
in rebel held areas, declaring these villages and
surrounding areas "prohibited" and authorizing the
killing of any person or animal found in these areas.
Economic blockades were put onto these villages
to cut them off from all support. The army also planned
for the evacuation of them and the inhabitants'
relocation to reservation-like collective towns. People
who refused to leave were often shot. In some cases,
people who agreed to leave were gathered up and
separated, with men from 15 to 70 in one group; women,
children, and elderly men in another. Many of the men
were executed while the others were removed to the
collective towns or to camps in the south of Iraq.
During the Anfal operation, some 1,200 villages
were destroyed. More than 180,000 persons are missing
and presumed dead. While the Iraqi government was
motivated partly by the fact that some Kurdish groups
cooperated with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war,
documentation recovered in the Kurdish safe haven in
1991 reveals that this operation was part of a larger
campaign undertaken by Saddam throughout his time in
power. Many now regard this operation as proof of
genocide against Iraqi Kurds. In all phases of the
ethnic cleansing program, which began when the Ba'ath
Party first seized power in 1963 and culminated in the
Anfal operation, it is estimated that more than 4,000
villages in rural Kurdistan were destroyed and perhaps
300,000 people perished.
The best-known chemical
attack occurred at Halabja in March 1988. This town is
located in the mountains near Sulaimaniya, about 11
kilometers from the Iranian border. Between 40,000 and
50,000 people were living there at the time. The Iranian
army had previously pushed Iraqi forces out of the area.
During three days, the town and surrounding district
were attacked with conventional bombs, artillery fire,
and chemicals - including mustard gas and nerve agents
(Sarin, Tabun, and VX). At least 5,000 people died
immediately as a result of the chemical attack and it is
estimated that up to 12,000 people died during those
three days.
Almost 15 years later, there is
still not much known about the impact of these agents on
the people and environment. Dr Christine Gosden, a
professor of Medical Genetics at the University of
Liverpool, working with the Washington Kurdish Institute
(WKI), helped establish the Halabja Post-Graduate
Medical Institute to understand the impact of weapons of
mass destruction on civilian populations. It offers both
research and medical help for thousands of survivors
living in the area.(3) The Kurds' first-hand experience
with such attacks has prompted their request to the
international community for protection from this type of
weapons in the event of US-led military action against
Iraq.
In April 1991, following the March
uprising of Kurds in the north and Shi'ite Arabs in the
south against the central government, Iraqi Kurdistan
was divided into two parts. Relying on UN Security
Council Resolution 688, military forces from 11
countries, including the United States and Turkey,
implemented Operation Provide Comfort to give security
and humanitarian assistance to refugees in camps along
the Iraq-Turkey border. The so-called Kurdish safe haven
and northern no-fly zone were established in this
context. Under considerable constraint and against
strong external and internal opposition, the Kurdish
safe haven has been successfully governed for a decade
by the Kurds themselves. This part of Iraqi Kurdistan is
roughly 40,000 square kilometers, or about half of Iraqi
Kurdistan.(4) The rest continues to be directly governed
by Baghdad.
In October 1991, the government of
Iraq voluntarily withdrew its civil administration and
the citizens of the Kurdish safe haven were left to
govern themselves. Elections were held in May 1992 and
the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA) and the Kurdistan
Regional Government (KRG) were created. The Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK) entered into an equal power-sharing
arrangement, with five of the 105 KNA seats allocated to
members of the Assyrian-Chaldean Christian community.
Turkomans boycotted the election, although efforts were
made to include representatives from all ethnic and
religious communities.
Participatory processes
were instituted to develop experience with the
requirements, and systems and procedures of democracy.
These elections were deemed to have been free and fair
by international observers.(5) Regional governance has
been based on the March 1970 Autonomy Agreement with
Iraq. Four provinces were established, each headed by a
governor.
The regional government, headed by a
prime minister with a cabinet of ministers, was
established in the regional capital of Erbil. But the
50-50 power-sharing arrangement broke down within two
years. Today, the Kurdish safe haven is governed in two
separate parts, each by one of the two main parties (KDP
and PUK). Efforts have been on-going to find how to
integrate the two administrations.
Despite this
disappointment, there have been some more positive
developments. Free and fair local elections, under
international observation, were conducted in dozens of
municipalities in 2000 and 2001 in the KDP and PUK
areas. For the first time since 1994, the KNA convened
in its entirety in Erbil on October 4, 2002. The
reconvening of the KNA is a clear indication of the
growing cooperation between the KDP and PUK,
particularly in their dealings with the Bush
administration and US Congress, as well as with states
in the region and Europe. In particular, the KDP and PUK
are unified in asserting the Kurdish right to
self-determination in a future democratic Iraq in which
they call for Iraqi Kurdistan entering into a federal
relationship with the central government under a new
constitutional arrangement.
The Kurdish safe
haven is now a decade-old example of what can happen
throughout the rest of Iraq. The liberated part of Iraqi
Kurdistan has become a refuge for all Iraqis seeking
freedom and democracy. Since 1991, thousands of Iraqi
refugees in Iran have returned. And since 1991,
thousands more Iraqis from central or southern Iraq have
sought asylum. Even more striking, some families who
fled Iraq over 20 years ago, and who became citizens of
the US and European countries, elected to return since
1991.
Despite various internal difficulties and
constraints, including the strong opposition of
neighboring countries and both external and internal
embargoes on the region by the Iraqi government, all
basic public services have been provided to the extent
resources have permitted. Freedom of speech and of free
movement is respected. Local NGOs have been established
and the three universities are working with US and
European partners to develop new academic programs,
reform and update curricula, and provide faculty
training opportunities. The region's leadership has
allowed satellite television with over 500 channels to
be available to anyone who can purchase readily
available hardware. Private companies provide uncensored
international phone service. Unlimited and uncensored
Internet access is also available from private,
independent sources. According to Human Rights Watch,
the leadership of the region has made notable progress
in promoting and protecting the basic rights of the
people of liberated Iraqi Kurdistan.(6)
With
assistance from the international community, hundreds of
destroyed communities were reconstructed and tens of
thousands of families were able to return to their
original homes between 1991 and 1997. Despite serious
problems due to inefficiency, intransigence and the
efforts of Baghdad, the oil-for-food (SCR-986) program
that began functioning in 1997 continues to provide the
region with substantial resources from Iraq's public oil
wealth for health care, reconstruction and education.
The KRG directly cooperates with 12 UN agencies in the
region, including nine involved in the management of the
oil-for-food program.
The history of Iraqi
Kurdistan before 1991 is the history of destruction and
displacement. More than 4,000 communities were destroyed
including towns of more than 50,000 Iraqi citizens.
Hundreds of thousands of citizens were detained and
killed. Tens of thousands were forced to live in
Baghdad-controlled "collective towns". Many were injured
in years of warfare. Despite their achievements in
democratization and civil society building since 1991,
the citizens of Iraqi Kurdistan continue to be
threatened by Baghdad and the neighboring states in a
manner that jeopardizes their hard-won freedom and
tenuous well-being. The future of Iraqi Kurdistan
remains most uncertain.
Post-Saddam Iraq and
federal arrangements
One extremely important
consequence of the Kurdish safe haven’s existence is
that some 3.7 million Iraqis - a considerable portion of
the country’s population - have actual experience with
self-rule, civil rights, and a transition to
democracy.(7) How would this situation interact with the
rest of the Iraq if it were to be freed from the current
regime?
Certainly, those in the safe haven are
greatly concerned about the effects of war and regime
change in Iraq, in terms of the threat posed by the war,
a possibly unstable aftermath, and their future status
in a new Iraq. There is strong support in the US
government, Iraqi opposition movement - ranging from the
Iraq National Congress (INC) through the Supreme Council
for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and Kurdish
groups - for a federalist structure in the country.(8)
Iraqis in exile and those lucky enough to live
inside the Kurdish safe haven are currently debating the
framework for a federal state. Some advocate a federal
system consisting of two political units: the Arab
region and Kurdistan. Others have suggested dividing
Iraq into three federal units: Kurdistan, a Sunni Arab
center and a Shi'ite Arab south. An arrangement of five
federal units (Kurdistan, Baghdad, Jazirah, Kufa and
Basra) has also been suggested.(9) Iraq’s Kurds would
support the division of Iraq into any number of federal
units, under a federal system, as long as Iraqi
Kurdistan itself constitutes one of those federal units.
At a recent conference hosted by the University
of Southern Denmark, Brendan O'Leary outlined an
interesting alternative to the adoption of a federal
political system for all of Iraq.(10) In his view, Iraqi
Kurdistan could enter into an institutionalized federal
arrangement with the central government wherein the rest
of Iraq is not federally organized. He refers to this
arrangement as federacy. In theory, this model could
accommodate the Arab majority in Iraq if system-wide
federalism is voted down in a referendum. It is
possible, indeed likely, that the Kurds would have no
objection to the creation of a democratic Iraq that is
not federally organized, as long as Iraqi Kurdistan
itself achieves self-rule in a constitutionally mandated
federal arrangement with the center.
There is,
however, a subtle but important distinction in how the
federalist concept might be applied. The Kurds have
tended to favor an explicitly Kurdish self-governing
portion of Iraq. Another option would be a northern
self-governing section (or several such divisions) which
are organized on a regional but not ethnic basis. Most
Kurds seem to favor the former approach, while most
American officials favor the latter approach as a way to
reduce ethnic tension in a post-Saddam Iraq. Further,
Kurds explicitly have opposed the division of historic
Iraqi Kurdistan into multiple federal units, an idea
which has currency among some American analysts.(11)
Under what might be called a "Kurdistani" rather
than "Kurdish" political solution, a Kurdish majority
would still control a geographically defined northern
state within an Iraqi federalist system. Still, that
type of structure would reduce Turkish objections while
also preserving the rights of non-Kurdish minorities,
especially Turkomans, in the area, who would be less
enthusiastic about a Kurdish ethnic entity. But would
the Kurds find such a plan acceptable? The issue is not
just whether the Kurds will exercise a right to
self-determination but how they will choose to do so. My
field work in the area (see below) shows some important
trends relative to this issue.
Federalism refers
to a system of government in which power is divided
between a central authority and constituent political
units which have a fair degree of local power, including
the ability to raise taxes and a militia, for example.
In some multi-cultural states like Switzerland, the
constituent political units are defined not only
geographically but also culturally on the basis of
language, ethnicity, religion or tribe. Federalism as an
organizing structure for governance can promote
stability in multi-ethnic or multi-religious states
through the establishment of political units whose
relationship to the center is defined in a constitution
that provides written principles concerning structures
and rules for governance and appropriation of federal
funds.
As in the United States, federalism in a
future Iraq can provide a system of checks and balances
to moderate the power of any future central government,
inhibiting the ability of an autocratic
leadership–secularist or Islamist–to seize control of
the center. And, as in Switzerland, federalism can
guarantee the political and cultural rights of Iraq’s
ethno-linguistic and religious communities.
The
creation of a constitutionally mandated federal
relationship between Iraqi Kurdistan and a post-Saddam
Hussein central government is the only solution that
will address the legitimate right to self-determination
of Iraq's Kurdish community in the context of a unified
Iraqi state. Absent a just and lasting resolution to the
Kurdish question in Iraq, it will prove impossible to
achieve stability in a post-Saddam Hussein state.(12)
Equally, an unstable post-Saddam Hussein Iraq would be
unlikely to pursue democratization – a stated goal of
the Bush administration.
In theory, the
establishment of a federal system of governance that
includes power-sharing at the center and self-governance
for Iraqi Kurdistan is a model that will work well in
Iraq. In practice, the challenge is to achieve internal,
regional and international support for the
self-determination of Iraq's Kurdish community in a
federal and democratic Iraq.
The role of
Turkey
A key concern for the Kurds, as well as
the Bush administration, is Turkey's evolving position
on federalism and the Kurdish question in Iraq.(13)
Turkey has consistently opposed the creation of an
independent Kurdish state in Iraq Kurdistan. However,
Turkey has also raised concerns about the establishment
of a federal arrangement between Iraqi Kurdistan and a
post-Saddam central government. Turkey's primary concern
is that Mosul and the oil-rich city of Kirkuk are not
ceded to a new Kurdistan federal unit.
In the
period since the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional
Government, the disposition of the Iraqi Turkoman
community has also been of concern to Turkey. In this
regard, Turkey and its proxy inside the Kurdish safe
haven – the Iraqi Turkoman Front - have called for the
establishment of a Turkoman federal unit to include the
cities of Mosul and Kirkuk if a permanent Kurdistan
federal region is created. Turkish leaders have declared
that the future establishment of a Kurdistan federal
region to include Kirkuk is a casus belli. In
fact, the Turks appear to have positioned themselves to
intervene militarily in Iraqi Kurdistan in the event of
a regime change.(14)
Estimates of the number
Turkoman in Iraq are unreliable and politicized. They
range between 350,000 to well over one million.
Similarly, the exact number of Kurds and Turkoman living
in Kirkuk today is unknown.(15) Historically, the city
was predominately Kurdish, but successive Iraqi
governments have pursued a policy of ethnic cleansing in
Kirkuk, directed first against the Kurds and later
against the Turkoman as well.(16)
The proposed
constitution for a Kurdistan political unit in a federal
Iraq, drafted by the KDP and PUK and currently under
review by the recently reunified Kurdistan National
Assembly does call for the inclusion of Kirkuk in a
future Kurdistan federal political unit. However, the
draft constitution is clear in ceding control of
Kirkuk's oil to the new central government and in
recognizing the fact that Kirkuk is a multi-ethnic city
inhabited by Kurds, Arabs, Turkomans and Assyrians. The
draft constitution calls for regularly scheduled mayoral
elections in which members of all ethnic and religious
communities can field eligible candidates.(17)
Iraq's Kurds are concerned that Turkey’s
strategic relationship with the US will negatively
influence US support for the kind of federal arrangement
they want to see. The Kurds have repeatedly and publicly
assured the US and Turkey that they do not seek
independence but prefer a unified, federal and
democratic Iraq within which Kurdistan represents one of
the federal political units. They have repeatedly
indicated that they will work with a representative
transitional government to create a constitution for a
federal Iraq that addresses the needs of all the
communities in Iraq.
Whether Kirkuk is
incorporated into a Kurdistan federal region in a future
Iraq and whether a separate federal region for the
Turkomans will be established cannot be unilaterally
determined by Turkey. Clearly, these are issues for the
Iraqi people to decide. Iraqi Kurds who have been
expelled from Kirkuk and its environs will surely return
after the liberation of Iraq. If the majority of
Kirkukis were to vote in favor of annexing Kirkuk to the
Kurdistan federal political unit in a future referendum
in a democratic Iraq, this would be a powerful argument
for doing so.
In thinking about a federal
solution for Iraq, it is important to note that Turkey
is supporting a UN plan to create a Swiss-style federal
government in Cyprus in which the Republic of Cyprus
would be replaced by two component states – one Turkish
and one Greek – each with its own constitution, in
addition to a common state with a presidential council
and a two-chamber legislature. Even the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka seem to have reached
the conclusion that a federal arrangement with the
government of Sri Lanka will address their demands for
self-determination through "substantial regional
autonomy".(18)
A key question for American and
European policy makers – as well as for Iraqis and
Turkey – is whether federalism is the only viable
solution to Iraq's still unresolved Kurdish question
that will ensure the territorial integrity of the state.
A second question is how the federalism will be
structured. And a third is whether federalism, as an
organizing structure for governance in pluralistic
societies, can best ensure stability in Iraq after
regime change - a necessary condition for the
development of democracy, human rights and an active
civil society.
Identity formation in Iraqi
Kurdistan since 1991
When I returned from a visit
to the region in June 2001, I wrote that an unintended
but welcome consequence of the establishment of the
Kurdish safe haven in 1991 was an ongoing experiment in
democracy.(19) Based on subsequent fieldwork conducted
in July 2002, I would further suggest that a second
unintended but welcome consequence of the establishment
of the safe haven is an experiment in pluralism that is
encouraging the emergence of a communal identity shared
by Kurds, Assyrian-Chaldeans and Turkomans.
I
have termed this emerging form of collective identity
"Kurdistani-ness" for lack of a better word. My
interviews with Assyrian-Chaldean and Turkoman
intellectuals, political and religious leaders, and
cultural activists suggest that the decade long
experiment in self rule has been a golden age not only
for the Kurds but for these smaller communities as well.
In trying to contextualize the frequent use of the term
"Kurdistani" by my Kurdish, Assyrian-Chaldean and
Turkoman informants, I was reminded of how Americans use
the descriptors "New England" and "New Englanders" to
define not only geographic but also cultural and
historic aspects of this localized American identity.
My discussions with more than 100 Kurds,
Assyrian-Chaldeans and Turkomans suggest that this new
sense of Kurdistani identity is taking root precisely
because it accommodates pluralism or cultural diversity
by not threatening deeply rooted ethno-linguistic
identities. The Kurdish Democratic Party - established
in 1946 and renamed the Kurdistan Democratic Party in
1953 - supported a broad-based political platform for
all Kurdistanis regardless of ethnic identity. The
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Party has advocated the
same view since its creation in 1975.
However;
it is only in the post-1991 period that the people of
Iraqi Kurdistan have experienced self rule and
democratization. This emerging Kurdistani identity
allows Kurds, Assyro-Chaldeans and Turkoman to maintain
their respective ethno-linguistic identities and, at the
same time, to establish a wider sense of collective
identity based on three key factors:
Common geography;
The ongoing experiment in self rule,
democratization and cultural tolerance;
Their shared experience as non-Arab
Iraqis who have all known repression and marginalization
within the modern state of Iraq.(20)
Suham Wali,
one of the many Turkomans I interviewed, is an educator
and cultural activist, as well as director-general of
Turkoman Studies in the Ministry of Education in Erbil.
She argues that the establishment of the Kurdistan
Regional Government in 1992 was a milestone. For the
first time in Iraq's modern history, the cultural and
political rights of all communities were truly
guaranteed. According to Wali, while the Kurdish
majority may have first sought to address the rights of
their own community, the new political structure under
the KRG has benefited all communities. She describes
political life in safe haven since 1991 as "a work in
progress in which all communities, not just the Kurdish
majority, participate". Based on my interviews with
Turkomans and Assyrian-Chaldeans, I would suggest that
it is this growing confidence in the Kurdistan Regional
Government’s protection of the political and cultural
rights of all communities – not just the Kurdish
majority – that has caused these two communities to
embrace a shared Kurdistani cultural identity, in
addition to their respective ethno-linguistic
identities.(21)
Moreover, I would suggest that
this shared sense of Kurdistani-ness relates to a
developing sense of communal solidarity as these
communities ponder their fate in a post-Saddam Iraq. For
these reasons, I would argue that the growing sense of
Kurdistani-ness among Kurds, Assyrian-Chaldeans and
Turkomans in the Kurdish safe haven has implications for
the debate on federalism as the best model for
governance in a post-Saddam Iraq.
It is well
know that the Kurds support a concept of federalism in
which all of Iraqi Kurdistan forms one of the new
federal political units. What is less well understood is
level of support for this position among
Assyrian-Chaldeans and Turkoman in the northern safe
haven. Future research can focus on how this emerging
sense of Kurdistani identity will affect support for
federalism within the Assyrian-Chaldean and Turkoman
communities in the safe haven.
Conclusions
As political realists,
Iraq's Kurds do not seek separation from Iraq. Their
goal is to share in the establishment of a viable
regional government for Iraqi Kurdistan in a unified
Iraq under a federal system, with a governing document
that provides written principles concerning structures
and rules for governance and appropriation of federal
funds. Federal systems flourish around the globe and the
establishment of such a structure in Iraq should not be
viewed as a threat by Turkey, Iran or the Arab states of
the region. On the contrary, federalism can help to
ensure the unity and stability of a post-Saddam Hussein
Iraq, thereby providing a climate for democratization
and civil society building. Such an outcome is clearly
in the interest of the United States and its European
allies, as well as in the interest of Turkey and the
Iraqi people.
Given the fact that the Iraqi
regime has pursued a genocidal campaign of ethnic
cleansing against its Kurdish community, it is
imperative that any future structure of governance
institutionalize protections and guarantees for all of
Iraq's communities, but most notably for the Kurds who
have been so brutally victimized on the basis of
cultural identity. A unified, democratic and federally
organized Iraq would not only address the legitimate
right to self-determination of the Kurdish community but
also guarantee the rights of all communities within
Iraq.
Chronology
The following is a
selected chronology of some of the significant events
that had an impact on Iraq’s Kurds in the past century.
1918: President Woodrow Wilson's
Fourteen Points: Woodrow Wilson was committed to the
ideal of self-determination for all peoples. The Twelfth
Point stated that non-Turkish nationalities living under
Ottoman control "should be assured an undoubted security
of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of
autonomous development".
1920: The
Treaty of Sevres: At the end of World War I, the Allied
powers met to determine the political future of lands
and peoples in the defeated Ottoman Empire. The treaty
provided for independence from Turkey in those parts of
Anatolia where Kurds were in the majority and set forth
a political mechanism for the establishment of a Kurdish
state that was to have encompassed the vilayet of Mosul.
The Treaty of Sevres was signed but never ratified.
1923: The Treaty of Lausanne: This
superseded the Treaty of Sevres. The Kurds were not
given autonomy and the areas where they lived were
distributed between Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria and the
Soviet Union. The greatest number of Kurds found
themselves either under the control of the Turkish state
or under British rule in the newly created state of
Iraq. A League of Nations delegation to Mosul in 1923 to
determine the wishes of the Kurds there reported they
wanted an independent state.
1924:
British view: The British High Commission issued
a statement on December 24, 1924 "recognizing the right
of the Kurds living within the frontiers of Iraq to
establish a Kurdish government inside these frontiers".
1932: Iraqi independence: In 1932,
Iraq was granted full independence by the British and
the Kurdish problem was left unresolved.
1946: Republic of Mahabad: In
Iran, Kurds established the short-lived Republic of
Mahabad, which survived from January 1946 until December
1946.
1946: Creation of the
Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq: This party changed its
name to the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq in 1953
to emphasize the inclusion of the non-Kurdish
communities of Iraqi Kurdistan.
1958: Iraq under Abd al Karim
Qasim: After the monarchy was overthrown, Qasim
encouraged the participation of Kurds in the new
government until his power was consolidated. In 1959,
the new government began to clamp down on all dissident
groups including the Kurds. In 1961, a Kurdish rebellion
broke out which continued intermittently for the next 14
years.
1963: Phase I of the ethnic
cleansing and Arabization campaign: The ethnic cleansing
and Arabization campaign began when the Ba'ath party
first came to power in 1963 and lasted until the
temporary removal of the Ba'ath leadership in February
1964. During this time, the Iraqi regime began
destroying most of the Shorgha, Azadi and Akhur Hussein
neighborhoods inside the city of Kirkuk. Hundreds of
houses were flattened using bulldozers. The inhabitants
of some 40 villages in the Kirkuk governorate were
forcibly evicted and Arabs from the south and center of
Iraq resettled there.
1970:
Autonomy Agreement between Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP) and the Government of Iraq: On March 11, 1970, an
autonomy agreement was worked out between the KDP and
the central government which acknowledged the existence
of Kurds and granted certain rights, but included only
three of five Kurdish provinces. It excluded provinces
like Kirkuk which contain oil.
1974:
Kurdish revolt against the Iraqi government: By
1974, relations between the Kurds and the central
government had deteriorated to the point of armed
rebellion. During this period, Iran and Iraq were
involved in extensive border disputes. The United States
was backing Iran and Iran was backing the Iraqi Kurds in
their struggle in order to put pressure on Iraq. In
1975, the border disputes were settled under the Algiers
Accord and the United States and Iran withdrew their
support of the Iraqi Kurds. As a result, the rebellion
collapsed. Hundreds of thousands of Kurds fled the
country to refugee camps, mainly in Iran. Many who could
not escape were murdered.
1974:
Phase II of the ethnic cleansing and Arabization
campaign: After the collapse of negotiations between the
Kurds and the Iraqi regime in 1974, the Ba'ath
government implemented the ethnic cleansing and
Arabization policy begun in 1963 to reduce the
predominantly Kurdish population in areas deemed of
strategic economic or political importance to Iraq. In
particular, the areas surrounding Kirkuk where large oil
fields are located and those within a 20 kilometer strip
near the Iran-Turkey border were targeted. Kurds were
forcibly deported, murdered, removed to refugee camps,
or resettled in collective towns. Kurdish language
instruction was terminated in schools. Villages and
wells in border areas were destroyed. This area became a
kind of no-man-land and anyone found entering this 20
kilometer strip was imprisoned and executed. Many Faily
(Shi'ite) Kurds living in Baghdad were deported to Iran
as well.
1975: Creation of the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK): It was established
in June 1975 in Damascus, Syria, after the collapse of
the Kurdish rebellion that same year.
1980: The Iran-Iraq War: While
many Kurds fought against the Iranians during this war,
others continued the rebellion against the central
government, often with Iranian support. This diverted
Iraqi troops from the battlefront to the Kurdish areas.
By 1987, the Kurds, with the support of Iran, controlled
most of Iraqi Kurdistan. Saddam appointed his cousin Ali
Hassan al-Majid in charge of northern Iraq with full
authority and powers to eliminate the Kurdish rebellion.
Chemical attacks, further destruction of villages,
pollution of water supplies, detentions, and mass
murders were some of the methods used to put down the
rebellion.
1984 Phase III of the
Arabization campaign: After another failed attempt at
negotiation in 1984, the regime began systematic
destruction of villages, homes, churches and mosques in
the Kurdish areas. Its operation reached a final stage
in the Anfal campaign of 1988. Some 1,200 villages were
destroyed during this one year alone. It is estimated
that 182,000 people died as a result of the Anfal
campaign. The number of persons unaccounted for or
killed during the three phases of the ethnic cleansing
and Arabization campaign is estimated at 300,000. The
total number of villages destroyed during all phases is
estimated to be more than 4000.
1988: In March 1988, Iraq attacked
the town of Halabja over three days using a mix of
chemicals that resulted in the deaths of around 5,000
civilians immediately and many more over the next few
years.
1990: Under UN SCR-661
passed in August 1990, sanctions were imposed on Iraq
with the intention of forcing Iraq to withdraw from
Kuwait.
1991: The Gulf War: Kurds
were encouraged by the United States to rise up against
the government and overthrow Saddam Hussein. The
uprising began in March 1991. But coalition forces did
not help the Kurds. At first, the Kurds were successful
in driving out the Iraqi army from their territory but
the Iraqi army regrouped and crushed the rebellion. In
the north, almost two million people fled Saddam's
forces, seeking refuge in Iran and Turkey. International
outrage forced the coalition and the UN to take action.
The Kurdistan National Front was formed to organize an
administration of public services for the area.
1992: In May 1992, elections were
held in the newly established Kurdish safe haven with
international observers in attendance. The Kurdistan
Regional Government (KRG) was formed and 105 Members of
the Kurdistan National Assembly (the parliament) were
elected.
1994: KDP-PUK split: The
50-50 government split between these two parties fell
apart and fighting broke out between them
1996: The KDP gained control of
Erbil and the PUK withdrew to Sulaimaniyah. The two have
maintained separate administrations from that point on.
1998: KDP and PUK representatives
met in Washington in the fall of 1998. Although both
parties accepted the accord, it has not been fully
implemented. Discussions and negotiations however are
ongoing and currently there has been significant
movement towards the resolution of issues.
2002: Reconvening of the Kurdistan
National Assembly: For the first time since 1994, the
full Kurdistan National Assembly convened in Erbil on
October 4, 2002.
Notes
(1) See Martin
Van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State: the Social and
Political Structures of Kurdistan (London, 1992) and
David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, (London,
2000) for comprehensive studies of the Kurds in English,
including extensive bibliographies. According to World
Food Program (WFO) food registration figures, the
population of KRG-administered Iraqi Kurdistan is
approximately 3.7million today. Based on the 1957 census
(the last reliable census) and Kurdish estimates of the
number of Kurds who were forced to leave Kirkuk and
other areas due to the regime’s policy of ethnic
cleansing, there are well over one million Kurds in
regime-controlled Iraq today, including Baghdad, Mosul
and part of Iraqi Kurdistan. Therefore, it is reasonable
to assume that there are between 5 and 6 million Kurds
in Iraq.
(2) See the Washington Kurdish
Institute for links to human
rights organizations that have documented the ethnic
cleansing and Arabization campaign against the Kurds of
Iraq, as well as the Anfal campaign and use of chemical
and biological weapons on Kurdish towns and villages,
including Halabja. See also Chapter 17, The Road to
Genocide, including footnotes and references, in
McDowall. See Kenan Makiya, The Republic of Fear: The
Politics of Modern Iraq (Berkeley, CA, 1989) and
Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising and the
Arab World (New York, 1993). For a comprehensive
analysis of the documents turned over by the Kurds to
the US in 1991 see Robert G Rabil, "Operation
"Termination of Traitors'." The Iraqi Regime Through its
Documents," MERIA Journal, Volume 6, Number 3, September
2002. See also the Harvard University
Iraqi Research and Documentation Project (IRDP) website.
(3) See the Washington
Kurdish Institute website under "Programs".
(4)
According to the Food and Agricultural Organization
(FAO), the area of Iraqi Kurdistan under KRG
administration amounts to 9 percent of the total land
area of Iraq, which is 437,400 square kilometers. This
makes KRG-administered Iraqi Kurdistan approximately
40,000 square kilometers which is roughly the same area
as Switzerland (39,800). To compare with states in the
United States, KRG-administered Iraqi Kurdistan is
double the area of the State of Massachusetts (20,300
square kilometers).
(5) Contact the Kurdistan
Regional Government for a copy
of the report on the 1992 elections. Observers included
members of the Danish and Norwegian Refugee Councils.
(6) See the Human Right
Watch/Middle East website under
the section "Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan".
(7) See
the KRG/KDP and KRG/PUK websites for
articles on the democratic experiment in Iraqi Kurdistan
since 1991. See also Carole O"Leary, "A No-Fly, Yes
Democracy Zone: Iraqi Kurdistan Offers a Model for a
Post-Saddam Future," (Washington Post, Sunday, July 15,
2001) and Robin Wright, "Kurdish Enclave May Lead Way
for New Iraq," Los Angeles Times, December 1, 2002.
(8) The parties that formed the Iraqi National
Congress (including the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Iraqi National Accord, and
the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq)
publicly announced their support for federalism and the
legitimate right of Iraq’s Kurds to self-determination
in Salahadin in 1992, in the final statement of the
meetings of the Iraqi Congress National Assembly. The
Iraqi National Congress reiterated its support in New
York in 1999. Noted independent Iraqi intellectuals,
including Kanan Makiya, Ghassan Attiyah, Munther Al
Fadhal and Rend Rahim Francke, have also voiced their
support for Kurdish self-determination and federalism.
(9) For example, the US State Department has
organized a "Democratic Principles Working Group" which
brings Iraqis together to flesh out a road map for
democracy and federalism as part of its Future of Iraq
project. For a regional perspective on the project see
Mustapha Karkouti, "Post-Saddam Roadmap Envisions
Federal State," Gulf News, December 5, 2002.
(10) "Iraqi Kurdistan: Ten years of self-rule
and future prospects," an international conference
hosted by the University of Southern Denmark, Odense,
Demark, November 30 - December 1, 2002. Brendan O'Leary
presented the keynote speech entitled "Right-sizing and
right-peopling the state: Regulating national and ethnic
differences." O'Leary holds the Stanley I Sheerr Endowed
Term Chair in the Social Sciences and is director of the
Solomon Asch Center for the Study of Ethno-political
conflict, both at the University of Pennsylvania.
(11) See Michael Rubin's article on "Federalism
and the Future of Iraq" in How to Build a New
Iraq, edited by Patrick Clawson (Washington, DC: The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2002).
(12) Stability is this context refers to the
establishment of a peaceful social and political
environment wherein democratization and civil society
building can take root. Stability as defined here
rejects the notion that support for autocratic regimes
in the Middle East promotes stability and is, therefore,
in the US strategic interest
(13) See the
interview with US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Paul Wolfowitz entitled "Wolfowitz Interviewed: Nobody
Should Have Their Eyes on Kirkuk," in Hurriyet, December
5, 2002, by Sedat Ergin. See also my written testimony
for the Congressional Human Rights Caucus briefing on "The Human Rights Situation in
Northern Iraq: The Kurdish Minority and its Future,"
November 20, 2002, for a discussion of Kurdish concerns
about US plans for a military intervention, including
role of Turkish forces in northern Iraq, and Barbara
Slavin, "Kurds Push US for a Promise of Protection," USA
Today, October 22, 2002.
(14) See the report by
David Nissman entitled "Turkey to Set Up "Security Belt"
in Northern Iraq if US Attacks," in the Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty Iraq Report, Vol 5 No 34, October
18, 2002. In the report, Turkey’s Defense Minister,
Sabahattin Cakmakoglu is quoted as stating: "The Turkish
armed forces are a deterrent force both with respect to
its size and its weapons ... [And] if this deterrent
force impedes the situation we do not want in Iraq, it
will have completed its objective." Turkish tanks are
positioned in areas inside the Kurdish safe haven,
including Bamarni. During my July '02 visit to the
Kurdish safe haven, I noted that the Turks had carved
the Turkish flag (Crescent and Star) into the
mountainside below where their tanks are stationed in
the Berwari Bala area, between Kani Masi and Zakho. The
number of Turkish troops currently in the Kurdish safe
haven is perhaps 5,000.
(15) The last reliable
census in Iraq took place in 1957. It indicated that
Kurds constituted the majority community in Kirkuk (48
percent). The number of Kurds and Turkoman in Iraq as a
whole and in Kirkuk in particular will be determined by
a new census in a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq.
(16)
See Robin Wright, "Arabization Forces Iraqi Kurds to
Flee From Homes," Los Angeles Times, December 3, 2002,
for a description of Saddam’s ongoing ethnic cleansing
campaign against the Kurds.
(17) The original
draft constitution for the establishment of Iraqi
Kurdistan as a federal political unit in a post-Saddam
federal Iraq can be accessed on the KDP/KRG website. Note
that the draft document is currently being debated in
the Kurdistan National Assembly and will surely be
amended to reflect the positions of the PUK and other
political parties represented in the regional assembly.
(18) Michele Kambas, "Cyprus Peace Plan Gets
Major Boost from Turkey," Reuters (Nov 12, 2002), and
Amy Waldman, "Sri Lanka to Explore a New Government,"
New York Times (December 6, 2002).
(19) See note
7.
(20) See Chapter 6 in Makiya's Republic of
Fear for a discussion of the treatment of Iraq's
non-Arab and Shi'ite communities since the Mandate
period, as well as an analysis of the construction of an
Arab (Sunni) nationalist ideology, under the Baa'th.
(21) Turkomans affiliated with the
Turkish-backed Iraqi Turkoman Front reject this shared
Kurdistani identity.
Professor Carole A
O'Leary is the Scholar-in-Residence for the Middle
East Initiative at the American University Center for
Global Peace. Professor O'Leary established a Future of
Iraq Working Group at the Center in early 2001 to
examine the premise that federalism is the best
organizing framework for governance in a future Iraq.
Since 1994, she has been an adjunct professor in the
School of International Service, cross-appointed to the
Divisions of International Peace and Conflict Resolution
and Comparative and Regional Studies. With Charles
MacDonald, she is the co-editor a volume entitled
The Kurdish Identity in an Unsettled World that
will be published in 2003.
This
article is reprinted from Middle East Review of
International Affairs (MERIA) Journal [vol 6, no 2,
2002]. Copyright MERIA. For a free subscription, e-mail
MERIA at gloria@idc.ac.il. Or visit all MERIA publications. To
see the work of MERIA's publisher, visit the Global Research in
International Affairs (GLORIA)
Center.
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