| |
Rumblings in Riyadh
By Ian Urbina
In March, the
22 Arab League states will head to Cairo for the Arab
summit. There will surely be much heated discussion over
how to respond to the impending - or by that time
possibly already begun - war with Iraq. But another item
on the agenda will be the recently released, and rather
surprising "Charter for Reform of the Arab Condition"
drafted by the Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz, the
de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia.
Though
thoroughly vague, the charter calls for Arab leaders to
"end the regional silence that has gone on for too long"
about the "explosive situation in this area" evidently a
reference to the social, economic and political
stagnation which has fueled discontent and contributed
to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. But most shocking
is the call for "internal reform and enhanced political
participation" which it describes as "essential steps
for building Arab capabilities".
Had such a
document been released by any other regional power it
would hardly have made press. But for the royalty of a
country which is so thoroughly conservative, religious,
hierarchical and static, any mention of "internal reform
and enhanced political participation" is noteworthy.
Many are wondering whether these could be the early
signs of glasnost in Riyadh?
The charter was by
no means the first unusual move. A little over a week
ago, the Saudi government shocked many by opening its
doors, or some of them at least, to an American human
rights organization, the first time ever in the Islamic
kingdom. A five-person delegation from the New
York-based Human Rights Watch was invited on a six-day
visit to the country. On the trip, they toured the
capital city's major men's prison, met with top
officials such as Interior Minister Prince Nayef and
Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, and even had a
consultation with the much-feared mutawa
religious police.
And lately there have been
other oddities of note.
In mid January, many
Saudi-watchers were left stunned when the Shura Council
in Riyadh - an advisory body that gives advice to the
government - rejected a draft of legislation which would
have imposed an income tax on foreigners working in the
kingdom. The specifics of the legislation are not half
as important as the fact that the council acted outside
its typically rubber-stamping capacity. The legislation
is currently being revised by a somewhat befuddled
Ministry of Finance.
Several weeks ago Crown
Prince Abdullah took a highly public tour through one of
the poorest districts of the capital. The visit was
hailed as an unprecedented admission that the country
suffers from poverty. Some interpreted the visit as a
small step toward the state actually confronting a
situation it has long chosen to ignore.
The
reason for the seemingly reformist moves is not easy to
explain, and in the end amounts to pure speculation
since so much about Saudi politics is opaque. But one
clear factor is a Saudi desire to stay out in front of
its neighbors when it comes to determining the political
direction of the region. From Riyadh, it may seem like
parliament fever is in the air. Kuwait’s was long alone,
but now Bahrain has ushered in a parliament and Qatar is
writing a constitution that will lead to a parliament.
Gone are the days when Saudis used to criticize the
Kuwaiti royal family for being the only Gulf nation with
such an odd institution.
Nor is the Saudi
reformist platform the only recent attempt to ensure
that Riyadh keeps its status as the predominant
diplomatic heavyweight in the Gulf. Last year’s major
Saudi initiative to negotiate a solution between Israel
and the Palestinians, and more recently the Saudi
shuttle-butting over an exile plan for Saddam all can be
read in this same light.
Internally, economics
and demographics have conspired to put added pressure on
Riyadh in the direction of reform. The Islamic kingdom
is facing a barrage of unprecedented problems, as its
population has doubled in 20 years to 23 million, even
though income from oil has remained flat, with no
prospects for sustained growth. In terms of material
infrastructure, per capita investment has been halved in
the past decade, leading to a bottoming out of basic
social services. Unemployment among the young has risen
sharply. The royal family may recognize that as these
popular frustrations grow, they will need to be
channeled through more accommodating political
mechanisms.
Education has also been a lightning
rod of controversy lately. Many Saudis worry that the
nation’s religious-based schooling inadequately prepares
the young for careers in a globalized and
technologically advanced world. America has also
attacked the Saudi school system, accusing it of
indoctrinating pupils with Islamic fundamentalism. The
fire in a girl’s school last year which led to numerous
deaths was a partial impetus for the critical look at
the conservative nature of the education system.
According to Saudi press accounts religious police would
not allow the girls out of their burning building
because the girls were in their night clothes.
Of course, there are also the factors of the
World Trade Center attacks and more recently the US
plans to invade Iraq. The fact that the bulk of the
September 11 highjackers were Saudis deeply shocked and
dismayed the royal family. Subsequently, the spate of
press skewering left many in the Saudi government
reeling. Reformism may be a consequence of this negative
attention. A major war on its borders could also open up
unpredictable forces for the Saudis. A destabilized
Iraq, a splintered and civil war Iraq, a US-occupied
post Saddam Iraq, a democratizing Iraq, all represent
worrisome possibilities for the Saudi leadership.
Appropriating the rhetoric now, if not also actually
carrying through on it with real actions, may be a
preemptive tactic by the Saudi royalty so that this
rhetoric is not eventually turned against Riyadh at a
vulnerable moment down the road.
But the push
for reform is far from monolithic. There are those
rather brave voices within the country who have been
pushing, largely from the bottom up, for political
change. Many of them find Prince Abdullah’s recent
charter far from convincing as it puts too much emphasis
on suggesting reforms for other area governments rather
than making any real commitments at home. In late
January, a group of these reformists - most of them
professors and prominent intellectuals - drafted a
petition calling for gradual democracy and eventual
elections in the absolute monarchy. The reformers'
document also asks for the reform of the judiciary, more
freedom for the press and more rights for women.
Ultimately, though, onlookers are left reading
tea leaves to figure out what, if anything, recent Saudi
moves mean in terms of real change. There is the
distinct possibility that the recent talk is little more
than hollow rhetoric. In crunch times before, the Saudi
rulers have been shrewd in their ability to deflect
certain pressures. For example, leading up to the 1991
Gulf War some Saudi leaders, including the King, spoke
freely of installing a military draft. Their tough talk
came at a moment when the royal family was under
significant pressure for being overly dependent on the
US military. But when the war ended, all such promises
were immediately dropped, and hardly a word of it has
been mentioned since.
Will Prince Abdullah’s
charter amount to anything? Only time will tell. But in
the meanwhile one wry critic recently quoted in the
Economist probably got it right, "So long as the
government gets its money from god, it remains
impossible to demand accountability."
Ian
Urbina is an editor at the Middle East Report and
is based at the Middle East Research and Information
Project (MERIP), a foreign policy think tank.
(©2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights
reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com
for information on our sales and syndication policies,
or to submit a letter to the editor.)
|
| |
|
|
 |
|
